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ARTICLES
RETHINKING ARTICLE I, SECTION 1: FROM
NONDELEGATION TO EXCLUSIVE DELEGATION
Thomas W Merrill*
The first substantive clause of the Constitution-providing that "[aill
legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress"--is associ-
ated with two postulates about the allocation of legislative power. The first is
the nondelegation doctrine, which says that Congress may not delegate legis-
lative power. The second is the exclusive delegation doctrine, which says that
only Congress may delegate legislative power. This Article explores the tex-
tual, historical, and judicial support for these two readings of Article I, Sec-
tion 1, as well as the practical consequences of starting from one postulate as
opposed to the other. The Article concludes that exclusive delegation is supe-
rior to the nondelegation doctrine, either in its present unenforced version, or
if it were enforced more strictly. The nondelegation doctrine demands that
Congress constrain the discretion of agencies by resolving, at some level, spe-
cific policy disputes. The exclusive delegation doctrine requires that Congress
consider who is to resolve policy disputes and over what domain of controver-
sies. Given the realities of modern government, Congress is better suited to
answer questions about which institution should make policy than it is to
make policy itself The exclusive delegation doctrine would reorient under-
standing of the allocation of legislative power in a way that provides a better
fit with institutional realities, and yet would also preserve an important mea-
sure of exclusive power to Congress as the first branch of our national
government.
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INTRODUCTION
The first substantive clause of the United States Constitution, appear-
ing immediately after the Preamble, provides, "All legislative Powers
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which
shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives." ' This "Vesting
Clause" (as it is sometimes called) of Article I, Section 1 is associated with
two postulates about the allocation of legislative power. The first says,
"Congress may not constitutionally delegate its legislative power to an-
1. U.S. Const. art. I, § 1. Subsequent references in quotation marks to "all" "legislative
power" and "legislative powers" all refer to the words "All legislative Powers" in Article I,
Section 1. Brackets denoting a missing "s" or a change in capitalization are omitted to
avoid undue clutter.
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other branch of Government. '2 The second says, "It is axiomatic that an
administrative agency's power to promulgate legislative regulations is lim-
ited to the authority delegated by Congress. ' 3 Both postulates ascribe
exclusive authority to Congress with respect to the exercise of legislative
power. Otherwise, the two postulates are in significant tension with one
another. The first says only Congress may exercise legislative power. The
second says only Congress may delegate legislative power. In short, Arti-
cle I, Section 1 has been read as imposing both a nondelegation doctrine
and what may be called an "exclusive delegation doctrine."
The tension between these postulates has long been recognized-up
to a point. What has been recognized is the difficulty of squaring the first
postulate (that Congress may not delegate legislative power) with the fact
that Congress has massively delegated legislative rulemaking authority to
administrative agencies. The Supreme Court has tried to resolve this par-
ticular tension by defining "legislative power" for purposes of nondelega-
tion challenges to mean the exercise of unconstrained discretion in making
rules.4 Thus, Congress would be guilty of delegating the legislative power
only if it gave something approaching blank-check legislative rulemaking
authority to an agency. As long as an agency's discretion is somewhat
confined-the favored formula is to ask whether Congress has laid down
an "intelligible principle" for the agency to follow5-then there has been
no delegation of "legislative power." This doctrinal solution has been
coupled with a judicial attitude of great deference in determining
whether any particular statute confers too much discretion. The net re-
sult is that the nondelegation doctrine, while still formally considered
part of our structural Constitution, is effectively unenforceable.
What has not been recognized is that the second postulate (that
agencies may not engage in legislative rulemaking unless Congress has
clearly authorized them to do so) rests on different assumptions from the
first. The most obvious difference is that this second postulate presumes
that Congress is permitted to delegate something that can be called legis-
lative power, whereas the first postulate posits that it may not. But there
is an even deeper dissonance in that the second postulate implicitly incor-
porates a different definition of "legislative power." When courts say that
agencies have no power to make legislative rules unless such power has
been delegated to them by Congress, they are not referring to how much
discretion an agency exercises. What they mean by "legislative power" in
this context is the power to make rules that are legally binding on the pub-
2. Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 165 (1991).
3. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988).
4. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472-76 (2001); Loving v.
United States, 517 U.S. 748, 771-72 (1996); Touby, 500 U.S. at 165; Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 372-73 (1989).
5. The formula dates from J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394,
409 (1928), and has subsequently become boilerplate doctrine. E.g., American Trucking,
531 U.S. at 472; Loving, 517 U.S. at 771; Touby, 500 U.S. at 165; Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372.
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lic. Further, the judicial attitude associated with the second postulate is
different. It is not so much one of extreme deference as one of inatten-
tion.6 Thus, the second postulate, although often overlooked, could at
least in theory be enforced quite strictly.
Although the two postulates rest on different definitions of legislative
power and different conceptions about how far that power can be shared,
they do not generate inconsistent doctrinal requirements. The nondele-
gation postulate generates the (unenforced) requirement that Congress
must constrain the discretion of an agency when it is given authority to make
legislative rules. The exclusive delegation postulate generates the (often
ignored) requirement that Congress must clearly authorize an agency to
make legislative rules. These propositions-that discretion must be con-
fined and that authority must be clearly granted-obviously can, and do,
coexist. For practically minded lawyers and judges, therefore, there has
been no urgency about developing a coherent understanding of Article I,
Section 1, because whatever inconsistencies may exist in theory do not
translate into contradictory commands in terms of everyday practice.
Still, the unresolved tension between nondelegation and exclusive
delegation matters. One problem is that the prominence given to the
nondelegation postulate has obscured the importance of the exclusive
delegation doctrine as a bedrock principle of the administrative state. As
I will explain, exclusive delegation plays an important role in preserving
checks and balances, brings important clarification to questions aboutju-
dicial review of agency action, provides a secure constitutional founda-
tion for the Chevron doctrine, and helps us sort out questions about the
scope of inherent executive and judicial authority.7 But exclusive delega-
tion receives relatively little emphasis in constitutional and administrative
law, and is often ignored by courts-in significant measure because it is
so difficult to square with nondelegation.
Another and potentially more serious problem is that the promi-
nence given to nondelegation, combined with the courts' unwillingness
to enforce that postulate, has generated a low-level but persistent crisis of
legitimacy for modern government.8 If we take seriously the idea that
Congress may not delegate legislative power-as the nondelegation doc-
trine seems to invite us to do-then all three branches of government
appear to be engaged in unconstitutional behavior. Congress is shirking
its duty to legislate, executive agencies are exercising forbidden authority,
and judges are violating their oaths by letting both of them get away with
it. This massive breach of the Constitution can only encourage cynicism
6. For a partial history of the exclusive delegation doctrine in the context of
rulemaking, see Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force
of Law: The Original Convention, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 467, 545-70 (2002).
7. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see
infra Parts IV.A.4, VI.C, VI.E.
8. See generally James 0. Freedman, Crisis and Legitimacy: The Administrative
Process and American Government (1978).
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about government. If, however, it turns out that Article I, Section 1 is
correctly understood to incorporate the exclusive delegation postulate
rather than the nondelegation postulate, this legitimacy problem largely
goes away. Congress has created the administrative state and has given its
far-flung agencies extensive powers to adopt legislative rules. But there is
nothing constitutionally problematic about this if Article I, Section 1 tells
us not that only Congress can legislate, but only Congress can delegate.
In this Article, I argue that Article I, Section 1 should be construed as
mandating the exclusive delegation doctrine, not the nondelegation doc-
trine. Such an exclusive delegation doctrine would entail two subsidiary
principles. First, that executive and judicial officers have no inherent au-
thority to act with the force of law, but must trace any such authority to
some provision of enacted law. I call this the anti-inherency principle.
Second, that Congress has the power to vest executive and judicial of-
ficers with authority to act with the force of law, including the authority to
promulgate legislative regulations functionally indistinguishable from
statutes. I call this the transferability principle.
The exclusive delegation doctrine with its two subsidiary principles
can be derived from Article I, Section 1 through a series of interpretive
moves. First, "legislative power" can be read to mean the power to adopt
any measure having the force and effect of a statute. Second, the vesting
in Congress of all legislative powers can be read to mean that all constitu-
tional power to legislate is given to Congress. In other words, the Vesting
Clause constitutionalizes the anti-inherency principle by making it clear
that neither the executive branch nor the judicial branch has any power
derived directly from the Constitution (as opposed to a statute) to make legis-
lative rules on the subjects enumerated in Article I. Third, the Necessary
and Proper Clause can be read to give Congress authority to transfer leg-
islative power to actors located in the other branches of government in
order to "carry[ ] into Execution" the enumerated powers granted to
Congress in Article I, Section 8.9 Finally, the reference to legislative pow-
ers "herein" granted can be understood to limit the anti-inherency princi-
ple to those powers granted in Article I itself. On this reading, the Vest-
ing Clause would not foreclose the possibility that Article II and Article
III contain specific grants of power to act with the force of law running to
the executive or judicial branches-grants that constitute partial excep-
tions to the anti-inherency principle recognized in Article I, Section 1.
I shall argue that these interpretive moves are not only consistent
with the text of Article I, Section 1; they also enjoy at least as much sup-
port in terms of the structure, original understanding, and evolved inter-
pretation of the Constitution as the traditional nondelegation doctrine
does. More conclusively, I will argue that the exclusive delegation doc-
trine would have practical consequences superior to those of the
9. U.S. Const. art I, § 8, c. 18.
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nondelegation doctrine, whether that doctrine is applied in its present
unenforced form, or if it were enforced quite strictly.
The Article is organized as follows. Part I provides further back-
ground about the two postulates concerning the meaning of Article I,
Section 1-nondelegation and exclusive delegation. Part II undertakes a
textualist analysis of Article I, Section 1, to show that the constitutional
language is susceptible to a wide range of possible meanings, including
both the traditional nondelegation doctrine and the exclusive delegation
doctrine. In order to narrow the field of possible readings further, Part
III considers how much support these meanings enjoy in terms of the
structure, original understanding, and interpretational history of Article
I, Section 1. This inquiry yields one nontrivial conclusion: The Supreme
Court's current doctrine, which assumes legislative power is nondelegable
but imposes no enforceable limit on legislative delegation, is more diffi-
cult to support than either a strictly enforced nondelegation doctrine or
the exclusive delegation doctrine. Part IV continues the narrowing pro-
cess, examining a bevy of consequentialist arguments that have been ad-
vanced both by proponents of strict nondelegation and proponents of
broad delegation. Many of these arguments are inconclusive because
they rest on debatable normative premises or because we lack sufficient
empirical evidence to evaluate them. But on balance the practical effects
of exclusive delegation appear to be superior to those of its principal ri-
vals. Part V elaborates further on why it is important to develop a substi-
tute for the nondelegation doctrine to secure the place of Congress as
the first branch of government. Part VI wraps things up by considering
some specific doctrinal implications of interpreting Article I, Section 1 as
incorporating the exclusive delegation doctrine.
I. Two POSTULATES ABOUT LEGISLATIVE POWER
Before taking a fresh look at Article I, Section 1, it is appropriate to
review existing decisional law bearing on the meaning of that clause.
This will help orient the ensuing discussion and provide some sense of
potential judicial receptiveness to different interpretations.
The story of the rise and fall of the first postulate-the nondelega-
tion doctrine-has been told many times.10 I offer here only the most
capsule summary, together with some observations about how that story
fits into the themes of this Article. The story of the second postulate-
the exclusive delegation doctrine-is less familiar. Here, however, there
is less to say, so I can be relatively brief on this subject too.
10. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, The Constitution as Political Structure 138-43 (1995);
David Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility: How Congress Abuses the People
Through Delegation 25-46 (1993); Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 Va.
L. Rev. 327, 355-72 (2002) [hereinafter Lawson, Delegation].
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A. The First Postulate-Nondelegation
The idea that the Constitution forbids Congress from delegating leg-
islative power made a cameo appearance in two decisions rendered by
the Marshall Court, with neither case resulting in the invalidation of a
statute. " After a period of relative quiet in the middle decades of the
nineteenth century, the nondelegation idea reemerged late in the cen-
tury, but again with no invalidations of statutes by the Supreme Court. 1 2
Only in 1935, when confronted with two hastily drafted provisions of the
National Industrial Recovery Act, did the Court actually strike down fed-
eral legislation as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.1 3
After President Roosevelt threatened to pack the Court if it persisted in
rendering such decisions, the Justices changed their tune, and nondele-
gation challenges were thereafter uniformly rejected.' 4 Notwithstanding
the modern Court's occasional flirtation with stricter enforcement of sep-
aration-of-powers requirements, this pattern continues today. 15 The only
arguable imprint of the nondelegation doctrine in recent years has been
as a canon of interpretation supporting narrow constructions of statutes
so as to "avoid" the constitutional question of excessive delegation. 16 But
11. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42-49 (1825) (upholding delegation
to courts to adopt rules of process); The Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S.
(7 Cranch) 382, 388 (1813) (upholding delegation to President to revive trading privileges
with certain countries upon a finding that they had ceased to interfere with neutral
commerce).
12. See, e.g., Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 496 (1904); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S.
649, 692-94 (1892); cf. United States v. Eaton, 144 U.S. 677, 688 (1892) (invalidating
prosecution for violating an agency rule in part on nondelegation grounds but also relying
on the doctrine of lenity).
13. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529-42 (1935); Pan.
Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 420-30 (1935).
14. E.g., Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 249-50 (1947); Yakus v. United States, 321
U.S. 414, 425-27 (1944) (upholding Emergency Price Control Act of 1942). On the Court-
packing episode, see William E. Leuchtenberg, The Supreme Court Reborn: The
Constitutional Revolution in the Age of Roosevelt 132-62 (1995).
15. See, e.g., Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 771-74 (1996); Touby v. United
States, 500 U.S. 160, 167 (1991); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-79 (1989).
16. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 373 n.7 ("In recent years, our application of the
nondelegation doctrine principally has been limited to the interpretation of statutory texts,
and, more particularly, to giving narrow constructions to statutory delegations that might
otherwise be thought to be unconstitutional."). The principal examples of the use of
nondelegation as a canon of avoidance are Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v.
American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607, 645-46 (1980) (adopting a construction
limiting OSHA discretion in regulating toxic substances) and National Cable Television
Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 340-41 (1974) (finding FCC levy on certain television
providers to be a "fee" rather than a "tax" to avoid nondelegation problem). See generally
Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 315, 315 (2000) (arguing that
nondelegation doctrine now consists of a set of canons subject to "principled judicial
adjudication"). For skepticism about the claim that the doctrine has played a significant
role in statutory interpretation, see David M. Driesen, Loose Canons: Statutory
Construction and the New Nondelegation Doctrine, 64 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1, 18-38 (2002).
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even this use of the doctrine is fading and has recently come under attack
as pointless or counterproductive.' 7
One significant recent development is that the nondelegation doc-
trine has become firmly implanted in the Vesting Clause of Article I.
Early judicial decisions were vague about the constitutional source of the
nondelegation doctrine, the most common refrain being that it was re-
quired by general principles of separation of powers. 18 With the emer-
gence of greater formalism in constitutional law in the late 1980s, how-
ever, the Court began confidently to assert that the doctrine derives from
Article I, Section 1.19 These statements have not been accompanied by
any detailed examination of the constitutional language or other histori-
cal materials. 20 Moreover, the discovery of a textual basis for the
17. See John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance,
2000 Sup. Ct. Rev. 223, 260 [hereinafter Manning, Nondelegation] (arguing that it is
counterproductive to allow courts to rewrite statutes in name of protecting congressional
prerogatives); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine,
69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1721, 1761 (2002) [hereinafter Posner & Vermeule, Interring] (arguing
that it is pointless to avoid a constitutional principle never enforced).
18. See, e.g., Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692-94 (1892); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S.
(10 Wheat.) 1, 46 (1825). The doctrine was also sometimes grounded in a maxim of
agency law, delegata potestas non potest delegari (a delegated authority cannot be delegated),
especially in state court cases. See generally Patrick W. Duff & Horace E. Whiteside,
Delegata Potestas Non Potest Delegari: A Maxim of American Constitutional Law, 14
Cornell L.Q. 168 (1929).
19. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) ("Article I, § 1, of
the Constitution vests '[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted . . . in a Congress of the
United States.' This text permits no delegation of those powers .... ."); Loving, 517 U.S. at
758 ("The fundamental precept of the delegation doctrine is that the lawmaking function
belongs to Congress .. .and may not be conveyed to another branch or entity." (citation
omitted)); Touby, 500 U.S. at 164-65 (noting that the Constitution "provides that '[aill
legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.' From
this language the Court has derived the nondelegation doctrine.. . ." (citation omitted));
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371-72 ("The Constitution provides that '[aill legislative Powers
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States,' and we long have
insisted that 'the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the
Constitution' mandate that Congress generally cannot delegate its legislative power to
another Branch." (citations omitted)).
Not all commentators have been paying attention. SeeJ.R. DeShazo &Jody Freeman,
The Congressional Competition to Control Delegated Power, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 1443, 1514
n.211 (2003) (stating that the nondelegation doctrine "is derived from Article I, Section 7
and the Due Process Clause").
20. As with other newly discovered textualist claims, the fixing of the nondelegation
doctrine in Article I, Section 1 appears to be due in significant part to the influence of
Justice Scalia. Although he is at least as deferential to Congress in nondelegation cases as
any other Justice, Justice Scalia has insisted in a series of opinions that it is not proper to
speak of Congress "delegating legislative power." His reasons are spelled out most clearly
in a concurring opinion:
While it has become the practice in our opinions to refer to "unconstitutional
delegations of legislative authority" versus "lawful delegations of legislative
authority," in fact the latter category does not exist. Legislative power is
nondelegable. Congress can no more "delegate" some of its Article I power to
the Executive than it could "delegate" some to one of its committees. What
2104
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nondelegation doctrine has done nothing to secure its enforcement. In
virtually the same breath as the contemporary Court cites Article I, Sec-
tion 1 as the constitutional foundation of the nondelegation doctrine, it
immediately notes the practical necessity of broad delegations of powers
to administrative agencies. 2'
Another interesting aspect of the recent history is that the nondele-
gation doctrine refuses to go away. The Court has not ruled in favor of a
nondelegation claim since 1935-"the nondelegation doctrine's only
good year."22 The decisions are unanimous or attract at most one or two
dissenters. Yet lower courts at irregular intervals persist in invalidating
federal legislation on nondelegation grounds, resulting in a continuing
trickle of cases reaching the Supreme Court.
23
Part of the explanation for this pattern of behavior may be the re-
peated waves of enthusiasm for "revival" of the nondelegation doctrine
among academics in the latter decades of the twentieth century. The mo-
tivation for this advocacy has varied,24 but the net effect may have been to
Congress does is to assign responsibilities to the Executive; and when the
Executive undertakes those assigned responsibilities it acts, not as the "delegate"
of Congress, but as the agent of the People. At some point the responsibilities
assigned can become so extensive and so unconstrained that Congress has in
effect delegated its legislative power; but until that point of excess is reached
there exists, not a "lawful" delegation, but no delegation at all.
Loving, 517 U.S. at 776-77 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
At first it may seem like a semantic quibble to insist that a broad transfer of power is
not a "delegation." Substantively, Justice Scalia accepts the intelligible principle doctrine
and the tradition of judicial deference to Congress associated with it. See American
Trucking, 531 U.S. at 474-75 (Scalia, J.) (noting "we have 'almost never felt qualified to
second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be
left to those executing or applying the law'" (citation omitted)). One possible reason for
Justice Scalia's insistence that legislative power may never be delegated is that this
reinforces his campaign against the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation.
Justice Scalia has argued that courts should not rely on legislative history because, among
other things, this amounts to delegating legislative power from Congress as a whole to the
member of Congress or the committee that authors the legislative history. See Antonin
Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 35 (1997). He may think that this argument is weakened
if the legislative power is understood to be delegable. For criticism of Justice Scalia's
constitutional argument against legislative history, see John C. Roberts, Are Congressional
Committees Constitutional?: Radical Textualism, Separation of Powers, and the
Enactment Process, 52 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 489, 503-11 (2001).
21. See Loving, 517 U.S. at 758 ("To burden Congress with all federal rulemaking
would divert that branch from more pressing issues, and defeat the Framers' design of a
workable National Government."); Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372 ("[Iln our increasingly
complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress
simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general
directives.").
22. Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 303, 332
(1999) [hereinafter Sunstein, Clean Air].
23. For discussion of lower court decisions accepting nondelegation arguments, see
id. at 334-35.
24. In the 1970s, the antidelegation position was associated with liberal public-interest
theorists, who saw the doctrine as a potential antidote to capture of administrative agencies
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encourage litigants to experiment with nondelegation arguments in the
lower courts, with this experimentation generating just enough success to
bring the issue before the Supreme Court from time to time.
The Court's most recent nondelegation decision, American Truck-
ing,25 illustrates the process. The case involved an attempt by the Clinton
Administration to tighten the National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQS) for two air pollutants-particulate matter and ozone. This ini-
tiative was opposed by much of the chemical industry. Industry lawyers
sought to build support for a challenge to the new regulations, in part by
publishing articles and sponsoring public forums in Washington, D.C. ad-
vocating a revival of the nondelegation doctrine. 26 This effort was rein-
forced by briefs filed in the D.C. Circuit, urging the court to interpret the
Clean Air Act in such a way as to "adequately constrain [the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency's (EPA)] rule-making discretion under the non-del-
egation doctrine. '2 7 A divided panel of the court of appeals obliged, af-
ter a fashion. The majority reasoned that the Clean Air Act would be
unconstitutional under the nondelegation doctrine, unless the EPA devel-
oped a narrowing construction providing an intelligible principle for de-
termining the appropriate levels of ambient air pollution.28 The idea
that agencies can cure nondelegation problems was not new. It too had
been proposed by academics, first by Kenneth Culp Davis in the late
by big business. See Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of
the United States 92-126 (2d ed. 1979); see also Carl McGowan, Congress, Court, and
Control of Delegated Power, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 1119, 1166 (1977) (article by D.C. Circuit
judge suggesting that nondelegation be taken more seriously); J. Skelly Wright, Beyond
Discretionary Justice, 81 Yale LJ. 575, 579-87 (1972) (book review by another D.C. Circuit
judge discussing and urging revival of nondelegation doctrine). David Schoenbrod, the
leading legal proponent of revival today, appears also to have started out in this camp. See
Schoenbrod, supra note 10, at ix (noting that the author came to "distrust agencies" in the
1970s when working for the National Resources Defense Council). Later, strict
enforcement of the nondelegation idea was endorsed by constitutional scholars who
wanted to perfect the democratic features of American constitutionalism. See John Hart
Ely, Democracy and Distrust 131-34 (1980); Redish, supra note 10, at 142-43. Most
recently, the position has been associated with public-choice influenced commentators,
who appear to be attracted to the doctrine as a potential brake on growth of the
administrative state. See, e.g., Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation,
68 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 63-67 (1982); Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction Costs and the
Normative Elements of the Public Choice Model: An Application to Constitutional
Theory, 74 Va. L. Rev. 471, 513-16 (1988).
25. American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 457.
26. See Edward W. Warren & Gary E. Marchant, "More Good than Harm": A First
Principle for Environmental Agencies and Reviewing Courts, 20 Ecology L.Q. 379, nn.* &
** (1993) (article coauthored by lead counsel for industry petitioners in American
Trucking).
27. Brief of Amicus Curiae Congressman Tom Bliley at 23, 34, Am. Trucking Assn's v.
EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (No. 97-1441) (on file with the Columbia Law Review);
Brief of Amicus Curiae Senator Orrin Hatch at 14, 17, 20-23, American Trucking, 175 F.3d
1027 (No. 97-1440) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
28. American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1034 (per curiam).
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1960s and more recently by Lisa Schultz Bressman. 2 9 But the Supreme
Court, as usual, was not interested in the revival of the nondelegation
doctrine in any form. It restated established doctrine and unanimously
reversed. 30
A third aspect of the recent history, which for our purposes is poten-
tially the most significant, is that support for the nondelegation doctrine
appears to be breaking down. Consider the opinions of the Justices in
American Trucking. Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, repeated the cate-
chism associated with the doctrine in its modern form: Congress may not
delegate the legislative power; there is no forbidden delegation as long as
Congress has supplied an intelligible principle; the intelligible principle
can be extremely vague; as long as the intelligible principle is no more
vague than those previously upheld by the Court, the nondelegation doc-
trine is not violated. 3 ' But signs of disquiet emerged in concurring opin-
ions by Justices Thomas and Stevens.
Justice Thomas, writing only for himself, expressed frustration that
the Court's jurisprudence has permitted too much delegation of legisla-
tive power. He agreed that the Clean Air Act provision challenged in
American Trucking satisfied the intelligible-principle requirement.3 2 But
he observed that the Constitution does not mention "intelligible
principles":
Rather, it speaks in much simpler terms: "All legislative Powers
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress." U.S. Const., Art.
I, § 1 (emphasis added). I am not convinced that the intelligi-
ble principle doctrine serves to prevent all cessions of legislative
power. I believe that there are cases in which the principle is
intelligible and yet the significance of the delegated decision is
simply too great for the decision to be called anything other
than "legislative. '3 3
He then issued an invitation:
[N] one of the parties to these cases has examined the text of the
Constitution or asked us to reconsider our precedents on ces-
sions of legislative power. On a future day, however, I would be
willing to address the question whether our delegation jurispru-
dence has strayed too far from our Founders' understanding of
separation of powers.3 4
29. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the Millennium: A Delegation
Doctrine for the Administrative State, 109 Yale L.J. 1399, 1415-16 (2000); Kenneth Culp
Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. Chi. L. Rev. 713, 728-29 (1969).
30. American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 475-76.
31. Id. at 472-76. Gary Lawson has captured the flavor of the typical modern
nondelegation opinion, noting that the Supreme Court simply recites the "many utterly
vacuous statutes" upheld in post-New Deal nondelegation decisions "and wearily move[s]
on." Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1231,
1240 (1994) [hereinafter Lawson, Rise and Rise].
32. American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 487 (Thomas, J., concurring).
33. Id.
34. Id.
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Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Souter, wrote separately to espouse
in effect the opposite position: Injustice Stevens's view, the Constitution
in fact does not forbid delegation of "legislative power." Justice Stevens
said the Court was just "pretend [ing]" when it held that Congress had not
delegated "legislative power" in conferring authority on the EPA to set
NAAQS:3 5
The proper characterization of governmental power should gen-
erally depend on the nature of the power, not on the identity of
the person exercising it.... If the NAAQS that the EPA promul-
gated had been prescribed by Congress, everyone would agree
that those rules would be the product of an exercise of "legisla-
tive power." The same characterization is appropriate when an
agency exercises rulemaking authority pursuant to a permissible
delegation from Congress. 36
Justice Stevens further noted that there was nothing in the Vesting
Clauses of either Article I or Article II "purport[ing] to limit the authority
of either recipient of power to delegate authority to others.13 7 Thus, just
as the "executive power" vested in the President by Article II may be
"granted to members of the Cabinet and federal law enforcement
agents," so there should be no constitutional impediment to delegation
of "legislative powers" vested in Congress by Article 1.38
Disquiet about the nondelegation doctrine can also be found in aca-
demic commentary. Most prominently, Eric Posner and Adrian
Vermeule have recently argued that it is time to lay the traditional
nondelegation doctrine to rest.3 9 They claim the doctrine is a dubious
invention of the late nineteenth century, lacking any sound basis in origi-
nal understanding or political and economic theory. In their view, Arti-
cle I, Section 1 is more plausibly read as incorporating a "naive view" that
would prohibit any attempt by Congress or its individual members to
cede formal power to enact statutes. But, they argue, the clause should
not be read as imposing any limitation on legislative rulemaking by agen-
cies "pursuant to an otherwise valid grant of statutory authority."40
This revisionism has not gone unchallenged. Larry Alexander and
Sai Prakash have written a response arguing that the Posner/Vermeule
definition of legislative power as the exercise of de jure powers of legisla-
35. Id. at 488 (Stevens, J., concurring).
36. Id. at 488-89 (Stevens, J., concurring).
37. Id. at 489 (Stevens, J., concurring).
38. Id. Justice Stevens anticipated this position in an earlier separation-of-powers
opinion. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 752 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring)
("Despite the statement in Article I of the Constitution that 'All legislative powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States,' it is far from novel to
acknowledge that independent agencies do indeed exercise legislative powers.").
39. Posner & Vermeule, Interring, supra note 17, at 1722-23.
40. Id. at 1726.
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tors is idiosyncratic and implausible. 41 It makes little sense, they contend,
to suppose that the Framers imposed elaborate limitations on how Con-
gress is selected and how it enacts laws if the exercise of formal legislative
powers could be easily evaded by broad delegations. Alexander and
Prakash argue that the writings of the Framers and materials familiar to
them reveal that they understood the legislative power to mean "the
power to make rules for society. ' 42 If this is correct, and if one assumes
the Constitution forbids delegation of the legislative power (an issue as to
which, interestingly, they take no position 4 3), then it is likely that the
Framers had in mind a prohibition akin to the traditional nondelegation
doctrine.
All in all, the first postulate about Article I, Section 1-the nondele-
gation doctrine-has remarkably little traction. It reflects the conven-
tional wisdom about the meaning of the Clause, and has enduring appeal
for some commentators and occasionally for lower courts. But as far as
the Supreme Court is concerned, the nondelegation doctrine imposes no
effective constraint on congressional legislation. Indeed, the Court's
most recent decision applying the doctrine reveals that some Justices have
come to question the doctrine, and respected academic commentators
are openly urging that it be abandoned.
B. The Second Postulate-Exclusive Delegation
While constitutional lawyers have persisted in arguing that the legis-
lative power may not be delegated, it is hornbook law among administra-
tive lawyers that "an agency has the power to issue binding legislative
rules only if and to the extent Congress has authorized it to do so." 44
This "exclusive delegation doctrine" includes both an anti-inherency
principle-that agencies have no inherent authority to act with the force
of law-and a transferability principle-that this inherent lack of author-
ity can be filled by a delegation of power from Congress.
The most prominent statement of the idea that the executive branch
has no inherent power to act "legislatively" is the Supreme Court's Steel
Seizure decision. 45 The issue was whether President Truman could na-
41. Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Reports of the Nondelegation Doctrine's
Death are Greatly Exaggerated, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1297, 1298 (2003). Posner and
Vermeule have a rejoinder in the same issue. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule,
Nondelegation: A Post-Mortem, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1331 (2003) [hereinafter Posner &
Vermeule, Post-Mortem].
42. Alexander & Prakash, supra note 41, at 1298.
43. Id. at 1329 ("[E]ven if one agreed with everything we have said, what remains to
be answered is the important question of whether the Constitution actually authorizes the
delegation of Congress's legislative powers.").
44. 1 Kenneth Culp Davis & RichardJ. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise § 6.3, at
234 (3d ed. 1994).
45. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579 (1952); see
also James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("The Executive .... in addition to 'tak[ing] Care that the Laws be faithfully
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tionalize steel mills in the midst of the Korean War to prevent a strike that
would impair steel production. The federal takeover and operation of
the mills was authorized by regulations issued by the Secretary of Com-
merce, whose authority was in turn based on an executive order of the
President. Writing what was styled the opinion of the Court, Justice Black
stated that "It]he President's power, if any, to issue the order must stem
either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself."46 Finding
no statute delegating such power and no provision of the Constitution
that conferred authority to issue such an order, Justice Black concluded
that the seizure was unconstitutional. Justice Black's opinion presup-
posed that Congress could delegate seizure authority to the President,
and if it had done so, the order would be lawful. But absent such a dele-
gation, the President's act amounted to "legislation" and hence violated
Article I, Section l's vesting of all legislative power in Congress. 4 7 His
opinion is therefore a clear endorsement of the anti-inherency principle
that undergirds the exclusive delegation doctrine.
Whether this aspect of Justice Black's opinion in Steel Seizure in fact
enjoyed majority support is debatable. Each of the five Justices who
joined his opinion wrote a concurring opinion, many of which seemed to
suggest that the President might have inherent power to act with the
force of law in certain situations.48 The concurring opinion most fre-
quently cited today is that of Justice Jackson, 49 who offered his famous
tripartite analysis of presidential power. According to this analysis, the
President has the most authority when he acts "pursuant to an express or
implied authorization of Congress, '50 and the least authority when he
takes measures "incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Con-
gress."' 5' In between lie situations where Congress has not spoken and
the President "can only rely on his own independent powers. '5 2 In this
so-called "zone of twilight," explained Justice Jackson, "any actual test of
power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary
imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law."5 3 This was hardly
a ringing endorsement of the idea that the President must trace his au-
executed,' Art. II, § 3, has no power to bind private conduct in areas not specifically
committed to his control by Constitution or statute .... "); Bowen v. Georgetown Univ.
Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (invalidating retroactive agency rule on the ground that it
was not expressly authorized); supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing Bowen).
46. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 585.
47. Id. at 588.
48. See id. at 589; 593-628 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 629-34 (Douglas, J.,
concurring); id. at 634-55 (Jackson, J., concurring in judgment and opinion); id. at
655-60 (Burton, J., concurring in judgment and opinion); id. at 660-67 (Clark, J.,
concurring in judgment).
49. See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 696-97 (1997); Morrison v. Olson, 487
U.S. 654, 694 (1988); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668-69 (1981).
50. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring in judgment and opinion).
51. Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring in judgment and opinion).
52. Id.
53. Id.
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thority to act to some source in enacted law. Since the Jackson concur-
rence appears to be what many Justices today regard as the enduring leg-
acy of Steel Seizure,54 the decision is at best a problematic authority for the
exclusive delegation idea.
Uncovering decisions that actually enforce the exclusive delegation
doctrine is more difficult but not impossible. The first candidate I would
propose is the Queen and Crescent Case.5 5 The original Interstate Com-
merce Act of 1887 gave the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) au-
thority to hold railroad rates unlawful after a hearing, and gave it author-
ity to enforce the Act in court. But the Act did not confer on the
Commission authority to prescribe rates for the future. Rate prescription
orders were then (and are now) regarded as a type of legislative rule.5 6
The question in the Queen and Crescent Case was whether the Act had im-
plicitly conferred authority on the Commission to issue such orders. Af-
ter elaborate consideration of the issue over two years, the Supreme
Court held that it did not. The Court observed that Congress had not
expressly given the Commission authority to set rates by rule, and that the
delegation of such power "is not to be presumed or implied from any
doubtful and uncertain language. '5 7 Thus, the Queen and Crescent Case
squarely holds that Congress must delegate the power to make legislative
rules to an agency before such power can be exercised, and must do so in
unequivocal language.
Why the Queen and Crescent Case did not become a landmark prece-
dent is unclear. The issue decided was of the greatest contemporary im-
portance, both legally and in terms of its economic impact on railroads.
Part of the explanation for the decision's obscurity may be that Congress
soon overruled its specific holding in the Hepburn Act of 1906, confer-
ring on the ICC the power to prescribe rates. 58 But perhaps the more
important reason was that the conceptual underpinnings of the deci-
sion-the exclusive delegation doctrine-were difficult to square with the
nondelegation doctrine, which was enjoying a surge of support at the
54. Chief Justice Rehnquist appears to be particularly fond of the Jackson opinion.
See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 694 (Rehnquist, C.J.); Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 660 (Rehnquist,
J.). He served as a law clerk to Justice Jackson when the Steel Seizure case was decided and
has written about the decision in his books on the Supreme Court. See William H.
Rehnquist, All the Laws But One: Civil Liberties in Wartime 219 (1998); William H.
Rehnquist, The Supreme Court: How It Was, How It Is 89-98 (1987).
55. Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Cincinnati, New Orleans, & Tex. Pac. Ry. Co.
(Queen and Crescent), 167 U.S. 479 (1897). The railroad involved connected Cincinnati
(the "Queen City") and New Orleans (the "Crescent City"), and hence was colloquially
known as the Queen and Crescent Line.
56. Id. at 500-01; see 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2000) ("'[R]ule' means the whole or part of
an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect . . . and
includes the approval or prescription for the future of rates .....
57. Queen and Crescent, 167 U.S. at 505.
58. See Hepburn Act, ch. 3591, § 4, 34 Stat. 584, 589 (1906) (codified as amended at
49 U.S.C. § 10704 (2000)).
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same time. Decisions like Field v. Clark59 and constitutional law treatises60
proclaimed that Congress could not delegate legislative power. The
Queen and Crescent Case said the ICC could not prescribe rates because
Congress had failed to delegate legislative power. Rather than try to sort
out the underlying premises about the allocation of legislative power
under the Constitution, the Court (and, it should be added, academic
commentators for the next one hundred years) found it more convenient
to ignore the Queen and Crescent Case.
A more recent holding that embodies the exclusive delegation doc-
trine is Chrysler Corp. v. Brown.6 1 The question presented was whether a
company that had given the Department of Labor information about its
compliance with federal affirmative action guidelines could sue to pre-
vent the agency from disclosing this information in response to a Free-
dom of Information Act request. The company relied on a federal crimi-
nal statute that prohibited federal employees from disclosing certain
information "to any extent not authorized by law."'62 The government
countered that disclosure was authorized by law because it was permitted
by a Department regulation. The Court, speaking through then-Associ-
ate Justice Rehnquist, said that the regulation would be "law" only if Con-
gress had delegated authority to the agency to make rules having the
force of law. As he put it, "The legislative power of the United States is
vested in the Congress, and the exercise of quasi-legislative authority by
governmental departments and agencies must be rooted in a grant of
such power by the Congress and subject to limitations which that body
imposes. ' 63 Justice Rehnquist considered a number of possible statutory
sources for such authority, but found no clear intention to delegate
power to issue regulations having the force of law, and hence held that
the disclosure of the information was unlawful. 64
Under Chysler and the exclusive delegation doctrine, agency regula-
tions have the force of law only if Congress has delegated authority to
promulgate them. Moreover, a delegation to act with the force of law will
not be presumed, but must be clearly intended by the legislature. Al-
though cited somewhat more often today than the Queen and Crescent
Case, Chrysler is also not well known, most likely because the delegation
59. 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892).
60. See, e.g., Charles K. Burdick, The Law of the American Constitution § 60, at
149-50 (1922) ("It is universally recognized as a fundamental principle of American
constitutional law that the legislative branch of the government cannot delegate its
essential legislative function to any other agency."); Thomas Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations 224 (8th ed. 1927) ("One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that
the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that
department to any other body or authority.").
61. 441 U.S. 281 (1979).
62. See 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (2000).
63. Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 302.
64. Id. at 302-12.
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issue was buried in an argument having multiple, complicated layers that
defy easy extraction of the key point.
Lower courts have fairly consistently followed Steel Seizure (and Queen
and Crescent and Chrysler) insofar as they assume that executive agencies
have no inherent authority to promulgate legislative regulations.65 They
have not, however, consistently followed Queen and Crescent and Chrysler in
requiring a demonstration of clear intent to delegate authority to make
regulations with the force of law. In fact, leading decisions by the D.C.
Circuit and the Second Circuit have construed ambiguous grants of au-
thority to make "rules and regulations" as conferring broad legislative
rulemaking authority on the Federal Trade Commission and the Food
and Drug Administration respectively, even though in both cases the leg-
islative history and unbroken decades of practice indicated that these
grants were not intended to confer such authority. 66
As a result of these sorts of decisions, lower courts today tend to as-
sume that any grant of rulemaking authority delegates authority to act
with the force of law, as opposed to authorizing only procedural rules or
interpretive rules, and make no serious inquiry to determine Congress's
delegatory intent.67 But this lax attitude toward exclusive delegation is
more a product of inattention than conscious design. The current indif-
ference to the principle could be easily rectified by one or two Supreme
Court decisions reaffirming that only Congress has authority to delegate
power to act with the force of law, and holding that particular legislative
rules are ultra vires for want of a clear delegation of such power.
The second subsidiary principle that makes up the exclusive delega-
tion doctrine is the transferability principle: that Congress is free to
transfer legislative rulemaking power to agencies and courts. This pro-
position has not been in doubt since 1911, when the Supreme Court held
in United States v. Grimaud that Congress can authorize an agency to pro-
mulgate rules that are enforced by criminal sanctions. 68 Today, agency
authority to make legislative rules enjoys an abundance of support. The
understanding that Congress may delegate legislative power to agencies is
stated explicitly from time to time. 69 Perhaps more importantly, it is im-
65. See, e.g., Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d 1100, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (invalidating EPA's
lender liability regulation for want of statutory authority to make legislative rules on the
subject).
66. See Nat'l Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 697-98 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Nat'l Ass'n of Pharm. Mfrs. v. FDA, 637 F.2d 877, 879 (2d Cir. 1981). The decisions were
authored by Judges J. Skelly Wright and Henry Friendly, respectively, both of whom were
strong proponents of expanded use of rulemaking by agencies. For further details, see
Merrill & Watts, supra note 6, at 549-65.
67. See, e.g., Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123, 1131 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding
general rulemaking grant in Clean Water Act to authorize legislative rules).
68. 220 U.S. 506, 521 (1911).
69. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 386 n.14 (1989) ("[R]ulemaking
power originates in the Legislative Branch and becomes an executive function only when
delegated by the Legislature to the Executive Branch."); Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v.
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plicitly acknowledged in every decision that enforces legislative rules
adopted by agencies pursuant to delegated authority. Unfortunately, lit-
tle effort has been made by the courts or commentators to spell out the
source of congressional authority to confer such power on agencies. In
that sense the transferability principle, although established in fact, is
undertheorized.
In short, the second postulate-the exclusive delegation doctrine-
is less prominent than the nondelegation doctrine. But it has enjoyed
intermittent judicial support, and it could be strictly enforced without
major modification of settled understandings about the distribution of
legislative power under the Constitution. 70
II. TEXTUAL POSSIBILITIES
Given its key location as the first substantive clause of the Constitu-
tion, remarkably little effort has been devoted to explaining the meaning
of the Vesting Clause of Article I. In this Part, I consider the meaning of
this clause independent of historically evolved understandings, con-
strained only by the rules of meaning and grammar. So viewed, we dis-
cover that the Vesting Clause will support a surprisingly large range of
meanings.7 1 Later, in Parts IV and V, I will attempt to reduce the range
of plausible meanings by introducing conventional interpretive aids and a
consideration of practical consequences as limits on the scope of linguis-
tically possible meanings.
Let us then begin rethinking Article I, Section 1 by considering the
words anew: "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States .... " From a textualist perspective, these
words pose three important questions. The first and most obvious relates
Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 663 (1980) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (stating that
when an agency adopts regulations pursuant to "legislative authority delegated by
Congress" it "exercises the prerogatives of the legislature"); Ariz. Grocery Co. v. Atchinson,
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 284 U.S. 370, 386 (1932) (holding that when the ICC
prescribes a rate for the future pursuant to power delegated by Hepburn Act, "it speaks as
the legislature, and its pronouncement has the force of a statute").
70. Other commentators have noted what I call the exclusive delegation doctrine.
See, e.g., Posner & Vermeule, Post-Mortem, supra note 41, at 1333 (noting that exclusive
delegation doctrine is an important attribute of separation of powers); Martin H. Redish &
Elizabeth J. Cisar, "If Angels Were to Govern": The Need for Pragmatic Formalism in
Separation of Powers Theory, 41 Duke L.J. 449, 480 (1991) (noting that executive branch
is confined to "interpreting or enforcing a legislative choice or judgment; its actions
cannot amount to the exercise of free-standing legislative power").
71. Textualism can be either liberating or constraining, depending on whether the
range of meanings linguistically supported by the text is larger or smaller than the range of
meanings that have been considered plausible as a matter of historical understanding. See
Thomas WI. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 Wash. U. L.Q.
351, 366-68 (1994) [hereinafter Merrill, Textualism]. As a comparison of Parts II and III
of this Article demonstrates, I consider textualism to be liberating in this context in that it
opens up a larger universe of interpretational possibilities. I suspect, but cannot prove,
that this is true for most constitutional provisions.
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to what sort of authority is encompassed within the exercise of "legislative
powers." The second concerns how much sharing of legislative powers is
possible, given the vesting of "all" such powers in the Congress. The third
concerns the referent of the word "herein": Does this refer to the Consti-
tution as a whole, or just to Article I itself?
A. Legislative Power
The first question concerns the meaning of "legislative powers." In
light of recent debates over the meaning of Article I, Section 1, we can
see that there are three conceptually distinct characterizations of legisla-
tive power consistent with these words.
One reading, which can be called the formal interpretation, is that
legislative power simply refers to the power to enact statutes on subjects
that fall within the scope of constitutional authority. Under this interpre-
tation, the legislative power consists of the power to enact measures hav-
ing a certain form. Article I, Section 1 vests all power in Congress to
enact measures bearing the label "statute of the United States." As long
as an edict does not have this label, it may be promulgated by some other
entity without violating Article I, Section 1.
This appears to be the interpretation recently advanced by Posner
and Vermeule. 72 Under what they describe as the "naive view" of legisla-
tive power, a delegation of legislative power would occur only "if Con-
gress or its individual members attempted to cede to anyone else the
members' dejure powers as federal legislative officers, such as the power
to vote on proposed statutes. ' '73 Thus, a delegation of power to adopt
rules that are the functional equivalent of statutes, no matter how legally
binding the rules may be or how much discretion the promulgator may
enjoy, can never be a delegation of legislative power-so long as such
rules are not labeled statutes. Any such exercise of rulemaking authority
would by definition be part of the "executive power" or the 'judicial
power," and hence would be immune from challenge on nondelegation
grounds.
A second reading of legislative powers is that this refers to the power
to enact statutes or rules that are functionally similar to statutes. Under
this definition, the form of an enactment is not decisive. Instead, we
should look beyond form by developing a functional conception of what
it means to enact a statute or to legislate, and read the Constitution as
vesting in the Congress all power to adopt measures that satisfy this func-
tional definition.
Alexander and Prakash endorse what amounts to a functional defini-
tion when they assert that the legislative power entails the power to make
rules for the governance of society.7 4 This definition, obviously, is not
72. Posner & Vermeule, Interring, supra note 17.
73. Id. at 1726.
74. Alexander & Prakash, supra note 41, at 1305.
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limited to enactments that are formally labeled statutes, but encompasses
both statutes and other rules that have the same force and effect as
statutes.
75
A third reading, which can be called the discretionary interpretation,
would be that legislative powers refer to the power to exercise great discre-
tion in enacting statutes or rules that are functionally similar to statutes.
This definition starts with the functional definition of legislation, but
then dramatically restricts the universe of measures that fall within the
legislative power by focusing on the degree of discretion that the rule
promulgator exercises. Only if the promulgator has great discretion in
determining the content of rules can we say that the promulgator exer-
cises legislative power. This, of course, is the definition of legislative pow-
ers that the Supreme Court has adopted in order to defeat consistently
claims that Congress has impermissibly delegated such powers. 76
B. Sharing Principles
The second question concerns how far these legislative powers may
be shared with other entities. Three aspects of the constitutional text are
relevant here. First, there is the fact that Articles I, II, and III all contain
individual Vesting Clauses, with each clause referencing a different gov-
ernmental power. The first clause of Article I vests "legislative" powers in
Congress, the first clause of Article II vests "executive" power in the Presi-
dent, and the first clause of Article III vests 'judicial" power in the Su-
preme Court and such inferior federal courts as Congress creates. 77 This
tripartite designation of powers raises the question whether, or to what
extent, these powers are mutually exclusive, such that each type of power
can be exercised only by the institution in which it is vested. Second,
there is the potentially significant fact that the first clause of Article I vests
"all" legislative powers in Congress, whereas the parallel clauses of Article
II and Article III omit the word "all" and speak simply of executive and
judicial power. Third, and perhaps most significantly, there is a textual
silence. As others have observed, most prominently Justice Stevens in his
concurring opinion in American Trucking,7 8 Article I, Section 1 does not
75. 1 do not think it necessary, at least for purposes of the present discussion, to
pinpoint the correct functional definition of "legislative power." It is sufficient to say that
under the functional approach, "legislative power" would be defined to mean the power to
enact statutes or rules that are like statutes in terms of having a similar force and effect,
whatever features we ultimately settle upon as satisfying this general criterion.
76. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
77. U.S. Const. art. I, § 1, cl. 1; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; id. art. III, § 1, cl. 1.
78. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 489 (2001) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and in the judgment); see also Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory
Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 Colum. L. Rev.
452, 478 (1989) (noting that nondelegation doctrine is "not expressly grounded in the text
of the Constitution"); Sunstein, Clean Air, supra note 22, at 303, 331 & n.131 (1999)
(noting the silence of the U.S. Constitution on nondelegation and contrasting the German
constitution).
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specifically address the question of whether or to what extent Congress
may delegate legislative powers to other actors or institutions.
There are many possibilities for how best to interpret these textual
features in determining the permitted degree of sharing of legislative
powers. Without being exhaustive, the possibilities that have been sug-
gested include: (1) that Congress may not delegate legislative powers to
the President but may delegate such powers to administrative agencies;
79
(2) that Congress may not delegate legislative powers to the executive
branch but may delegate them to the judicial branch;8 0 (3) that Congress
generally may not delegate legislative powers but may delegate legislative
power concerning certain restricted subjects;8 1 (4) that Congress may
delegate the power to regulate but not the power to tax;8 2 (5) that the
President may act with legislative force in default of congressional action,
but must conform to any legislation that Congress does enact;8 3 and (6)
that the President may act with legislative force in an emergency, but
must seek authority from Congress through appropriate legislation as
soon as practicable.8 4 In an attempt to keep the discussion manageable, I
will again confine myself to three central and conceptually distinct
possibilities.
The first may be called the legislative monopoly understanding.
Under this conception, legislative powers may be exercised only by Con-
gress and hence cannot be shared. Such an interpretation gives the
strongest measure of exclusivity to Congress. The vesting of all legislative
powers in Congress means that only Congress can exercise "legislative
power," however that is defined.
79. See Nathan D. Grundstein, Presidential Power, Administration and Administrative
Law, 18 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 285, 304-05 (1950); see also Lawrence Lessig & Cass R.
Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 39-41 (1994)
(claiming that the Framers anticipated that Congress could vest significant administrative
power in agencies independent of presidential control).
80. See Redish, supra note 10, at 140-41.
81. See Michael B. Rappaport, The Selective Nondelegation Doctrine and the Line
Item Veto: A New Approach to the Nondelegation Doctrine and Its Implications for
Clinton v. City of New York, 76 Tul. L. Rev. 265, 265 (2001) (arguing on originalist grounds
that the nondelegation doctrine does not apply to appropriations laws, foreign affairs
issues, and perhaps other subjects such as management of federal lands).
82. See Nat'l Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 340-42 (1974)
(dictum). This notion was rejected in Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212,
223-24 (1989).
83. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 700-04
(1952) (Vinson, CJ., dissenting). This appears to be the position reflected in President
Theodore Roosevelt's "stewardship" theory of the Presidency, as described in Henry P.
Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 38-39 (1993)
(quoting Roosevelt as saying, "'[T]he executive power [is] limited only by specific
restrictions and prohibitions appearing in the Constitution or imposed by Congress.'")
[hereinafter Monaghan, Protective].
84. This appears to be the position advanced by the government in United States v.
Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474-75 (1915).
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The second may be called the legislative first-mover understanding.
Under this construction, executive and judicial actors have no inherent
power to make legislative rules, but Congress can invest agencies or
courts with the power to make such rules pursuant to a valid delegation
of power. This reading gives an intermediate level of exclusivity to Con-
gress. The vesting of all legislative powers in Congress means that only
Congress can delegate "legislative power," however that is defined.8 5
The third may be called the legislative supremacy understanding.
Under this position, executive and judicial actors must always conform to
valid legislative rules promulgated by Congress. But if Congress is silent,
executive and judicial entities have authority to promulgate legislative
rules in areas where the federal government as a whole is competent to
act. This gives the weakest measure of exclusivity to Congress. The vest-
ing of all legislative powers in Congress means that Congress has the last
word on what the legislative policy of the United States Government shall
be on all issues.
C. Herein
The third question, which has received comparatively little attention,
zeroes in on the word "herein" in the phrase, "All legislative Powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States."8 6 Specifically,
what is the referent of "herein"? Is it "this Constitution," or is it "Article
I"?
If "herein" means the Constitution as a whole, then the power to
legislate, no matter where it is granted in the Constitution, can be exer-
cised only by the Congress. Neither the President (the subject of Article
II) nor the federal courts (the subject of Article III) nor any other gov-
ernmental entity can exercise the federal power to legislate.
But it is also possible that herein simply means "Article I." On this
reading, the various legislative powers enumerated in Article I-such as
the power to tax, the power to borrow, the power to regulate commerce
among the States, and so forth-are given exclusively to Congress, subject
to whatever degree of sharing we conclude is permissible under Article I,
Section 1. But other powers arguably of a legislative nature not enumer-
ated in Article I might be exercised by entities besides Congress. For ex-
ample, the President's power as Commander in Chief of the Armed
85. Hal Krent has perceived that this is a possible reading of the Constitution. See
Harold J. Krent, Delegation and Its Discontents, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 710, 743 (1994)
(reviewing David Schoenbrod, supra note 10) [hereinafter Krent, Discontents] (noting
that the Constitution may "not claim for Congress the exclusive function of rule-making,
but merely the authority to start the ball rolling by passing a law").
86. U.S. Const. art. I, § 1, cl. 1 (emphasis added). Schoenbrod briefly flags the issue
in his book. See Schoenbrod, supra note 10, at 187.
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Forces, set forth in Article 11,87 might serve as a valid basis for making
legislative rules for the governance of the armed forces, even absent any
legislation by Congress.
D. Mixing and Matching
Note that the answers to these three questions are logically indepen-
dent of one another. Thus, the three options in regard to the meaning of
"legislative power" interact with the three options with respect to sharing
of that power and with the two options with respect to the referent of
"herein," to create a large number of theoretically possible interpretive
packages. Eighteen to be exact (3 x 3 x 2). Some of these packages are
rather far fetched and have never been advocated by any serious constitu-
tional interpreter. For example, no one has ever advanced a 3-3-2 pack-
age, which would be the understanding that legislative power refers to
the power to exercise unconstrained discretion in making rules (issue 1,
option 3), combined with the legislative supremacy understanding of the
sharing of this power (issue 2, option 3), combined with the understand-
ing that this rule applies only to the powers conferred by Article I (issue
3, option 2). This package would reduce Congress to the role of a board
of oversight with respect to the powers enumerated in Article I, Section 8.
Nevertheless, it is instructive to consider several serious interpretive posi-
tions that have been advanced, and to note the package of answers they
presuppose to our interpretational options.
The nondelegation doctrine, in the anything-goes version currently
embraced by the Supreme Court, represents a 3-1-1 interpretive package.
It is created by combining the discretionary meaning of "legislative
power" (issue 1, option 3) with the principle that sharing of the legislative
power is not permitted (issue 2, option 1) and the understanding that
"herein" refers to the entire Constitution (issue 3, option 1). This con-
struction preserves the nondelegation doctrine as an official part of the
Constitution, but renders it effectively unenforceable, because the Court
has given nearly conclusive deference to congressional judgments about
how much discretion is too much.
Significant alterations in constitutional meaning can be achieved by
changing the first variable, the definition of legislative power. Thus, Pos-
ner and Vermeule's "naive view" of legislative delegation consists of a 1-1-
1 interpretive package, that is, the formal understanding of legislative
power as the power to enact statutes (issue 1, option 1), combined with
the understanding that the power may not be delegated (issue 2, option
1), and the implicit understanding that herein refers to the entire Consti-
tution (issue 3, option 1).88 This combination has the effect of "inter-
87. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. I ("The President shall be Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called
into the actual Service of the United States .... ").
88. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
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ring" the nondelegation doctrine, because the only thing prohibited by
Article I, Section 1 is the delegation of power to enact rules bearing the
label "statute of the United States."
Alternatively, a nondelegation diehard like David Schoenbrod can
be understood as advancing a 2-1-2 interpretive package. He combines
the functional meaning of "legislative power" (issue 1, option 2) with the
understanding that the legislative power may not be delegated (issue 2,
option 1). He then tries to soften the impact of this a bit by appearing to
endorse the understanding that "herein" refers only to the powers con-
ferred by Article I (issue 3, option 2).89 This package, if rigorously pur-
sued, presumably would mean that any delegation of legislative rulemak-
ing authority to the executive branch, at least as to subjects covered by
Article I, would be unconstitutional.9 0
Compared to the definition of legislative powers, relatively little at-
tention has been given to modifying the second and third interpreta-
tional issues. The position I endorse in the article is the 2-2-2 interpretive
package. In other words, I agree with Alexander and Prakash, Schoen-
brod, and others, that "legislative power" should be given a functional
definition-the power to enact statutes or measures that are functionally
similar to statutes (issue 1, option 2). But, in contrast to most commenta-
tors, I agree with Justice Stevens that this power may be legislatively dele-
gated by Congress (issue 2, option 2). Finally, I agree with Schoenbrod
that "herein" should be understood to refer only to the legislative power
conferred in Article I, not to all legislative powers found in the Constitu-
tion (issue 3, option 2).
The point is that the three ambiguities raised by Article I, Section 1
give rise to multiple interpretational possibilities, and the task is to
choose the one that is most faithful to settled interpretational norms and
would produce the best overall consequences. In Part III, I develop the
case that the 2-2-2 interpretational package, if not compelled by tradi-
tional interpretive sources, is at least compatible with them. In Part IV, I
argue that the 2-2-2 package is preferable on consequentialist grounds to
the most plausible alternative packages.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE, ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING,
SETTLED MEANINGS
The text of Article I, Section 1, considered without regard to histori-
cal context or evolved understandings, generates a wide range of possible
89. Schoenbrod, supra note 10, at 187.
90. It is not clear that this is in fact Schoenbrod's position. He says that Congress may
not delegate the legislative power, and the legislative power is the power to make rules for
the governance of private conduct. See id. at 16. It would appear to be a logical corollary
of these propositions that only Congress can make legislative rules. But Schoenbrod never
explicitly embraces this corollary. So it is possible that he would allow administrative
agencies to promulgate subordinate or second-round legislative rules fleshing out or giving
further content to first-round legislated rules promulgated by Congress.
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meanings. In this Part, I inquire whether some discipline can be imposed
on the options by going beyond the bare text of the Constitution to con-
sider also its structure, the understandings of the framing generation,
and the interpretive gloss that has been added with the passage of time.
A. Is Article I, Section 1 Irrelevant?
Before turning to the discrete interpretive questions presented by
Article I, Section 1, let us consider a more radical possibility: that the
Vesting Clause of Article I has nothing to do with the allocation of legisla-
tive power under the Constitution.9 1 The argument for the irrelevance of
Article I, Section 1 is based on differences in the wording of the Vesting
Clause of Article I, as opposed to the parallel clauses of Articles II and III.
Articles II and III begin by vesting "[t] he executive power" in a President
of the United States and "[t]he judicial power" in the courts of the
United States.92 Article I, in contrast, begins by saying that "[a] 11 legisla-
tive powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States." Commentators have suggested that the unqualified vesting
clauses of Articles II and III were intended to confer on the President and
the federal courts all of the powers traditionally exercised by executives
and judges.93 The variant language in Article I, in contrast, was intended
to signal that the Congress does not exercise all the powers traditionally
exercised by a legislature, but only those legislative powers specifically
enumerated in Article I, Section 8.94 Consequently, the argument goes,
the wording of Article I, Section 1 has no substantive import, other than
to confirm (or anticipate) the principle of enumerated powers. Since
this is the sole purpose of the unique wording of Article I, Section 1, we
cannot derive any conclusions from it about the power of Congress to
delegate legislative powers. To answer that question, we must look else-
where in the Constitution, such as the Necessary and Proper Clause, and
consider whether the "executive" or the 'judicial" power was understood
to include the power to receive and implement a delegation of legislative
power.
The words "all... powers herein granted" may well have been added
to the Vesting Clause of Article I to avoid any inference that Congress was
being given plenary legislative authority (although I would note that
there is little documentary evidence-other than the text itself-to sup-
port this supposition). However, even if we accept that this was the moti-
vating purpose of adding these words to Article I, it does not follow that
91. Gary Lawson has suggested this possibility to me. E-mail from Gary Lawson,
Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law to Author (July 28, 2004) (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
92. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; id. art. III, § 1.
93. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution:
Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1153, 1175-76 (1992).
94. Id.
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the balance of Article I, Section 1 is irrelevant to the question of the allo-
cation of legislative power under the Constitution.
First, Article I, Section 1 is the only place in the Constitution where
the powers of Congress are identified as being legislative. Article I, Sec-
tion 8, where the enumerated powers are listed, simply tells us that "l[t] he
Congress shall have Power To" (emphasis added), and then lists eighteen
different powers (spending, taxing, regulating interstate commerce, and
so forth). In order to establish that the power exercised by Congress is
legislative power, we must refer back to Article I, Section 1. Thus, Article
I, Section 1 uniquely contributes the concept of "legislative power" to the
Constitution, and requires that some meaning be attributed to that term.
Second, Article I, Section 1 uniquely vests the legislative power in
Congress. Just as Article II vests the executive power in the President,
and Article III vests the judicial power in the federal courts, Article I,
Section 1 vests "all legislative powers herein granted" in the Congress.
Congress in some sense is given exclusive power to legislate by Article I,
Section 1, and this must be accounted for in any theory about the permis-
sible degree of sharing of legislative power under the Constitution.
Third, whatever else one may think about the Supreme Court's per-
formance in determining the allocation of legislative power, the Court
has been steadfast in recent years in identifying Article I, Section 1 as the
relevant constitutional text for determining the permissible scope of dele-
gation of legislative powers. 95 If one is prepared to give any weight at all
to such pronouncements in interpreting the Constitution, this consistent
line of authority cuts against the position that Article I, Section 1 is irrele-
vant to the question of the proper allocation of legislative power.
B. Legislative Power
What then do the traditional tools of interpretation tell us about the
meaning of "legislative power" as used in Article I, Section 1? Does the
legislative power include only the power to enact statutes (the formal in-
terpretation)? Or does it also include the power to enact statutes and
other measures having the force and effect of a statute (the functional
interpretation), or perhaps only the power to exercise unconstrained dis-
cretion in enacting measures having the force and effect of statutes (the
discretionary interpretation)?
The text of Article I, Section 1, as we have seen, does not answer this
question. But what about the more general structure of the Constitu-
tion?96 Alexander and Prakash make much of the fact that the Constitu-
95. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
96. The structural arguments I will consider draw heavily on comparisons across
clauses of the Constitution, and thus correspond to what Akhil Amar has called
"intratextualism." See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 747
(1999). This style of interpretation should be distinguished from an older structural
tradition, associated with Charles Black, which largely ignores the text and instead focuses
on functional arguments about the requirements of a federal system of government. See
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tion appears to use the words "law," "rule," and "regulation" interchange-
ably, which they take to mean that the legislative power is broader than
the power to enact statutes.9 7 But I do not think this follows. Even if we
grant that the Framers regarded "laws," "rules," and "regulations" to be
synonyms, this does not tell us which of the three senses of a single juris-
tic category (law/rule/regulation) they meant. Were they speaking of
law/rule/regulation in the formal sense of statutes, in the functional
sense of statutes and measures like statutes, or in the sense of having un-
constrained discretion to enact statutes and measures like statutes?
Yet if structural considerations offer little basis to choose between
the formal and functional interpretations, they do cast some doubt on
the discretionary interpretation. The intellectual pedigree of the discre-
tionary interpretation is unclear, but I suspect it has its roots in notions
about the absolute sovereignty of Parliament familiar in English law98 and
adopted by many of the States in the United States with respect to the
power of state legislatures.9 9 The unstated argument is that the legisla-
ture is the supreme sovereign within the political system, and as such ex-
ercises virtually unconstrained discretion as to what sorts of policies it
chooses to pursue. Therefore, any body that exercises "legislative power"
is one that has very great discretion with respect to the content of the law
it chooses to enact.10 0
The problem with this line of reasoning is that under Article I of the
Constitution, the Congress does not have unlimited discretion in the ex-
ercise of legislative power. Congress must demonstrate that its enact-
ments fall within one of the enumerated powers of Article I, Section 8
and do not transgress any of the substantive limits imposed by Article I,
Section 9 and the Bill of Rights. During most of the post-New Deal era,
when the Court broadly deferred to Congress's interpretation of the
generally Charles L. Black, Jr., Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law 3-32 (Ox
Bow Press 1985) (1969).
97. Alexander & Prakash, supra note 41, at 1305-07.
98. See, e.g., 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *156-57.
99. See Douglas L. Grant, Underpinnings of the Public Trust Doctrine: Lessons from
Illinois Central Railroad, 33 Ariz. St. L.J. 849, 872-73 (2001) (discussing briefly the extent to
which States adopted the English conception of the legislature as a body of inherent and
plenary power).
100. The first Supreme Court decision to articulate the discretionary conception of
the legislative power drew upon a decision of the Ohio Supreme Court. See J.W.
Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 407 (1928) (quoting Cincinnati,
Wilmington & Zaneville R.R. Co. v. Comm'rs of Clinton County, 1 Ohio St. 77, 88-89
(1852)). The Ohio Supreme Court, in turn, relied on a definition of legislative power-
state legislative power of course-that stressed the discretionary nature of legislative
determinations:
The true distinction, therefore, is between the delegation of power to make the
law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an
authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law. The first can not be done; to the latter no valid objection
can be made.
Cincinnati, 1 Ohio St. at 88-89 (emphasis added).
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scope of its enumerated powers (especially the Commerce Clause), it
would have been easy to lapse into thinking that Congress, like Parlia-
ment, exercises unconstrained legislative discretion. But United States v.
Lopez and ensuing decisions remind us that Congress does not exercise
unconstrained discretion under the Constitution. °1 0 This feature of our
written Constitution makes it unlikely that the Framers understood the
"legislative power" to mean the power to exercise unconstrained discre-
tion in making rules.10 2
Statements by political thinkers familiar to the Framers and state-
ments made in the ratification debates also shed relatively little light on
the meaning of legislative power. Alexander and Prakash collect a large
number of these statements, nearly all of which say that the "legislative
power" is the power to make laws, or something to that effect. 10 3 Again,
however, these statements do not specify whether "making laws" was un-
derstood in the formal, functional, or discretionary sense. That being
said, there are a handful of pronouncements that seem more consistent
with the functional than the formal definition. For example, John Locke,
in his Second Treatise of Government, defined the legislative power as the
"right to direct how the Force of the Commonwealth shall be imploy'd
for preserving the Community and the members of it."1 0 4 This is a func-
tional rather than a formal definition of legislative power. Alexander
Hamilton, for his part, wrote in The Federalist that "[jt]he essence of the
legislative authority is to enact laws, or in other words to prescribe rules
for the regulation of the society." 10 5 This too points more toward a func-
tional definition (the power to enact statutes and measures like statutes)
than a formal understanding (the power to enact statutes only).
The most directly relevant comment comes from no less an authority
than James Madison, speaking in support of ratification in Virginia. He
said, "If nothing more were required, in exercising a legislative trust, than
a general conveyance of authority-without laying down any precise rules
by which the authority conveyed should be carried into effect-it would
follow that the whole power of legislation might be transferred by the
101. 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act as
exceeding the scope of the Commerce Clause); see also United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598, 618 (2000) (invalidating portions of the Violence Against Women Act as going
beyond permissible scope of commerce regulation).
102. Of course, even if the Framers did not conceive of Congress as having the same
degree of discretion as Parliament, they still might have imagined that it would enjoy
significantly more discretion than either the executive or judicial branches. So the
inference from the enumerated nature of congressional power only rebuts the Court's
current version of the nondelegation doctrine, which requires extreme delegations of
discretion before it is violated.
103. Alexander & Prakash, supra note 41, at 1310-17.
104. John Locke, Two Treatises of Civil Government 364 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690) [hereinafter Locke, Laslett].
105. The Federalist No. 75, at 504 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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legislature from itself." 106 This comment is primarily directed to whether
legislative power may be shared, on which question it is equivocal.
(Madison does not categorically oppose all delegations, only those not
cabined by "precise rules"; the only thing he clearly opposes is the trans-
fer of the "whole power of legislation.") But the comment is also telling
on the meaning of legislative power, insofar as Madison seems to antici-
pate the modern notion that Article I, Section 1 forbids the transfer of
authority "without laying down any precise rules by which the authority
conveyed should be carried into effect"-in other words, the transfer of
great discretion to enact rules like statutes. So Madison's comment pro-
vides a small measure of support for the discretionary interpretation of
legislative power.
When we turn to the decided cases, one thing stands clear. There is
no support in decisional law for the formal definition of legislative power
as the power to enact statutes. Posner and Vermeule cite no federal or
state cases adopting such a construction. To be sure, there is no deci-
sional law rejecting this construction either. The possibility seems never
to have occurred to anyone in a context in which it would have decisional
significance. This strongly suggests that the formal interpretation is at
the very least idiosyncratic, and probably would be rejected if presented
to the courts.
Beyond this, the picture is complicated. As we have seen, the Su-
preme Court in its nondelegation decisions has adopted the discretionary
definition of the legislative power. As Justice Scalia puts it, "The focus of
controversy, in the long line of our so-called excessive delegation cases,
has been whether the degree of generality contained in the authorization
for exercise of executive or judicial powers in a particular field is so unac-
ceptably high as to amount to a delegation of legislative powers."10 7 Thus,
if we look only to those cases, we would have to conclude that the Court
has gravitated over time toward the discretionary definition.
But this is only part of the decisional picture. In other contexts, the
Court has not adhered to the discretionary definition of the "legislative
power," but instead has invoked a functional definition. Most promi-
nently, in the legislative veto cases, the Court has considered what sort of
action is sufficiently "legislative" that it must run the gauntlet of bicam-
eral approval and presidential presentment that Article I prescribes for
the enactment of valid laws. INS v. Chadha, the leading decision, holds
that action is subject to these requirements when it is "essentially legisla-
tive in purpose and effect."10 8 The Court further concluded that action
106. Madison's Report on the Virginia Resolutions, reprinted in 4 Debates on the
Adoption of the Federal Constitution 546, 560 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., Philadelphia,
J.B. Lippincott 1881).
107. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 419 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
108. 462 U.S. 919, 952 (1983); see also Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 754-58 (1986)
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that Congress is subject to requirements
of bicameral and presentment filter when it exercises legislative power).
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by a legislative body meets this standard when it has "the purpose and
effect of altering the legal ... relations of persons ... outside the Legisla-
tive Branch."' 0 9 This is a purely functional definition of legislative power.
The Court made clear that the bicameral and presentment requirements
apply to any measure adopted by Congress or one of its agents that has
the force and effect of a statute, without regard to the label the measure
formally bears. Moreover, the Court made no mention of the degree of
discretion that Congress or its agent exercises in promulgating a measure
before it will be regarded as being sufficiently "legislative" to trigger these
constitutional requirements. ' 0
Decisions enforcing the exclusive delegation doctrine also implicitly
rest on a functional definition of legislative power. For example, when
the Court in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown held that the agency did not have
authority to issue legislative regulations, what the Court meant was that
the agency did not have authority to issue regulations that are legally
binding the way a statute is."' There was no suggestion that the rule was
not legislative because the agency did not have enough discretion in
promulgating it. The Court's decisions holding that legislative rules
promulgated by agencies can preempt state law' 12 also reflect a func-
tional definition of legislative power, insofar as agency rules are equated
with statutes and both are deemed to be "Laws of the United States"
under the Supremacy Clause." t 3
That the Court has endorsed different definitions of legislative
power in different contexts does not tell us which one is correct. But
109. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952.
110. The Court in Chadha came close to acknowledging that it has employed different
definitions of "legislative power" for legislative veto and nondelegation purposes. In a
famous (or infamous) footnote, the Court admitted that executive rulemaking will often
satisfy the functional definition of legislation that it endorsed for legislative veto purposes.
Id. at 953 n.16. But the Court insisted that this kind of executive action is not properly
classified as "legislative," because the constitutionality of such executive action "involves
only a question of delegation doctrine." Id. The Court explained that this means such
executive action "is always subject to check by the terms of the legislation that authorized
it; and if that authority is exceeded it is open to judicial review as well as the power of
Congress to modify or revoke the authority entirely." Id. at 953-54 n.16. In other words,
the definition of "legislative action" for purposes of considering the constitutionality of the
legislative veto (the functional definition) is different from the definition of "legislative
action" under the nondelegation doctrine (the discretionary definition).
111. 441 U.S. 281, 295 (1979) ("It has been established in a variety of contexts that
properly promulgated, substantive agency regulations have the 'force and effect of law."').
The decision is discussed supra text accompanying notes 61-64.
112. See, e.g., La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 368-69 (1986) ("[A]
federal agency acting within the scope of its congressionally delegated authority may pre-
empt state regulation."); Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-53
(1982) ("Federal regulations have no less preemptive effect than federal statutes.").
113. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; see City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 63 (1988)
("The phrase 'Laws of the United States' encompasses both federal statutes themselves and
federal regulations that are properly adopted in accordance with statutory
authorization.").
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given that the Court has enforced Chadha's rule against legislative vetoes
quite strictly and has broadly treated agency legislative rules as having the
same force and effect as statutes, whereas it has failed to enforce the rule
against delegations, perhaps we should take the Court's functional defini-
tions of legislative power more seriously than the definition it has em-
ployed in order to reject nondelegation claims.' 14
The foregoing arguments drawn from the structure of Article I,
originalist sources, and considerations of precedent do not indubitably
prove that the correct definition of the legislative power is the functional
one. But they strongly suggest that the functional definition is preferable
to the formal definition, recently advocated by Posner and Vermeule, t 15
and they also suggest that the functional definition enjoys somewhat
more support than the discretionary definition, which the Supreme
Court has seized upon as a device for rendering the nondelegation doc-
trine unenforceable.
C. Sharing Principles
The text of the Constitution is also silent on the question whether or
to what extent legislative power may be shared. As Justice Stevens ob-
served in his concurring opinion in American Trucking, the text of Article
I, Section 1 does "not purport to limit the authority" of Congress "to dele-
gate authority to others."'1 16 But silence on the immediate point in con-
troversy does not mean that the Constitution is devoid of features that
bear on the question of how far the legislative power may be shared.
For the proponent of the legislative monopoly position (that only
Congress may legislate), there are three important bits of structural evi-
dence. First, the Constitution specifically references three powers-the
legislative, the executive, and the judicial-and specifically "vests" each of
114. The tension between the recent executive nondelegation cases like Whitman v.
American Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001), and the Chadha line of cases is even
greater if we interpret Chadha as resting on a principle that prohibits delegation of
legislative power from Congress to one of its own units or agents. See John F. Manning,
Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 673, 720-21 (1997) (arguing
that use of legislative history allows for legislative self-delegation "condemned by Chadha
and its progeny"). If Chadha rests on nondelegation, then we have to explain why
delegations are policed strictly in one context (delegations to legislative agents) but not in
another context (delegations to executive or judicial agents), and we have to explain why
two different definitions of "legislative power" are used in enforcing the nondelegation
rule. The tension is not so great if we interpret Chadha as resting on an antievasion
principle grounded in the need to preserve the integrity of Article I, Section 7's bicameral
and presentment requirements, procedural limitations that apply uniquely to action taken
by the Legislative Branch. Under this theory, Chadha applies only to Congress and to
subunits or agents that are controlled by Congress. Moreover, Chadha applies without
regard to whether Congress has formally delegated legislative power; it also would apply if
the subunit or agent has simply asserted the power on its own initiative.
115. See Posner & Vermeule, Interring, supra note 17.
116. American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 489 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and in the
judgment).
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these powers in a different branch of government. Surely this means the
Framers viewed these powers as being distinct. Perhaps it means more.
Perhaps it means that the Framers regarded these powers as being mutu-
ally exclusive.' 1 7 If that were the case, then it would logically follow that
no branch can exercise a power vested in another branch. Specifically, it
would mean that the "legislative power" may never be shared with the
executive or the judicial branches.
In addition, the legislative monopoly proponent can point to the fact
that Article I, Section 1 says that "All" legislative powers "shall be vested in
a Congress of the United States." It is possible that the addition of the
qualifier "All"-which is not found in the Vesting Clauses of Article II and
Article III-denotes exclusivity and hence precludes any sharing of legis-
lative power among other branches. 1 8 Under this reading, Article I, Sec-
tion 1 means, "only Congress may legislate."
Finally, the proponent of legislative monopoly can draw upon the
detail with which Article I spells out how Members of Congress are to be
selected and how, once selected, they are to go about enacting laws. Al-
exander and Prakash argue that it would make little sense for the Framers
to specify a detailed process for selecting legislators "if those selected may
transfer the substance of their legislative discretion to persons who are
not selected by that process." 1 9 Similarly, it would make little sense to
spell out the requirements of bicameral approval and presentment to the
President if Congress could simply transfer "all substantive policy discre-
tion to the executive" and evade these requirements. 120 Why would the
Framers devote so much attention to the method of selecting legislators,
and- to the procedures for enacting statutes, if Congress could turn
around and freely delegate legislative power to some executive agency or
court that is not subject to these Article I limitations?
However, the proponent of the legislative first-mover interpretation
(that only Congress may delegate) can offer rejoinders to each of these
structural inferences. There is no conclusive evidence that the Framers
deemed the three great powers of government mutually exclusive. It is
just as likely that they viewed these three powers as being distinct yet over-
lapping to a degree.' 2 ' If this is the case, then the vesting of different
powers in different branches would not necessarily mean that a power
117. See Lawson, Rise and Rise, supra note 31, at 1238-39. Mutual exclusivity of
vested powers is a critical assumption of most proponents of the so-called formalist
approach to separation of powers. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, The Vesting Clauses as
Power Grants, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1377, 1390-91 (1994).
118. See American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 487 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting U.S.
Const. art. I, § 1 and underscoring the word "All").
119. Alexander & Prakash, supra note 41, at 1301.
120. Id.
121. See Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the
Constitution 80-87 (1985) (noting many deviations in state constitutions of the
revolutionary era from Montesquieu's model of separation of powers); Gerhard Casper, An
Essay on Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions and Practices, 30 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
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functionally equivalent to lawmaking cannot be exercised by the execu-
tive or the judicial branches.
For its part, the reference to "all" in the phrase "All legislative Powers
herein granted" may have been inserted for reasons unrelated to the
question of permissible sharing of powers. As previously discussed, the
clause with the word "all" may have been added simply to make clear that
Congress was being granted only enumerated legislative powers, as op-
posed to some single, undifferentiated "legislative power" parallel to the
grant of "executive" power to the President or 'judicial" power to the
courts.
122
Finally, the detail with which Article I specifies how legislators are to
be selected and how statutes are to be enacted is in fact consistent with
either the legislative monopoly or the legislative first-mover constructions.
Decisions to create administrative structures and to confer legislative pow-
ers on them are of the highest political magnitude, and would fully war-
rant the Framers prescribing in detail who is to make these decisions and
with what degree of deliberation. The only sharing theorem inconsistent
with the detail of Article I is the legislative supremacy construction, which
would allow agencies and courts to make law without any warrant for do-
ing so from the body constituted by Article I.
The proponent of the legislative first-mover construction can also ad-
vance an affirmative argument based on the language of Article I, Section
1. If we consider the opening words, "[a]ll legislative Powers herein
granted," it is possible that what the Clause means is that the constitutional
power to legislate is given exclusively to Congress. In other words, entities
other than Congress have no inherent power to legislate derived directly
from Article I or the Constitution as a whole. On this reading, Article I,
Section 1 constitutionalizes the anti-inherency principle, establishing that
executive agencies and courts have no power to legislate on their own
authority. But it does not speak to the question whether Congress can
delegate legislative power to some other entity.
If Article I, Section 1 embodies the anti-inherency principle, then
the transferability principle can be derived from the Necessary and
Proper Clause.' 23 There is, in fact, a direct implication in the Necessary
and Proper Clause that Congress has the power to transfer significant
powers of implementation to executive and judicial actors. The Clause
reads in full,
211, 216-24 (1989) (finding that state constitutions adopted between 1776 and 1787
"display an exceedingly weak version of separation of powers").
122. See supra Part III.A.
123. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. See Krent, Discontents, supra note 85, at 736 ("[A]s
a textual matter, the constitutional authorization for Congress to make all laws 'necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing powers' could readily include
delegating policymaking authority, whether in authorizing some other entity to fashion
new rules, interpret preexisting rules, or apply rules to different factual situations.").
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The Congress shall have Power To... make all Laws which shall
be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the forego-
ing Powers [of Article I, Section 8], and all other Powers vested by
this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any De-
partment or Officer thereof 124
In other words, Congress is directly authorized to make laws neces-
sary and proper for carrying into execution "other Powers" originally
vested in the executive branch and the judicial branch.1 25 This direct
authorization of cross-branch transfers of power in turn raises three ques-
tions as applied to congressional grants of legislative rulemaking powers.
First, are grants of legislative rulemaking authority "necessary" to car-
rying into execution various federal programs and policies? The Court in
M'Culloch v. Maryland famously concluded that "necessary" here means
useful and appropriate. 2 6 Given two centuries of delegations of legisla-
tive rulemaking power to executive agencies, there is no doubt that such
grants are "necessary" as that term has been understood from M'Culloch
to the present, i.e., useful and appropriate.
Second, are grants of legislative rulemaking authority a "proper"
means of carrying out federal programs and policies? "Proper" here
should be understood to mean otherwise in accordance with the struc-
ture and specific proscriptions of the Constitution. 12 7 The most plausible
candidate for a clause that might specifically proscribe delegation of legis-
lative power is, of course, Article I, Section 1. But if we interpret Article I,
Section 1 to mean only that there is no constitutionally conferred power to
legislate on the part of the executive and judicial branches-in other
words, as constitutionalizing the anti-inherency principle-then there is
nothing "improper" about Congress concluding that it is necessary to dele-
gate legislative power to one of these other branches. 28
124. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cls. 1, 18 (emphasis added).
125. See William W. Van Alystyne, The Role of Congress in Determining Incidental
Powers of the President and the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect of
the Sweeping Clause, Law & Contemp. Probs., Spring 1976, at 102, 107 (arguing that
Necessary and Proper Clause was intended to give Congress exclusive authority to augment
by legislation the powers given to the executive and judicial branches by Articles II and
Ill).
126. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 356 (1819).
127. See Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal Power: A
Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 Duke L.J. 267, 291 (1993).
128. Lawson discusses at some length the possibility that the Necessary and Proper
Clause could constitute a source of authority for delegation of legislative power, but he
concludes that it cannot, since the Necessary and Proper Clause allows Congress to adopt
only those additional means to permissible ends that are themselves "proper." See Lawson,
Delegation, supra note 10, at 347-51. This presupposes, however, that Article I, Section 1
incorporates the legislative monopoly sharing principle. If, instead, that Clause
incorporates the legislative first mover sharing principle, then there would be nothing in
Article I, Section 1 that would render delegation pursuant to the Necessary and Proper
Clause improper.
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Third, are the "powers vested in" the executive and judicial branches
the sort of powers that would make entities in these branches the proper
objects of delegations of legislative rulemaking authority? Here the an-
swer is more doubtful as an original matter. With respect to the courts,
the matter remains doubtful. Article III courts have had only minimal
involvement in rulemaking, primarily in promulgating rules of evidence
and procedure and participating in formulating sentencing guidelines.1 29
The dominant mode of judicial policymaking has always been through
case-by-case decisionmaking. It is doubtful, therefore, that the 'Judicial
power" referenced in Article III is broad enough to sustain a delegated
grant of legislative rulemaking authority that would encompass rules de-
signed to regulate private primary behavior.1 30 But with respect to the
executive branch, the lesson of history has clearly been that the "execu-
tive power" is broad enough to encompass the exercise of legislative
rulemaking authority. The First Congress made several significant grants
of rulemaking authority to President Washington, 13 1 and Congress has
continued to make such grants ever since.1 3 2 By the test of time, there-
fore, it is settled that the executive power is the sort of power that can
properly be augmented by delegations of legislative rulemaking power
from Congress.
What about evidence of original intent? The debates at the Conven-
tion and over ratification shed little light on the original understanding
about the possibility of sharing of legislative powers. As to whether the
three great powers of government are mutually exclusive, certain state
constitutions of the founding era were explicit about this. As stated by
one such document, "The legislative, executive, and judiciary depart-
ment, shall be separate and distinct, so that neither exercise the powers
properly belonging to the other: nor shall any person exercise the pow-
ers of more than one of them, at the same time .... ,,t33 Whether the
Framers intended the same result without saying so under the federal
Constitution is highly debatable. Madison offered some famous observa-
129. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 384-88 (1989) (describing role of
judges sitting on Sentencing Commission and under the Rules Enabling Act).
130. One important implication of identifying the Necessary and Proper Clause as the
basis for the transferability principle is that this means delegation is a power restricted to
Congress. See Van Alystyne, supra note 125. The President, for example, has no
constitutional authority to delegate the power of the pardon or the veto, and the courts
have no constitutional authority to delegate the power to render decisions within their
jurisdiction. Congress, wielding the Necessary and Proper Clause, might authorize such
presidential and judicial delegations. But these powers cannot be delegated by the
President or the courts without authorizing legislation from Congress. See, e.g., infra Part
VI.D (discussing subdelegation).
131. See Posner & Vermeule, Interring, supra note 17, at 1735-36.
132. See Merrill & Watts, supra note 6, at 472.
133. The Constitution of Virginia-1776, in 7 Francis Newton Thorpe, The Federal
and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the States,
Territories, and Colonies Now or Heretofore Forming the United States of America 3812,
3815 (1909).
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tions in The Federalist Papers implying that strict differentiation among the
three powers is not possible.13 4 But later he proposed that a provision
mandating strict separation be added to the Constitution as one of the
articles of the Bill of Rights.1 3 5 Although the proposal passed the House,
it was rejected for unexplained reasons by the Senate. 13 6 The failure of
the amendment could mean either that Congress opposed the idea of
strict separation of powers or that it assumed the principle of strict sepa-
ration was already reflected in the Constitution, making the amendment
unnecessary.
As to the significance of the qualifier "all" in the Vesting Clause, the
documentary record also sheds little light, since the qualifier was added
late in the Convention by the Committee of Style, and the addition stimu-
lated no recorded comment.' 3 7 Throughout most of the deliberations,
the powers of the three branches were described in parallel language that
included no such differentiation.
Given the dearth of materials in the constitutional debates, the dis-
pute over original understanding regarding delegation of legislative
power has turned to a passage in John Locke's Second Treatise of Govern-
ment. 13 8 The premise here is that the Framers were familiar with and
largely approved of Locke's political philosophy. So if Locke supported
the legislative monopoly position, the Framers presumably supported the
legislative monopoly position. Locke's most pointed comment about leg-
islative delegation was made in the course of discussing limitations on the
extent of the legislative power that he said must be observed in all
commonwealths:
The power of the Legislative being derived from the People by a
positive voluntary Grant and Institution, can be no other, than
what that positive Grant conveyed, which being only to make
Laws, and not to make Legislators, the Legislative can have no
power to transfer their Authority of making Laws, and place it in
other hands. 139
Posner and Vermeule engage in a spirited debate with Alexander
and Prakash over what Locke meant in saying the legislature can make
134. The Federalist No. 37, supra note 105, at 235 (James Madison).
135. Edward Dumbauld, The Bill of Rights and What It Means Today 46-47 (1957).
136. Id.
137. See David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Federalist Period
1789-1801, at 177 (1997); Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 Yale L.J.
1725, 1791 (1996) (arguing "the absence of debate" about Committee on Style's changes
"does not signal a deliberative consensus so much as exhaustion and impatience").
138. In addition to the debate between Posner and Vermeule and Alexander and
Prakash, see also, for example, Ernest Gellhorn, Returning to First Principles, 36 Am. U. L.
Rev. 345, 347-48 (1987) (noting Locke's "insistence that legislators cannot delegate their
legislative authority").
139. Locke, Laslett, supra note 104, at 375. The sound bite about "making Laws not
Legislators" does not appear in the first edition of the work, as reproduced in John Locke,
Two Treatises of Civil Government 189 (Everyman's ed. 1970) (1690) (reproducing first
state of the first edition).
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laws but not legislators. Posner and Vermeule say Locke was arguing only
against the transfer of de jure powers of enacting legislation, as by grant-
ing third parties the right to vote in the legislature. 140 In other words,
Locke was forbidding delegation only of the formal understanding of leg-
islative power. Alexander and Prakash counter that Locke intended to
proscribe any delegation of the making of rules for the governance of
society. 14 1 That is, Locke would forbid any delegation of legislative
power, understood in the functional sense of statutes or rules having the
force and effect of statutes. Both sets of authors agree on one thing:
Locke opposed any sharing of legislative power by the body the people
elected to exercise it.
A fuller consideration of Locke's Second Treatise on Government reveals
a more complex picture. The principal complication is that Locke in fact
was not opposed to all sharing of legislative power in the functional sense,
because he endorsed the concept of the executive prerogative. In a chap-
ter entitled "Of Prerogative," Locke offered a sweeping definition of the
prerogative, as the "[p]ower to act according to discretion, for the pub-
lick good, without the prescription of the Law, and sometimes even
against it .... -142 Locke commended the idea of inherent executive
power, because the legislature is not always in session and it is "impossible
to foresee, and so by laws to provide for, all Accidents and Necessities,
that may concern the publick; or make such Laws, as will do no harm, if
they are Executed with an inflexible rigour, on all occasions, and upon all
Persons, that may come in their way . . ,,143 Locke appears to have
contemplated that this executive prerogative could be expanded or con-
tracted by legislation. 144 But even with this qualification, his chapter on
the prerogative makes clear that he was not so much in the option one
camp (legislative monopoly) or the option two calmp (legislative first
mover) but rather in the option three camp (legislative supremacy): He
believed the executive had inherent authority to act with the force of law,
subject to being overridden by subsequent action of the legislature.
Locke's endorsement of the executive prerogative casts doubt on
whether his statements about legislative delegation are a true guide to the
Framers' intent for another reason. We can be confident that the execu-
tive prerogative endorsed by Locke was rejected by the Framers of our
Constitution. 145 How then would the Framers have regarded the balance
140. Posner & Vermeule, Interring, supra note 17, at 1727-28.
141. Alexander & Prakash, supra note 41, at 1297-98.
142. Locke, Laslett, supra note 104, at 375.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 376.
145. See St. George Tucker, 2 Blackstone's Commentaries: With Notes of Reference
to the Constitution and Laws, of the Federal Government, and of the Commonwealth of
Virginia 237 n.1 (Lawbook Exch., Ltd. 1996) (1803) ("The title 'prerogative' it is presumed
was annihilated in America with the kingly government . . . ."); see also James Hart, The
Ordinance Making Powers of the President of the United States 110-19 (1925) (arguing
that grants of specific powers such as those of commander-in-chief demonstrate Framers'
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of Locke's presentation? Would they have accepted the remainder with-
out qualification, embracing legislative monopoly with no possibility of
delegation? Or would they have modified the remainder by embracing
something like the first-mover idea and permitting delegation? Obviously
we do not know, but the latter possibility is surely at least as reasonable as
the former.
A second complication concerns a passage at the beginning of the
chapter "Of the Extent of the Legislative Power" that includes the famous
statement about making laws not legislators. In introducing the topic,
Locke writes,
[The legislative power] is not only the supream power of the
Common-wealth, but sacred and unalterable in the hands where
the Community have once placed it; nor can any Edict of any
Body else, in what Form soever conceived, or by what Power so-
ever backed, have the force and obligation of a Law, which has
not its Sanction from that Legislative, which the publick has chosen
and appointed. For without this the Law could not have that,
which is absolutely necessary to its being a Law, the consent of
the Society, over whom no Body can have a power to make Laws,
but by their own consent, and by Authority received from them
146
The words "any Edict... which has not its Sanction from [the] Legis-
lative" are ambiguous. Partisans of legislative monopoly might argue that
they mean the edicts themselves must have the sanction of the legislature.
That is, the edicts of others cannot under any circumstances have the
force and obligation of law because they do not have the sanction of the
legislature. But an alternative reading is that the edicts of others have the
force and obligation of law if and only if the legislature so sanctions. On
this interpretation, Locke was acknowledging that the legislature does
have the power to confer authority on other persons to act with the force
of law, provided it gives its "sanction" to this outcome, i.e., the first mover
interpretation. 147 This alternative reading, moreover, is somewhat more
consistent with the idea of an executive prerogative subject to legislative
regulation, which, as we have seen, Locke explicitly endorsed.
The important point for present purposes is that we must exercise
considerable caution before treating one dictum in Locke as the Rosetta
Stone that unlocks the Framers' intent with regard to the sharing of legis-
lative powers. 48
intent not to convey broad executive prerogative); William Howard Taft, Our Chief
Magistrate and His Powers 139-40 (1916). See generally Monaghan, Protective, supra note
83, at 12-24 (describing consensus among early commentators that the President did not
enjoy the powers exercised by the King).
146. Locke, Laslett, supra note 104, at 356 (emphasis added).
147. See Posner & Vermeule, Post-Mortem, supra note 41, at 1339.
148. This is not the only respect in which one must exercise caution about Locke's
famous pronouncements. In the same chapter on the extent of legislative power, Locke
also asserted that the legislature can never take someone's property without consent. This,
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When we turn to evolved judicial understanding, we similarly find
little basis for favoring either the legislative monopoly or legislative first-
mover positions. The dilemma here is whether we heed what the Court
says or what it does. The Court says that Article I, Section 1 precludes any
delegation of legislative power.' 49 But the Court has declined to enforce
this understanding by invalidating any of Congress's numerous post-New
Deal enactments that transfer to executive agencies broad power to make
rules with the force of law.' 50 If we look to what the Court does, it be-
lieves that legislative power can be delegated. This is probably true no
matter which of the three definitions of legislative power we embrace-
even the discretionary definition-for there is no doubt that Congress
has been allowed to transfer discretionary authority subject to constraints
so gossamer that the agency has virtually the same leeway that Congress
itself enjoys when it legislates. 15 1
The judicial performance is even more puzzling than this disjunction
between rhetoric and holdings would suggest. In its more candid mo-
ments, the Court has recognized even in nondelegation cases that agency
rulemaking reflects a form of delegated legislative power. In Mistretta v.
United States, for example, the majority affirmed that "rulemaking pursu-
ant to a legislative delegation is not the exclusive prerogative of the Exec-
utive.... On the contrary, rulemaking power originates in the Legislative
Branch and becomes an executive function only when delegated by the
Legislature to the Executive Branch."1 5 2 In still other cases, the Court
has gone so far as to describe the power to delegate as an inherent attri-
bute of the powers vested in each branch of government.1 5-3 Even Justice
Scalia, who insists most vehemently that the legislative power can never
be delegated, has otherwise acknowledged that "a certain degree of dis-
cretion, and thus of lawmaking, inheres in most executive or judicial ac-
of course, is inconsistent with the power of eminent domain, which the Framers implicitly
acknowledged to exist when they adopted the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation
Clause. The Framers here followed more nuanced discussions of eminent domain found
in Blackstone, Pufendorf, and Vattel rather than the simplistic assertion of Locke. See
David A. Dana & Thomas W. Merrill, Property: Takings 19-25 (2002).
149. See supra note 19.
150. See supra notes 14-30 and accompanying text.
151. See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 172-78 (1968)
(upholding FCC regulation of cable television industry even though Federal
Communications Act contained no provision authorizing regulation of that industry);
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1965) (upholding against nondelegation challenge a
statute authorizing the Secretary of State to establish rules and regulations for issuing
passports but setting forth no criteria for their issuance); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S.
414, 425-26 (1944) (upholding price controls under a statute that provided no guidance
as to the factors to be used in setting prices).
152. 488 U.S. 361, 386 n.14 (1989).
153. See Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 778 (1948) ("A constitutional power
implies a power of delegation of authority under it sufficient to effect its purposes."
(emphasis omitted)).
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tion."1 54 So even the Court's rhetorical commitment to the legislative
monopoly position is open to question.
On one point, however, the lesson of evolved understanding is more
decisive. There can be no claim grounded in history and tradition that
the executive or the courts enjoy a general, inherent power to promul-
gate legislative rules absent some delegation by Congress. As my col-
league Henry Monaghan concludes in his magisterial survey of historical
understandings about the scope of inherent presidential powers, "Our
tradition is that no official-from the President down-can invade pri-
vate rights unless authorized by legislation."1 55 Thus, if one is inclined to
give significant weight in constitutional law to settled interpretational
glosses, the third sharing option-legislative supremacy-must be re-
jected, at least as a general rule.
This does not mean that the legislative supremacy conception is in-
consequential. Although history has rejected legislative supremacy as the
appropriate characterization of the maximal degree of congressional ex-
clusivity under Article I, Section 1, there is a bedrock consensus that it
represents the minimal degree of congressional exclusivity in the exercise
of legislative power. In other words, when Congress has legislated on a
subject, the legislation is constitutional, and the legislation leaves no
room for interpretation, all agree that the statute is binding on those who
come within its terms-including of course the executive and judicial
branches of government. 1 56 This is an extremely important axiom of
American government, reflected in the Supremacy Clause of Article VI,
but also, one can say, in Article I, Section 1.
D. Herein
The third interpretive question-whether "herein" refers to "this
Constitution" or "this Article I"-has the thinnest backdrop of interpre-
tive material available to help resolve it. In one other place where the
Constitution uses "herein," the context clearly suggests that the referent
is the Constitution as a whole, not a single article.' 57 But the inferential
value of this is weak, since the referent of herein is always heavily depen-
dent on context.
154. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 417 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
155. Monaghan, Protective, supra note 83, at 61.
156. See, e.g., Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) (noting that
"[o]nce the meaning of an enactment is discerned and its constitutionality determined,
the judicial process comes to an end"); Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 177-78
(1804) (holding that presidential order cannot contradict language of statute). See
generally Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 Geo.
L.J. 281 (1990).
157. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl 2. This Appointments Clause provides that the
President shall appoint ambassadors, judges, "and all other Officers of the United States,
whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for. .. ." Id. (emphasis added).
The most likely referent of "herein otherwise provided for" would be the Members of
Congress, whose method of appointment is detailed in Article I.
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Arguably the overall structure of the Constitution makes more sense
if we construe "herein" in Article I, Section 1 to refer only to Article I
itself. For example, the President's power to make treaties, set forth in
Article II, seems to qualify as a type of legislative power. 15 8 It would be
odd for the constitutional drafters to confer "all" legislative powers on
Congress in Article I, and then grant a specific type of legislative power to
the President in Article II. The anomaly disappears if we read "herein
granted" to limit the "all" to powers enumerated in Article I.
Potentially offsetting this structural inference is the fact that the
clearest instance of the President's participation in the legislative pro-
cess-his exercise of the veto-is set forth in Article I itself. 15 9 If "herein"
is designed to emphasize the exclusivity of the vesting of Article I powers
to the Congress, what is the President's principal legislative function do-
ing in Article I, rather than Article II?
But this counterinference is weak, given that the Framers could plau-
sibly distinguish between "legislative powers" and "legislative functions"
(including the veto). 1 60 Article I, Section 1 says that "[a]ll legislative Pow-
ers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States."
Article I takes up the delineation of these powers in Article I, Section
8.161 The President participates in legislative functions pursuant to Arti-
cle I, Section 7-which does not mention powers-and the President is
given no particular constitutional authority over the powers listed in Arti-
cle I, Section 8. His constitutionally conferred powers, such as the power
to make treaties or to act as Commander-in-Chief, appear in Article II. So
the placement of the veto in Article I does not defeat the structural infer-
ence that "herein" refers to Article I powers.
The narrow reading of "herein granted" is also, roughly speaking,
consistent with evolved institutional practice. The President has been ac-
knowledged to have significant independent rulemaking powers with re-
spect to the Commander-in-Chief function, the power to negotiate trea-
ties, and the power to receive ambassadors. After reviewing the
precedents, Professor Monaghan has concluded, "[T]he President's 'spe-
158. Id. ("He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to
make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur .... "). Article VI
provides that "all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land," a status otherwise accorded only to
federal statutes and the Constitution itself. Id. art. VI, cl. 2.
159. Id. art I., § 7, cl. 2.
160. See Bernard W. Bell, Dead Again: The Nondelegation Doctrine, The Rules/
Standards Dilemma, and the Line Item Veto, 44 Vill. L. Rev. 189, 221-22 (1999) (citing
evidence that Framers did not regard the presidential veto as a type of "legislative
authority"). I am not suggesting that the veto is not an important presidential power, using
power in the sense of "clout." I am only suggesting that in the linguistic conventions of the
Constitution, "power" is used more in the sense of subject matter jurisdiction, rather than
in the sense of clout.
161. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (commanding that "[t]he Congress shall have Power
To" do certain enumerated things).
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cific' constitutional powers, such as the Commander-in-Chief power and
the powers 'implied' from presidential duties, now (whatever the original
understanding) imply some independent presidential law-making
power." 162 Interestingly, the President has also been given broad inher-
ent authority with respect to the management of territories and federal
lands. 163 The power to manage the territories and other federal property
is given by the Constitution to Congress. But it is given in Article IV, 16 4
not Article I, and hence is not covered by the "herein granted" lan-
guage-if we construe this language to refer to Article I rather than the
Constitution as a whole. The narrow interpretation of "herein" thus gives
the text a meaning that comports with the tradition of stronger inherent
presidential powers in the areas of territorial governance and federal-
land management as well.' 65
E. Final Verdict on Traditional Tools of Interpretation
We have made some headway in narrowing the plausible meanings
of Article I, Section 1 using the traditional tools of constitutional inter-
pretation. In particular, insofar as we wish to know whether the Supreme
Court's current "anything goes" interpretation is sound, the traditional
tools appear to favor other readings.
There are three different interpretive paths one can take to reach
the result that no duly enacted statute of Congress ever violates Article I,
Section 1, i.e., anything goes. Two of these paths entail selecting particu-
lar definitions of legislative power. The Court's preferred path is the 3-1-
1 solution (to use the numbering system of Part III), that is, the discre-
tionary interpretation of legislative power, coupled with the legislative
monopoly interpretation of sharing, coupled with a broad construction
of "herein." This results in anything goes because of the Court's extreme
reluctance to disturb congressional judgments about how much discre-
tion is too much discretion under the discretionary definition of legisla-
tive power. An alternative path to the same end would be the one en-
dorsed by Posner and Vermeule-a 1-1-1 solution, substituting the formal
definition of legislative power for the discretionary definition. This re-
sults in anything goes, so long as the challenged delegation is contained
in a formally adopted statute. The third path to the current doctrine
would be to embrace the legislative supremacy interpretation of sharing
162. Monaghan, Protective, supra note 83, at 54.
163. With respect to territories, see Gary Lawson, Territorial Governments and the
Limits of Formalism, 78 Cal. L. Rev. 853, 905 (1990) (discussing presidential power to
govern occupied territory as part of Commander-in-Chief power); with respect to federal
lands, see United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 469 (1915) (recognizing
presidential power to close federal public-domain lands to further oil concessions in order
to conserve military fuel reserves).
164. See U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall have Power to... make all
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the
United States.").
165. See Schoenbrod, supra note 10, at 186-89.
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(any type of x-3-x solution). This results in anything goes because it
would confer inherent authority on agencies to make legislative rules, the
only question being whether the agency has complied with any legislation
that Congress has enacted.
The evidence surveyed in this Part suggests that all three paths are
problematic. As we have seen in subpart A, the functional definition of
legislative power (meaning 2) is more plausible than either the formal
definition (meaning 1) or the discretionary definition (meaning 3).
Thus, there is reason to believe that either strict nondelegation (the
Schoenbrod/Redish/Lawson position) or exclusive delegation-both of
which embrace the functional definition of legislative power-represent
sounder interpretations of Article I, Section 1 than current constitutional
doctrine. As we have seen in subpart B, the legislative supremacy inter-
pretation (meaning 3) is less plausible than either the legislative monop-
oly (meaning 1) or the legislative first-mover (meaning 2) interpreta-
tions. Consequently, the third path to anything goes is also less plausible
on traditional legal grounds than either the strict nondelegation doctrine
or the exclusive delegation doctrine. In short, each of the three paths to
current doctrine (nonenforcement) is inferior to either strict nondelega-
tion or exclusive delegation on traditional legal grounds. This conclu-
sion is a modest but important payoff of considering traditional legal
materials.
Unfortunately, when we turn to a comparison between strict
nondelegation and exclusive delegation, the traditional tools lose their
power to differentiate. A strict nondelegation doctrine would represent
either a 2-1-1 or 2-1-2 solution; the exclusive delegation doctrine, at least
my version, would represent a 2-2-2 solution. The difference lies in which
sharing principle we adopt-legislative monopoly or legislative first-
mover. The evidence surveyed in subpart B suggests that neither of these
conceptions of permissible sharing clearly dominates the other. Thus, we
cannot say, based at least on an analysis of traditional legal evidence, that
either of these options is necessarily superior to the other.
IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF INTERPRETATIONAL CHOICE
Traditional interpretational sources-constitutional structure, origi-
nal understanding, and settled precedent-take us only part of the way in
our quest to narrow the plausible meanings of Article I, Section 1. In
these circumstances (not unusual in matters of constitutional law), it is
important to consider the consequences of embracing one interpretation
or another. Interpretation should remain faithful to the constraints dis-
coverable using the traditional tools of interpretation. But when those
tools leave room for choice, the sensible course is to try to choose the
interpretation that has better overall consequences. 166
166. For a sustained argument in support of this proposition, see Richard Posner,
Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy 6-7 (2003). In undertaking any such consequentialist
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In what follows, I briefly consider a number of consequentialist argu-
ments thought at various times to bear on the constitutional allocation of
legislative power. The inquiry with respect to many of these arguments is
thwarted by the lack of relevant empirical data, so the discussion will nec-
essarily be speculative. I will confine my comments to the three options
that seem to have the strongest claims to legal plausibility. The first two
options are versions of the nondelegation doctrine: a version in which
the requirement of an intelligible principle (or its equivalent) would be
strictly enforced by the courts, perhaps along the lines advocated by
Schoenbrod, Redish, or Lawson ("strict nondelegation"), and the version
reflected in current case law, which features such lax judicial enforce-
ment that anything goes ("lax nondelegation"). The third option is what
I have called exclusive delegation: the idea that agencies and courts have
no inherent authority to make law (at least with respect to the matters
covered by Article I), but that Congress may transfer such authority to
them. These of course are not the only options imaginable. "Strict" and
"lax" nondelegation describe points along a continuum rather than dis-
tinctively different approaches. And either mode of nondelegation (or
anything in between) could be combined with exclusive delegation, since
nondelegation and exclusive delegation are not incompatible at the level
of doctrine, as opposed to the level of constitutional theory. 16 7 But the
consequentialist inquiry is complex enough without adding more options
for examination, and the conclusions we reach about these three points
of reference should be enough to determine whether intermediate pos-
sibilities are preferable. 168
I will begin with arguments advanced primarily by the proponents of
strict nondelegation, and will then turn to arguments put forward by pro-
ponents of a broad power of delegation (which means in practice the
proponents of lax nondelegation). Since no one to my knowledge has
expressly argued for exclusive delegation, we will have to make do with
inquiry, it is important to frame the choice in comparative terms: Given political and
institutional realities, what would be the probable consequences of the different
interpretational options if they were adopted and enforced by the courts? See David B.
Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 Geo. L.J. 97,
134 (2000). See generally Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and
Institutions, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 885, 914 (2003) (arguing that "[i]t is impossible to derive
interpretive rules directly from first-best principles, without answering second-best
questions about institutional performance," in particular, questions about the capacities of
judges to get things right, and about likely responses of other institutions to judicial
rulings).
167, See supra text after note 6.
168. Specifically, and to anticipate, if exclusive delegation is superior to either version
of nondelegation, then it is difficult to see how an) blending or pairing of nondelegation
and exclusive delegation would fare better than simply adopting exclusive delegation.
Pairing strict nondelegation with exclusive delegation would merely dilute the comparative
advantage of exclusive delegation, whereas pairing lax nondelegation with exclusive
delegation would neither add nor subtract from the comparative advantage of exclusive
delegation.
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guesses as to how it would fare in light of arguments put forward by pro-
ponents of strict and lax nondelegation.
A. Antidelegation Policies
1. Democratic Accountability. - The most prominent argument ad-
vanced by the proponents of strict nondelegation is the desirability of
having public policy made by actors who are accountable to the peo-
ple. 169 Indeed, this is typically offered as the trump card in the case for
strict nondelegation. Congress, it is argued, is the most democratically
accountable political institution; hence, if we want policy made by actors
accountable to the people, we should require that policy (at least "impor-
tant" policy) be made by Congress rather than by unelected administra-
tors.1 70 More recently, revisionist thinkers, led by Jerry Mashaw, have
called into question whether Congress is in fact more accountable than
are administrative agencies. 171 They argue that agencies actually rate
more highly on the accountability scale because agencies must answer to
the President, who is elected by all the people.
As Elizabeth Magill has observed, the debate over which is more ac-
countable-Congress or an agency-is normatively confused because
each side means something different by "accountability."' 72 For the pro-
ponents of strict nondelegation, accountability refers to "the relationship
between government and citizens."1 73 From this perspective, the Mem-
bers of Congress are more accountable because they must personally
stand for election by citizens. Mashaw and the other revisionists, in con-
trast, define accountability differently, focusing on whether the person
who actually exercises policymaking authority "can be monitored and
controlled." t 7 4 From this perspective, Congress is not especially account-
169. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 24, at 132; Redish, supra note 10, at 142; Schoenbrod,
supra note 10, at 8-12; Marci A. Hamilton, Representation and Nondelegation: Back to
Basics, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 807, 820 (1999).
170. This is an argument based on the legitimacy of different governmental forms.
Although legitimacy arguments can be either consequentialist or nonconsequentialist, for
present purposes we can consider public accountability a type of consequentialist claim. It
is plausible that government forms that are more legitimate are more acceptable to the
public and hence more effective. It is also plausible that government forms that are more
legitimate increase public satisfaction with decisions, independent of their content.
171. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Greed, Chaos, & Governance 132 (1997) [hereinafter
Mashaw, Greed]; Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make
Political Decisions, I J.L. Econ. & Org. 81, 95-99 (1985); see also Peter H. Schuck,
Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 775,
783-90 (1999) (noting variety of mechanisms making agencies accountable).
172. M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 Va. L.
Rev. 1127, 1180-81 (2000) [hereinafter Magill, Real Separation]; see also Dan M. Kahan,
Democracy Schmemocracy, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 795, 795-96 (1999) (arguing that either
nondelegation or prodelegation can be derived from the idea of furthering democratic
decisionmaking, because democracy has multiple contested meanings).
173. Magill, Real Separation, supra note 172, at 1181.
174. Id.
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able, since responsibility for enacting statutes is diffusely spread among
100 Senators and 435 Representatives. Moreover, in the age of omnibus
legislation, policy issues are commonly bundled together, and individual
votes on each policy are often impossible. 175 So individual legislators can
often disclaim responsibility for controversial legislation, even if they cast
their vote in favor of the final measure in which it was adopted. In con-
trast, executive policymakers can be monitored and controlled by the
White House, giving them a degree of "accountability" that is absent
when Congress makes policy.
The normative debate about what constitutes accountability is com-
pounded by empirical uncertainties about whether and when legislators
are likely to seek to avoid accountability (in the sense of being directly
responsible for policy choices). Some authors have asserted that legisla-
tors seek to shirk responsibility when regulation would impose concen-
trated costs on particular interest groups.1 76 Others have claimed that
shirking is most common when regulation will produce diffuse as op-
posed to concentrated benefits. 177 Still others have claimed that shirking
is to be expected most whenever two or more interest groups are at odds
over a proposed law.178 No one has suggested a workable empirical test
that would distinguish among these hypotheses, or that would distinguish
between legislative shirking and decisions to delegate taken for reasons
other than a desire to avoid accountability.
The accountability issue ultimately turns on complicated normative
and empirical questions that remain unresolved. Given this impasse, we
cannot award decisive points to any of the three options on accountability
grounds. To the extent it turns out that direct election is more important
in assuring accountability, strict nondelegation is clearly the winner, since
it would assure that the largest amount of policymaking is made by the
directly accountable Congress. Exclusive delegation would presumably
be second, since on this approach Congress would at least be required
clearly to delegate agency authority to act legislatively and to delineate
the scope of authority to be exercised. Lax nondelegation would come
out last. To the extent it turns out that monitoring and control are more
important in assuring accountability, the order of preference would be
reversed.
2. Policy Drift. - Another variable that has loomed large in the dele-
gation literature is the danger that agencies will promote policies that
diverge from those intended by the enacting legislature. A variety of "pol-
175. See Barbara Sinclair, Unorthodox Lawmaking: New Legislative Processes in the
U.S. Congress 71 (2d ed. 2000).
176. See Aranson et al., supra note 24, at 24-27.
177. See David Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost
Politics Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers 201-06 (1999) [hereinafter
Epstein & O'Halloran, Delegating Powers].
178. See Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Penalty Default Canon, 72 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 663, 674-75 (2004).
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icy drift" arguments have been advanced, some of them mutually exclu-
sive. Analysts have posited that agencies will pursue their own interests,
such as expanding the size of agency budgets, at the expense of policies
they were established to pursue. 179 Others have suggested that agencies
are susceptible to lock-in effects, as the political values of the first genera-
tion of agency officials are continuously replicated over time, even as the
values of the public and the legislature change. 180 Still others have hy-
pothesized that agencies are dominated by powerful congressional com-
mittees, with the result that agency policy reflects the preferences of cur-
rent legislative committees, as opposed to the preferences of the enacting
Congress. 18
By far the most prominent problem of drift emphasized in the litera-
ture, however, is what is called "agency capture."'18 2 Much of the call to
arms by the strict nondelegation camp has been driven by the belief that
agencies are more prone to capture than legislative bodies. This belief,
unfortunately, has been more often assumed than demonstrated, and so
is difficult to evaluate.
The earliest incarnation of the agency capture thesis was based on a
kind of relational theory of contract. 183 Agencies were depicted as ex-
isting in a reciprocal long-term relationship with particular industries,
with the result that they tend to develop norms of cooperation with the
industry. Industry will supply agencies with needed information and sug-
gestions for workable policies; agency personnel who adopt policies fa-
vored by industry are rewarded with lucrative employment or consulting
contracts after leaving office. Thus, it was said, the agency's policy over
time will come to resemble the preferences of industry, rather than the
values reflected in the agency's legislative mandate. More recent versions
of the agency capture thesis appear to be loosely based on the interest-
group theory of politics, which posits that different groups have different
degrees of influence on policymakers based on their costs of organizing
for effective political action. 184 The argument-or at least the assump-
tion' 85-appears to be that powerful interest groups will enjoy greater
179. William A. Niskanen, Jr., Bureaucracy and Representative Government 38-41
(1971).
180. See Spence & Cross, supra note 166, at 114-15 (citing to literature).
181. For an overview of this literature, see David B. Spence, Administrative Law and
Agency Policy-Making: Rethinking the Positive Theory of Political Control, 14 Yale J. on
Reg. 407 (1997).
182. For further discussion, see generally Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the
Courts: 1967-1983, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1039, 1050-52 (1997) [hereinafter Merrill,
Capture Theory]; Spence & Cross, supra note 166, at 121-22.
183. See Marver H. Bernstein, Regulating Business by Independent Commission
157-60 (1955).
184. See, e.g., Neil Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law,
Economics, and Public Policy 54-58 (1994); Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action
10-12, 46-47 (1965).
185. How proponents of the interest-group theory of politics came to assume that
agencies are more prone to capture than legislatures remains largely unexplained-at least
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influence with agencies than they do with legislatures, presumably be-
cause the costs of capturing the agency are lower than costs of capturing
the legislature.
All the arguments based on the asserted tendency of agencies toward
policy drift are open to serious objections. As numerous political scien-
tists have pointed out, agencies are subject to multiple external con-
straints on their behavior, ranging from legislative oversight to executive
oversight to judicial oversight.18 6 Indeed, the checks on agency behavior
are so numerous and powerful that some have complained the problem is
not agency drift, but agency paralysis.18 7 The argument relying on drift
also ignores internal constraints that militate against problems of aggran-
dizement, lock-ins, or capture. One is the lower cost of participating in
agency proceedings relative to legislative proceedings, which may mean
that a wider variety of interests participate in agency policymaking relative
to legislative policymaking. 18 8 Another is the constraint imposed by the
deliberative norms of the administrative process (the "hard look doc-
trine" and the like), which probably cuts down on the degree to which
agencies can embrace solutions to policy problems favored by agency in-
siders or narrow interest groups.1 89 Given all these constraints, it is not
surprising that empirical support for policy drift as a general problem of
administrative governance is weak.1 90
by political scientists. For the effort of a lawyer who champions the nondelegation
doctrine to derive such an explanation, see Schoenbrod, supra note 10, at 111-12 (arguing
that "diffuse interests typically find it more difficult to press their case before an agency
than before the legislature"). For discussion of the significance of the assumption of
agency capture in the development of administrative law, see Merrill, Capture Theory,
supra note 182, at 1043.
186. See, e.g.,James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy 235-94 (1989); Thomas H. Hammond &
Jack H. Knott, Who Controls the Bureaucracy?: Presidential Power, Congressional
Dominance, Legal Constraints, and Bureaucratic Autonomy in a Model of Multi-
Institutional Policy-Making, 12 J.L. Econ. & Org. 119, 119-20 (1996); Terry Moe, The
Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, in Can the Government Govern? 267, 324-25 (John
Chubb & Paul Peterson eds., 1989) (noting complicated procedural and judicial checks on
EPA and OSHA).
187. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of
Federal Environmental Law, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1991, at 311, 313-15.
188. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Does Public Choice Theory Justify Judicial
Activism After All?, 21 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 219 (1997) (setting forth an analogous
argument about judicial policymaking).
189. For example, federal regulatory agencies were in the vanguard-not the
rearguard-of the movement to deregulate transportation and public utilities industries in
the 1980s and 1990s. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great
Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1323, 1365-69 (1998).
190. For reviews of the weak empirical evidence in support of the agency capture
thesis, see Paul J. Quirk, Industry Influence in Federal Regulatory Agencies 4-21 (1981);
Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98
Colum. L. Rev. 1, 52-56 (1998); Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look
at the Theoretical and "Empirical" Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 Va. L. Rev.
199, 238-68 (1988).
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Some of the more prominent drift arguments suffer from additional
implausibilities. For example, the relational contract theory of agency
capture undoubtedly contains a grain of truth as a descriptive matter.
But it is not clear why the same factors are not also at work in the relation-
ship between the chairs of congressional subcommittees and the indus-
tries they regulate. 9 1 Similarly, it is undoubtedly true that interest-group
capture is more likely where the costs of reaching a deal with political
actors are lower. But again, it is not clear that an interest group must
secure a deal with a majority of the members of both houses in order to
capture Congress; it may be enough to gain support of key committee
chairs, who then get what they want via logrolling. 192 Moreover, because
elected officials "depend on campaign contributions for their continued
existence" whereas agency officials do not,t9 3 it is plausible to think that
elected politicians will be more, rather than less, attentive to interest
group entreaties than agency officials.
Finally, all policy drift arguments, like accountability arguments, are
based on legitimacy. Drift arguments assume that the original legislated
policy is legitimate, and hence any deviations from that policy by the
agency over time are illegitimate. From a broader consequentialist per-
spective this is open to question. It is possible that the original legislative
policy is defective, and that the departures move in the direction of better
policy. To illustrate: The legislature may adopt an ill-conceived populist
measure, which the agency then ameliorates under the influence of pro-
longed exposure to industry views advocating a more pragmatic solution.
Thus, even if it were proven that broad delegation leads to policy drift, it
would still be necessary from a broad consequentialist perspective to show
that this leads to a less desirable state of affairs. No one has even begun
to develop the information that would allow this kind of demonstration
to be made.
Given these objections and unresolved questions, I find it impossible
to give any weight to the alleged proclivities of agencies toward policy
drift in assessing different conceptions of the allocation of legislative
power. Certainly the claim that imposing a strict nondelegation require-
ment would reduce the overall level of policy drift is unproven,' 9 4 as is
the implicit assumption that policy drift is ultimately a bad thing.
3. The Bicameral and Presentment Filter. - Another factor in support
of strict nondelegation that has been cited more recently by public-
191. See Epstein & O'Halloran, Delegating Powers, supra note 177, at 237-38
(concluding that enhanced enforcement of nondelegation doctrine would magnify the
power of congressional subcommittees).
192. David Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, The Nondelegation Doctrine and the
Separation of Powers: A Political Science Approach, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 947, 952-54
(1999) [hereinafter Epstein & O'Halloran, Political Science].
193. Spence & Cross, supra note 166, at 123.
194. Posner & Vermeule, Interring, supra note 17, at 1745-48; see Daniel A. Farber &
Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice 85-86 (1991).
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choice-influenced scholars is the difficulty of enacting congressional legis-
lation.' 9 5 Specifically, the bicameral enactment and presidential present-
ment requirements of Article I serve as important barriers to new laws.
The justification for these barriers is that they promote legislative deliber-
ation and constitute a functional supermajority requirement, thereby fil-
tering out a certain percentage of ill-conceived or faction-driven mea-
sures before they become law. 19 6  Whether the bicameral and
presentment filter (B&P filter) in fact promotes legislative deliberation is
debatable, as is whether it eliminates more impurities than desirable ele-
ments from the legislative stream. But there can be no doubt that the
filter has the effect of restricting the amount of legislating that can take
place in any given session. The question is how much governmental poli-
cymaking should be subject to the B&P filter.
The choice among conceptions of the allocation of legislative power
has a direct bearing on this question. Strict nondelegation would impose
the B&P filter before any legislative rulemaking takes place, or at least
before any important rulemaking takes place. This would impose a signifi-
cant chokehold on federal policymaking relative to current arrangements
and would constrict the total volume of new federal regulation. 197 The
result would be a shift toward more state regulation, state tort law, and
unregulated market ordering. Lax nondelegation permits much more
policymaking to bypass the filter, giving us a significantly larger quantum
of federal regulation. Exclusive delegation would presumably have a
somewhat intermediate effect. Any decision to delegate legislative power
would have to pass through the filter, as would the demarcation of the
scope of authority so granted. But the content of the policymaking au-
thority so delegated would not be subject to the filter; as to the content of
federal regulatory policy, the B&P filter could be bypassed-as is pres-
ently the case for practical purposes under the current regime of lax
nondelegation.
Two large normative questions, both of which entail empirical judg-
ments for which we have woefully insufficient data, are implicated by the
choice among these three allocations of the B&P filter. The first con-
cerns the balance between good and bad federal legislation, as compared
to state regulation, tort law, and market ordering. By "good" I mean leg-
islation that, at a reasonable cost, corrects market failures or redistributes
wealth in a way that enjoys widespread public support. By "bad" I mean
195. See, e.g., Aranson et al., supra note 24, at 21 (noting argument that "absent
delegation, the quality and quantity of legislation, as well as congressional oversight and
investigation, would suffer"); Macey, supra note 24, at 513 (citing Aranson et al.).
196. Manning has the best discussion of the functional reasons for the B&P filter. See
Manning, Nondelegation, supra note 17; see also John 0. McGinnis & Michael B.
Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 703, 770-80 (2002)
(characterizing B&P filter as a type of supermajority rule that tinctions to eliminate
legislation with merely majoritarian support).
197. See Harold H. Bruff, Judicial Review and the President's Statutory Powers, 68 Va.
L. Rev. 1, 28 (1982).
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legislation that produces costs that exceed benefits, or transfers economic
rents to interest groups. If bad federal law predominates over good fed-
eral law, relative to state regulation, tort law, and market ordering, then
we would want to raise the barrier to federal lawmaking. Conversely, if
the good predominates over the bad, then we would want to lower it.198
The second normative question concerns the effectiveness of the
B&P filter in discriminating between good and bad legislation. If the
B&P filter accurately discriminates between market-correcting and rent-
seeking schemes, then we should be eager to employ it as a barrier to
federal regulation. If the B&P filter just randomly blocks proposed laws,
or allows more bad laws to get through than good ones,199 then we
should probably look elsewhere for our barrier to federal regulation. 20 0
I have no special insights into the correct answers to these questions.
The extreme answers-that federal regulation is almost all bad or all
good-seem impossible to defend. Some federal regulation (airline
safety, antiterrorism laws) is almost surely good; other federal regulation
(the Smoot-Hawley tariff20 1) is almost certainly bad. It seems likely that
the B&P filter will kill off some bad ideas, if only because it slows things
down and allows some public debate to take place before laws are en-
acted. But it is also likely that the B&P filter allows interest groups to kill
off legislation that would be in the public interest, by exploiting procedu-
ral bottlenecks in the legislative process.
My own guess-and it's just a guess-is that the B&P filter acts as a
modestly effective screening device that is appropriately imposed before
delegation of legislative power takes place. This would be achieved by the
exclusive delegation doctrine. But I am more skeptical about claims that
the filter needs to be applied before every significant federal policyjudg-
ment is made, or that the filter should be subject to ready evasion on
congressional say-so.
4. Checks and Balances. - A different argument sometimes advanced
in support of strict nondelegation is the desirability of maintaining a vi-
198. As Mashaw points out, the argument against delegation in Aranson et al., supra
note 24, is driven by the assumption that federal regulation is mostly malign. Mashaw,
Greed, supra note 171, at 142-43. Other commentators, who insist that strict
nondelegation would impose an inefficient barrier to federal lawmaking, implicitly assume
that most federal legislation is benign. See generally, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political
Accountability and Delegated Power: A Response to Professor Lowi, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 391
(1987).
199. See Posner & Vermeule, Interring, supra note 17, at 1751 (noting that "if
members of Congress believe that transfers to supporters are the priority, increasing
decision costs will interfere only with low-priority public-interest legislation and not with
high-priority interest-group legislation").
200. Aggressive judicial enforcement of property rights would be an example of an
alternative. See Thomas W. Merrill, Rent Seeking and the Compensation Principle, 80 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 1561, 1589-90 (1986) (reviewing Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property
and the Power of Eminent Domain (1985)).
201. Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, 49 Stat. 590 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 14 U.S.C.).
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brant system of checks and balances among the branches of government,
in order to secure personal liberty more effectively.20 2 The argument
usually goes that without strict nondelegation, Congress will be tempted
to give away too much of its power, paving the way for an all-powerful
Executive Leviathan. Only by forcing Congress to make key policy judg-
ments can we ensure that Congress will continue to serve as an effective
check on the imperial presidency.
This argument, however, faces serious objections. The most obvious
is that it is implausible that Congress-the historical rival of the Execu-
tive-would give away all or even most of its powers.203 A more funda-
mental objection is that strict nondelegation is unnecessary to achieve
lively checks and balances among the branches of government.20 4 All
that is needed is fidelity to three less-exalted propositions: (1) the execu-
tive and judicial branches have no general inherent power to act with the
force of law (the anti-inherency principle); (2) Congress is free to dele-
gate as much power as it wants to the executive and judicial branches (the
transferability principle); and (3) Congress must delegate legislative
power either to the executive orjudicial branches, i.e., it cannot delegate
202. See, e.g., Schoenbrod, supra note 10, at 107-18.
203. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 194, at 84 (calling "unthinkable" idea that
Congress would ever delegate all of its legislative authority "since to do so would leave
Congress impotent"); Epstein & O'Halloran, Political Science, supra note 192, at 950.
204. For a more complete exposition of the argument, see Thomas W. Merrill, The
Constitutional Principle of Separation of Powers, 1991 Sup. Ct. Rev. 225, 251-55
[hereinafter Merrill, Constitutional Principle]. This place is as good as any to offer a
partial qualification of my previous essay. I argued there that the benefits of checks and
balances could be achieved without recognizing any judicial role in enforcing the meaning
of "legislative," "executive," or 'Judicial" power. All that is needed, I argued, is recognition
that every governmental unit must be located in one of three branches of government, and
that each branch must comply with specific constitutional limitations on its exercise of
governmental power. I continue to believe that there is little to be gained by developing
fully specified definitions of "legislative," "executive," and 'judicial" powers, and asking
courts to strike down legislation that allocates governmental power in ways that deviate
from these definitions. But to the extent my earlier essay suggested that any definition of
these powers could be adopted without adversely affecting the system of checks and
balances, I now qualify what I said there. In particular, I now believe that it is necessary, at
a minimum, that Article I, Section 1 be understood to incorporate the anti-inherency and
transferability principles, i.e., the exclusive delegation doctrine. In my previous essay, I
attempted to derive the anti-inherency principle with respect to the executive branch from
the Take Care Clause of Article II. But this begs the question of the source of the "laws"
that the President is enjoined faithfully to execute. If the President has a general inherent
authority to make law as part of the "executive" power, then the Take Care Clause would
impose no limit on the Executive. Moreover, there is no textual basis for the anti-
inherency principle as applied to courts. History of course presents a strong argument
against inherent powers of lawmaking by federal courts. See generally Thomas W. Merrill,
The Judicial Prerogative, 12 Pace L. Rev. 327 (1992). But it is preferable to ground this
understanding in constitutional text, and the most obvious candidate for a text-based
argument is the Vesting Clause of Article I.
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such power to its own agent (the Chadha principle), and it cannot create
a fourth branch of government. 20 5
As long as these three propositions stand, Congress will have a built-
in incentive to maintain a diffusion of power that will maintain a dynamic
tension among the branches. Because of the B&P filter, Congress cannot
do everything itself; it must give significant powers away. If Congress can-
not delegate governmental power to its own agent or create a fourth
branch of government, then it must delegate to the Executive and the
courts. Given its rivalry with the President, Congress would want to pro-
vide for a substantial measure of judicial review of executive action. Yet
because courts cannot govern other than through cases or controversies,
Congress cannot dispense with the Executive for most of what we regard
as executive functions. Congress therefore must share power with both of
the other branches. This dynamic ensures that each branch is sufficiently
powerful to act as a counterweight to the others. 20 6
Notice that under this alternative conception of how to maintain a
diffusion of power among the branches, strict nondelegation is not neces-
sary. Indeed, such an understanding could get in the way of promoting a
proper diffusion of power, by inviting courts to meddle with congres-
sional efforts to distribute governmental power. The exclusive delegation
conception, in contrast, is necessary to make this conception of self-regu-
lating checks and balances work. Indeed, the two subsidiary principles of
the exclusive delegation doctrine-the anti-inherency and transferability
principles-comprise two of the three propositions on which this alterna-
tive conception rests. The argument for checks and balances, therefore,
gives us one clear reason to accept exclusive delegation as the preferred
understanding of the constitutional allocation of legislative power.
5. Facilitating Judicial Review. - A final argument advanced in sup-
port of strict nondelegation is that it is necessary for full and effective
judicial review of administrative action. Courts review agency actions in
order to determine whether they are contrary to law. If Congress has set
forth a reasonably determinate standard to guide agency action, then
courts can review that action in order to ascertain if it conforms to this
205. I assume here that independent agencies are sufficiently subject to control by the
White House, whether through the appointments process, the budgetary process, Office of
Management and Budget review of proposed regulations, or informal jawboning, that they
can be regarded as part of the executive branch. See generally Geoffrey P. Miller,
Independent Agencies, 1986 Sup. Ct. Rev. 41.
206. Merrill, Constitutional Principle, supra note 204, at 255. To achieve genuine
checks and balances, it is important that power not be too diffuse or too concentrated.
This is the principal criticism I have of the proposal advanced by Liz Magill, who would rely
on diffusion of power among myriad institutions and subinstitutions to promote the
purposes of a system of checks and balances. M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and
Branches in Separation of Powers Law, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 603, 603-06 (2001). If power is
too diffuse, then the result may not be a tension or equilibrium among power centers, but
rather a balkanization that permits many little isolated tyrannies to coexist.
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standard. 2117 In contrast, if Congress has simply conferred power to act
with the force of law, but has provided no clear standard to guide the
agency, then the court will be at a loss to know whether the agency's
action is lawful or not. Judicial review will become weak and
meaningless. 20 8
This point has some force. The denser the backdrop of statutory
law, the more opportunities there will be for judicial review of agency
action based on alleged conflicts with the agency's statutory mandate. Yet
the point should not be overstated. Courts set aside agency action not
only when it is contrary to statute, but also when it is "arbitrary, capri-
cious, [or] an abuse of discretion. '" 2 1 9 Judges have shown great ingenuity
in building on this standard of review to ensure a fairly significant mea-
sure ofjudicial review. For example, agencies have been required to ad-
here to their own regulations, to explain deviations from past precedents,
to disclose to interested parties the factual assumptions underlying their
decisions, and to respond to material comments by parties who object to
the proposed course of action.2 10 The result has been vigorous judicial
review that serves as a check on agency action, without regard to whether
Congress has laid down any particular statutory standard to structure the
agency's action. So judicial review is and will continue to be available,
whether or not Congress is required to include an "intelligible principle"
in every delegation of power to act with the force of law.
Here, as elsewhere, the exclusive delegation option would take up an
intermediate position somewhere between strict and lax nondelegation.
In addition to the various reasoned decisionmaking requirements availa-
ble under lax nondelegation, the exclusive delegation understanding
would require courts to determine whether agencies have been delegated
power to act with force of law, and whether they are acting within the
207. Justice Rehnquist cited this as one of the purposes that would be served by strict
nondelegation in his concurring opinion in Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v.
American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607, 686 (1980). See also Redish, supra note 10, at
138-43 (discussing effect of nondelegation doctrine on judicial review).
208. I will not venture into a discussion of whetherjudicial review of agency action is a
good thing. Most observers, including the author, agree that judicial review is necessary to
assure that executive actors adhere to the rule of law. See Thomas W. Merrill, Marbury v.
Madison as the First Great Administrative Law Decision, 37 J. Marshall L. Rev. 481, 481
(2004). It is when courts go beyond upholding what the law clearly requires, and start
meddling with policy, that judicial review of executive action becomes controversial.
209. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000).
210. These are the elements that constitute the modern "hard look" paradigm of
reasoned decisionmaking. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 31 (1983) (requiring agency to give reasoned explanation for
rejecting alternatives to proposed action); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Wichita Bd.
of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 808 (1973) (requiring agency to explain departure from prior
norms); Conn. Light & Power Co. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 673 F.2d 525, 530-31
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (requiring that agency disclose technical basis for proposed rules in order
to afford meaningful basis for comment). See generally Alfred C. Aman, Jr. & William T.
Mayton, Administrative Law 519-29 (2d ed. 2001).
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scope of their delegated powers. Thus, the grounds for judicial invalida-
tion would be expanded relative to what they are under lax nondelega-
tion,2 1 1 Indeed, under the exclusive delegation conception, searching ju-
dicial review of these issues would be necessary in order to enforce Article
I, Section 1. Exclusive delegation would therefore establish a constitu-
tional backdrop for judicial review considerably more powerful than ex-
ists under lax delegation, although admittedly not as powerful as would
be required under a strict nondelegation doctrine.
In the end, it is difficult to award decisive points to any of the con-
ceptions of Article I, Section 1 in terms of their impact on judicial review.
Some judicial review is a good thing; too much judicial review is not, espe-
cially when it arrives in large, unpredictable doses. 212 What we most need
is not more judicial review, but better judicial review. The exclusive dele-
gation doctrine would focus judicial review on questions of boundary
maintenance that courts are thought to be well suited to perform, 2 13 and
might modestly reorient judicial review in a salutary direction.
6. Antidelegation Policies: Summing Up. - The clear verdict of this
overview of antidelegation arguments is that the consequentialist case for
strict nondelegation cannot be sustained. Each argument for strict
nondelegation is either opposed by an equally plausible counterargu-
ment (accountability), rests on unsubstantiated normative/empirical
claims (policy drift and the B&P filter), or is unnecessary and possibly
counterproductive to achieve the stated aim (checks and balances, facili-
tating judicial review). The closer question is what the survey tells us
about the choice between the other two options-lax nondelegation and
exclusive delegation. Here we find that in some dimensions there is a
modest case for preferring exclusive delegation to lax nondelegation
(B&P filter, facilitating judicial review). With respect to one argument-
promotion of checks and balances-exclusive delegation appears to
come out on top.
B. Prodelegation Policies
Let us now turn to some arguments advanced by the partisans of
broad delegation to see what light they shed on the choice among inter-
pretive options.
1. Expertise. - Perhaps the argument most commonly invoked in
support of broad delegation is the desirability of having policy formulated
by persons who have expertise in the subject matter. Administrative
agencies typically have large professional staffs, protected by civil service
laws, who have specialized training and extensive experience with particu-
211. The doctrinal implications of the exclusive delegation reading of Article I,
Section 1 are spelled out more fully in Part VI.
212. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Judicial Review of Agency Actions in a Period of
Diminishing Agency Resources, 49 Admin. L. Rev. 61, 84-85 (1997).
213. For defense of this conception of judicial review of agency action, see Henry P.
Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 6 (1983).
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lar regulatory issues. Congress has a much smaller staff, which tends to
be selected under pressure from interest groups and party members
rather than on the basis of expertise. 2 14 Thus, to the extent we want pol-
icy made by persons who know what they are doing, it is better that poli-
cymaking be centered in the administrative agencies rather than in
Congress. 215
On closer examination, the argument here is open to question to a
greater degree than the traditional literature assumes. One problem is
that the current allocation of expert staff between agencies and Congress
may be a contingent feature of American politics that could always be
changed. 2 16 Thus, if Congress were required to make fundamental policy
decisions about the safety of nuclear power plants or the money supply, it
could beef up the size and quality of the legislative staff-and could then
defer to the judgment of the staff (as presumably happens when heads of
agencies make these decisions). Another problem is that if we ignore the
staff and focus on the principals, it is not clear that agency heads have
greater experience on average than do Members of Congress. Certainly,
the average Member of Congress-and especially the average chair of a
legislative committee-has a longer tenure in office than do agency
heads, who tend to be short-term "in and out" political appointees. 2 17 So
the expertise gap between agencies and Congress at the level of princi-
pals (rather than staff) may be small or nonexistent.
Still, there is a measure of truth in the generalization that agencies
have greater expertise than Congress, certainly under current institu-
tional arrangements. This provides a strike against strict nondelegation.
Between lax nondelegation and exclusive delegation, there is less room
to choose. Exclusive delegation might in theory come out on top, since
under this approach Congress would not feel any obligation (even ajudi-
cially unenforced one) to supply an "intelligible principle" constraining
agency action. There are many examples of regulatory statutes in which
Congress has imposed an "intelligible principle" that turns out to be mis-
guided-such as the Delaney Clauses of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Acts, with their absolute prohibitions on carcinogens in food additives
and cosmetics, 2 18 and the Clean Air Act, with its injunction to ignore
214. See Steven S. Smith, The American Congress 125-28 (2d ed. 1999).
215. For a recent defense of delegation to administrative agencies that puts great
weight on the superior information of agencies, see Spence & Cross, supra note 166, at
124-28.
216. Schoenbrod, supra note 10, at 120.
217. Political appointees in the executive branch have an average tenure of about two
years. See James P. Pfiffner, Political Appointees and Career Executives: The Democracy-
Bureaucracy Nexus in the Third Century, in The American Constitution and the
Administrative State: Constitutionalism in the Late 20th Century 141, 149 (Richard J.
Stillman II ed., 1989).
218. See Richard A. Merrill, FDA's Implementation of the Delaney Clause:
Repudiation of Congressional Choice or Reasoned Adaptation to Scientific Progress?, 5
YaleJ. on Reg. 1, 1 (1988).
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costs in setting ambient air quality standards. 21 9 Regulatory policy might
be improved if Congress felt it could simply delegate authority to desig-
nated agencies to promote public health and safety with respect to food
additives or air quality.220 But in practice the difference between lax
nondelegation and exclusive delegation would probably not be great,
given that courts have shown no sign of enforcing the intelligible princi-
ple requirement of lax nondelegation. Thus, both lax nondelegation and
strict delegation should permit significant amounts of policy to be made
by relatively more expert agencies.
2. Scale. - Closely associated with expertise, but conceptually dis-
tinct, is the idea that broad delegation is necessary if government is to
realize the ambitious agenda it has set for itself. The focus here is not on
the technical complexity of issues, but the scale of government opera-
tions. Congress, an old-fashioned legislative body operating under cum-
bersome procedures (most prominently the B&P filter), can enact at
most a couple hundred statutes per year. Given the enormous demand
for government intervention, the modern regulatory state must crank out
thousands of new and revised laws each year. Broad delegation is neces-
sary, therefore, to leverage up the lawmaking function of government in
order to generate the volume of regulations necessary to carry out the
wide-ranging functions of modern government. Courts and commenta-
tors have often alluded to this idea in justifying a lax approach to
nondelegation challenges. 221 As the Court observed in Mistretta, "Con-
gress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under
broad general directives."22 2
Proponents of strict nondelegation complain that the Court has
failed to offer empirical evidence supporting the claim that broad delega-
tion is necessary for government to operate at its current scale.22 3 But
the argument from scale is surely correct, at least if we want the govern-
ment to perform with a reasonable degree of coherence most of the func-
tions it is currently committed to performing. One can see this by com-
paring the U.S. Code and the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) in any
given regulatory area. In terms of page numbers, the CFR dwarfs the U.S.
Code many times over, suggesting that more legislative rules are gener-
ated by the implementing agency than by Congress. Moreover, although
219. This is the intelligible principle upheld in Whitman v. American Trucking
Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
220. See Bruce A. Ackerman & William T. Hassler, Clean Coal/Dirty Air 54-58 (1981)
(using case study of Clean Air Act to suggest that broad delegations to agencies may
produce policy results superior to detailed legislated solutions, in part because of interest
group influence on Congress).
221. See, e.g., Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946) ("The judicial
approval accorded these 'broad' standards for administrative action is a reflection of the
necessities of modern legislation dealing with complex economic and social problems.");
Baker & Krawiec, supra note 178, at 707.
222. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989).
223. See Schoenbrod, supra note 10, at 174.
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longer, the CFR is typically much easier to follow. The U.S. Code,
patched together from layers of legislative enactments that are often
poorly integrated, frequently is incomprehensible to anyone not an ex-
pert in the area; the CFR, periodically revised by agencies under their
broad delegated authority with an eye to making the law more accessible
and improving voluntary compliance, is something that even nonlawyers
can often follow.
If Congress were not permitted to delegate broadly, we would likely
see some combination of a reduced volume of federal regulation and less
coherent federal regulation. Libertarians and public-choice influenced
scholars who believe most federal regulatory law is bad would not be un-
happy with this outcome. But the median American voter supports most
of the undertakings of the modern regulatory state, whether it be for en-
vironmental protection, transportation safety, or homeland security. 2 24
The argument from scale thus lands yet another blow against the propo-
nents of strict nondelegation.
The argument from scale, however, provides little basis to differenti-
ate between exclusive delegation and lax nondelegation. Exclusive dele-
gation would slow down the engine of delegation somewhat, by requiring
clear authority from Congress and by confining agencies within the scope
of their delegated authority. But it would place no constraint on Con-
gress in terms of how far Congress hands over authority to agencies to
determine the details of policy. Lax nondelegation, of course, imposes
no constraint at all. Neither conception should put much of a barrier in
the way of leveraging up the ability of government to generate new law.
3. Deliberation. - Also related to but distinct from expertise is the
desirability of assuring adequate deliberation before policies are adopted
as law. "Deliberation" is a rather indefinite concept. Here, I take deliber-
ation to mean both public input into the policymaking process, and give
and take among the experts and their principals who are responsible for
formulation of the policy. Partisans of strict nondelegation have some-
times argued that their position would promote greater deliberation, and
perhaps it would in the legislative arena.225 But unless we stack the deck
by defining deliberation to mean legislative deliberation, there is not
224. See, e.g., Riley Dunlap, Public Opinion and Environmental Policy, in
Environmental Politics and Policy 87, 87-93 (James Lester ed., 1995) (noting widespread
public support for environmental protection measures even at expense of economic
growth).
225. This proposition has been endorsed by the Supreme Court as a central
justification for the (unenforced) nondelegation doctrine. See Loving v. United States,
517 U.S. 748, 757-58 (1996) ("Article I's precise rules of representation, member
qualifications, bicameralism, and voting procedure make Congress the branch most
capable of responsive and deliberative lawmaking.").
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much doubt that promoting deliberation is a policy that more generally
favors broad delegation. 226
This can be seen by comparing the procedural rules that govern leg-
islative statutemaking and administrative rulemaking. Legislative sta-
tutemaking may be preceded by wide-ranging hearings and public debate
and may undergo significant internal revision in response to concerns
raised in the hearings, by staff, by constituents, and by other legislators.
But none of these features is required. Often hearings are contrived ex-
ercises put on for show rather than to gather information. And more and
more often, important statutes are rammed through as appropriation rid-
ers or in omnibus statutes without any significant deliberation at all. Ad-
ministrative rulemaking, at least in its modern guise, is subject to a much
more unyielding set of procedural requirements, including advance no-
tice to the public, disclosure of studies and data on which the agency
relies, extensive opportunity for public comment, and a requirement that
agencies respond to and explain their disagreement with material com-
ments submitted from any quarter.2 27 What gives these procedural rules
bite, and truly differentiates administrative rulemaking from legislative
statute-making, is judicial review. Agencies know that courts stand ready
to invalidate agency rules if the agency cuts corners in complying with the
norms of deliberation. So agencies tend to comply with these norms.2 28
Even if we concede that agency decisionmaking is more deliberative
than congressional decisionmaking, what implications does this have for
the constitutional allocation of legislative power? The superficial assump-
tion might be that the more we delegate, the more we deliberate. But
there may be a more subtle interaction at work here. My colleague Peter
Strauss, for one, believes that the nondelegation doctrine, even in its lax
version, reinforces the background understanding that an agency must
"be prepared tojustify its behavior to outside assessors in accordance with
principles of regularity and legality."229 In other words, the nondelega-
tion doctrine is an important element in the tradition of searching judi-
cial review of agency action, which, among other things, promotes greater
deliberation by agencies before they make policy. I think there is an im-
portant element of truth in this argument. Courts act with greater confi-
226. For a defense of this position, see Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican
Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1512, 1541-62 (1992); see also
Schuck, supra note 171, passim.
227. See Richard B. Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 323,
333-34 (1987).
228. Indeed, if anything, the complaint is increasingly that agency rulemaking suffers
from too much deliberation, which creates pressures to make policy in more informal
modes that avoid the procedural rules designed to ensure deliberation. See Thomas 0.
McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 Duke LJ. 1385,
1396-1436 (1992).
229. Peter L. Strauss, Legislative Theory and the Rule of Law: Some Comments on
Rubin, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 427, 443 (1989).
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dence and assertiveness when they think important constitutional princi-
ples lurk in the not-too-distant background. 2 30
But this insight does not get us very far in choosing among the vari-
ous conceptions of the constitutional allocation of legislative power. If
lax nondelegation serves an important function in supporting judicial re-
view, would strict nondelegation do better, or would this be overkill?
More intriguingly, would exclusive delegation provide an adequate substi-
tute for lax nondelegation in creating the appropriate sense that there
are important constitutional stakes at issue in judicial review of agency
action? My sense is that it would. Courts would be constitutionally re-
quired to identify clear evidence that legislative power has been dele-
gated, and that the agency is acting within the sphere of its delegated
authority. This would lend a sense of gravity to the process of review,
which would have spillover effects for the judicial attitude in reviewing
the legality of the agency's compliance with rulemaking procedures and
its fidelity to any statutory directions Congress has provided.
4. Judicial Administrability. - A final argument, which has tradition-
ally been the trump card of the proponents of broad delegation, is that
this is the only approach to the allocation of legislative power that courts
can administer in a consistent and predictable manner. The focus here
has been entirely negative, highlighting the shortcomings of the strict
nondelegation approach. 2 31 The notion that Congress must provide an
intelligible principle to guide agency action has been rightly derided as
unworkably vague. Commentators have struggled to come up with a bet-
ter rubric. Contenders include Schoenbrod's distinction between rules
statutes and goals statutes, Redish's call for statutes that incorporate a
"recognizable normative commitment," and Lawson's admittedly circular
requirement that Congress resolve matters sufficiently important to re-
quire resolution by Congress. 23 2 Yet each of these alternatives also suffers
from vagueness and indeterminacy, and it is doubtful that any of these
could be applied in a consistent and predictable fashion.
The basic problem is that the partisans of strict nondelegation have
been unwilling to say that all legislative rulemaking by executive branch
230. For example, courts will not defer to agency interpretations of statutes if they
think these interpretations raise serious constitutional questions. See, e.g., Solid Waste
Agencies v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172-73 (2001); Edward J.
DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 574-75
(1988).
231. For critiques of strict nondelegation that emphasize the lack of judicially
administrable criteria for determining how much delegation is too much delegation, see,
for example, Bell, supra note 160, at 192-98; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the
Judiciary in Implementing an Agency Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1239,
1255-60 (1989); Jim Rossi & Mark Seidenfeld, The False Promise of the "New"
Nondelegation Doctrine, 76 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1, 5-6 (2000); Stewart, supra note 227, at
324.
232. Redish, supra note 10, at 154-57; Schoenbrod, supra note 10, at 182-85; Lawson,
Delegation, supra note 10, at 361.
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agencies is unconstitutional. Although they are disturbed by the notion
that important or controversial policy judgments are being made by agen-
cies rather than Congress, they are unwilling to say that agencies should
forgo all legislative rulemaking and confine themselves to interpretive
rules, policy statements, and enforcement actions. The result is that strict
nondelegation partisans are forced to draw a line within a general phe-
nomenon-agency legislative rulemaking-past which there is too much
discretion, too much controversy, too much importance, etc., to allow the
agency to make the judgment alone. As Justice Scalia has observed, "the
debate over unconstitutional delegation becomes a debate not over a
point of principle but over a question of degree."2 33 Sometimes courts
will wade in where questions are a matter of degree. But where the basic
allocation of power in government is concerned, and, I might add, where
the arguments in support of wading in are so lacking in normative and
empirical support, this is unlikely to happen.
Instead of wading in, courts have retreated to the position of nonen-
forcement, that is, to lax nondelegation. There is no question that lax
nondelegation can be administered in a consistent and predictable man-
ner. Whatever Congress says, goes. The more interesting question is
whether similar problems of administrability would arise if instead courts
adopted the exclusive delegation conception of the allocation of legisla-
tive powers. No doubt exclusive delegation would present more
problems of administrability than lax nondelegation; any rule enforced
by courts presents more problems than a rule not enforced. Still, I think
there is reason to be more optimistic about the administrability of exclu-
sive delegation than of strict nondelegation.
The basic reason to be encouraged is that exclusive delegation
presents an either/or question rather than a question of degree. Either
Congress has delegated power to act with the force or law, or it has not
delegated such power. Either/or inquiries are generally more amenable
to the tools ofjudicial resolution than inquiries that ask whether an exer-
cise of power goes too far along one or more dimensions. In addition, as
Kathryn Watts and I have discussed at length elsewhere, there is an histor-
ical convention for signaling when legislative power is being transferred
to an agency.23 4 Throughout much of the modern era, Congress has sig-
naled its intent to transfer power to make rules with the force of law by
conferring power to make "rules or regulations" and coupling this grant
with a statutory provision imposing some sanction or other adverse legal
consequence on persons who fail to abide by the resulting rules. 235 This
convention could be used without difficulty in most cases as a canon of
interpretation for determining whether the required delegation has been
made.2 36 So I am cautiously optimistic that the administrative costs of
233. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
234. See Merrill & Watts, supra note 6, at 472.
235. Id. at 503-26.
236. Id. at 582-86.
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exclusive delegation, although inevitably higher than lax delegation,
would not reach the unworkable level that has vexed strict
nondelegation.
5. Prodelegation Policies: Summing Up. - The policies that have been
advanced in support of broad delegation provide significant support for
lax delegation relative to strict nondelegation. But, interestingly, it ap-
pears that these policies provide nearly as much support for a rule of
exclusive delegation. Exclusive delegation lags only slightly behind lax
nondelegation in terms of promoting expertise and permitting growth in
the scale of government, and exclusive delegation would likely do more
to encourage deliberation. Moreover, although exclusive delegation
would raise issues of administrability to a greater degree than would lax
nondelegation, there is reason to believe that the added costs would be
significantly less severe than those associated with strict nondelegation.
C. Final Verdict on Consequences
The main message of this excursion into consequences is that the
factors to weigh in the balance are highly complex, and we lack adequate
information to determine how much weight to give to any particular fac-
tor. Still, given that traditional legal materials provide no decisive basis
for choice, the choice must be made, as best we can make it, on conse-
quentialist grounds.
My own judgment is that exclusive delegation is preferable on conse-
quentialist grounds to either strict nondelegation or lax nondelegation. I
would summarize the arguments this way. The principal arguments in
support of strict nondelegation (accountability, policy drift, B&P filter,
checks and balances, facilitating judicial review) are either debatable, un-
proven, overkill, or unnecessary. Moreover, strict nondelegation would
reduce the quality and scale of government, and has proven to be
unadministrable by courts. Exclusive delegation, by contrast, furthers
some of the goals of accountability, provides a more measured applica-
tion of the B&P filter, should do at least as well in maintaining checks and
balances, advances some of the goals that strict nondelegation frustrates
(expertise, scale, and deliberation), and is more administrable. So in a
head-to-head consequentialist competition between strict nondelegation
and exclusive delegation, exclusive delegation clearly wins.
On the other side of the ledger, lax nondelegation serves important
goals, including promoting expertise, facilitating the growth of govern-
ment, and enhancing deliberation in policymaking. Moreover, as a non-
rule, it is easy to administer. But lax nondelegation probably results in
underuse of the B&P filter, and it does nothing to promote checks and
balances. Exclusive delegation does virtually as well as lax nondelegation
on the expertise, scale, and deliberation fronts, better in terms of the
B&P filter and checks and balances, and only somewhat worse in terms of
administrability. Recall, too, as shown in Part III, that exclusive delega-
tion comes out ahead of lax nondelegation on conventional legal
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grounds, providing an additional reason to prefer exclusive delegation to
the Court's current "anything goes" approach. So exclusive delegation
also prevails in a head-to-head competition against lax nondelegation.
This kind of qualified conclusion is obviously not enough to justify
some kind of legal revolution. But we are not talking about a legal
revolution. We are talking about the choice between constitutional pos-
tulates, one of which is currently unenforced (but many believe should be
strictly enforced), the other of which is irregularly asserted and often
overlooked. In these circumstances, if the consequential case for the sec-
ond postulate is significantly stronger than the first-whether enforced
or not-we should abandon the first and stake our faith on the second.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE
There is another, arguably more fundamental, reason to reconsider
the meaning of Article I, Section 1. This concerns what might be called
constitutional architecture. Without doubt the Framers regarded Con-
gress as the most important branch of the federal government. Congress
is the first governmental institution mentioned in the U.S. Constitution
and is the subject of the first and by far the longest article in that docu-
ment. Charles Black may have exaggerated when he claimed that "[w] ith
some changes in detail . . .a complete, ongoing government, with all
necessary organs, could have been formed, and could have functioned
down to now, if the Constitution had ended at the end of Article I.237
But he exaggerated only a little.
For most of our history, political reality conformed to this constitu-
tional design. Except in wartime, Congress was the dominant power.
238
Then, starting around the time of the New Deal, the relative power of
Congress and the Executive began to shift. Today, the executive branch
is ascendant and Congress much diminished. On virtually all matters of
legislative policy, the Executive leads, and Congress follows. 239 Some-
times Congress can frustrate or impede the Executive by refusing to enact
legislation sought by the President, rejecting presidential appointments,
or modifying presidential appropriations requests. But only rarely does
Congress take the initiative in setting national policy.
The reasons for the eclipse of Congress as the dominant policymak-
ing institution are complex. One important factor, already mentioned, is
the enormous growth in the scale and complexity of the federal govern-
237. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Presidency and Congress, 32 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 841,
842 (1975).
238. See, e.g., Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government: A Study in American
Politics 52 (Boston, Houghton Mifflin 1885) ("For all practical purposes ... Congress [is]
predominant over its so-called co6rdinate branches." (citation omitted)).
239. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. et al., Legislation: Statutes and the Creation of
Public Policy 26 (3d ed. 2001) ("The executive proposes or drafts much of the important
legislation considered by the legislature.").
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ment.2 40 This makes it impossible for individual Members of Congress to
remain conversant with more than a fraction of the important policy is-
sues on the agenda at any one time. Another factor is the persistence of
war in the modern era, including first the Cold War and now the war on
terrorism, which has further expanded the size of government and en-
hanced the power of the President relative to Congress. A third factor,
largely a product of imperfect campaign finance laws, is the imperative of
nonstop fundraising activity by Members of Congress. This tends to chan-
nel the time and effort of Members toward symbolic gestures, constituent
services, and fundraising appeals, and away from legislative activity. 241 A
fourth factor might be the growth of the national news media, which has
tended to magnify the power of the President and other national figures,
and to reduce in relative terms the stature and visibility of Members of
Congress, who owe their positions to statewide or even more local
elections. 242
Congress's relative decline in political importance has been mir-
rored by a decline in public regard. Both popular and scholarly com-
mentaries tend to depict Congress in extremely unflattering terms.24 3
Members of Congress, perhaps not unrealistically, are assumed to be
driven almost exclusively by a desire to secure reelection. 244 The Presi-
dent and the Justices of the Supreme Court, in contrast, are more typi-
cally portrayed as being motivated by sincere policy convictions. Not sur-
prisingly, given these depictions, opinion polls regularly show that the
public holds Congress as an institution in lower regard than either the
President or the Supreme Court.24 5
Judicial doctrine, as usual, tends to follow public opinion-especially
elite opinion.2 46 Thus, it should come as no surprise that the Supreme
240. See supra Part IV.B.2.
241. See Morris P. Fiorina, Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment
37-47 (2d ed. 1989).
242. See Theodore J. Lowi, The Personal President 138-40, 156 (1985).
243. See, e.g., John Hibbing & Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, Congress as Public Enemy
33-36 (1995).
244. See David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection 13 (1974). Since the
publication of Mayhew's study, this assumption has dominated political science literature
on Congress.
245. Each year the Harris Poll conducts a survey in which it asks Americans how much
confidence they have in different institutions. Congress nearly always lags behind the
President and the Supreme Court. Over the last twelve years the average percentage
responding that they have a "great deal of confidence" in each of these institutions has
been approximately 33% for the Supreme Court, 24% for the President, and 14% for
Congress. See Humphrey Taylor, The Harris Poll #4 (Jan. 22, 2003), at http://www.harris
interactive.com/harrispoll/index.asp?PID=351 (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(author's calculations based on yearly numbers for 1992-2003). Interestingly, the level of
confidence in "[t]he executive branch of the federal government," i.e., federal agencies
exercising delegated power, has averaged 17%, closer to the average score of Congress
than the score for the head of the executive branch. Id.
246. See William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a
Countermajoritarian Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court
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Court has been busy trimming the powers of Congress. 24 7 The scope of
congressional powers under the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment have been cut,24 8 while the scope of immunity
of state governments from congressional enactments has been ex-
panded.249 The overall rate of invalidations of congressional legislation
under various constitutional rubrics has risen to record levels. 250 And in
matters of statutory interpretation, the Supreme Court, and lower courts
by emulation, have shifted away from a faithful-agent model of interpreta-
tion, which seeks to enforce the intentions of Congress, toward a textual-
ist or plain-meaning model.2 5' Various justifications have been given for
this shift, the most prominent theme being that congressional lawmaking
is too incoherent and manipulative to produce anything that could be
characterized as an institutional intent.2 52 In other words, Congress is a
principal unworthy of the courts' service as faithful agents.
2 53
Decisions, 87 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 87, 96-97 (1993) ("For most of the period since 1956, a
reciprocal relationship appears to have existed between the ideology of the public mood
... and the broad ideological tenor of Supreme Court decisions.").
247. See Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 80,
80-87 (2001); Christopher H. Schroeder, Causes of the Recent Turn in Constitutional
Interpretation, 51 Duke L.J. 307, 336-38 (2001) (discussing common perception that
Congress does not have interests of constituents in mind). See generally Neal Devins,
Congress as Culprit: How Lawmakers Spurred on the Court's Anti-Congress Crusade, 51
Duke L.J. 435, 436 (2001) (arguing that Congress has encouraged judicial encroachment
"by signaling its indifference to the constitutional fate of its handiwork"); John Ferejohn,
Judicializing Politics, Politicizing Law, Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer 2002, at 41, 59-60
(arguing that political gridlock leads to judicial takeovers of legislative prerogatives).
248. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 507-08 (1997) (cutting back on
Section 5 power); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 549-50 (1995) (cutting back on
scope of commerce power).
249. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 706 (1999) (constitutionalizing state
sovereign immunity as inherent-design principle of the Constitution); Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 898-99 (1997) (invalidating federal statute that coerced state
administrative agents).
250. See Seth P. Waxman, Defending Congress, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 1073, 1074 (2001)
(providing data showing that rate of invalidation of federal statutes from 1995-2000 was
about seven times that of the first 200 years following Constitution's ratification).
251. See Merrill, Textualism, supra note 71, at 354. Academic proponents of
textualism have begun to hedge a bit as to whether considerations of purpose may enter
into statutory interpretation. See, e.g., John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116
Harv. L. Rev. 2387, 2408 (2003). See generally Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism? (2004)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing that textualist
judges do not in fact abjure the faithful agent perspective). But much of the rhetorical
assault on intentionalism and the use of legislative history continues to emphasize the
irrationality and manipulability of the legislative process.
252. See Scalia, supra note 20, at 16-18, 29-32 (arguing that concept of legislative
intent as "something that exists" is "contrary to all reality").
253. Law professors, for their part, have also contributed to the demise of Congress as
the principal policymaking voice of government. Commentators regularly explain how the
Constitution confers sweeping powers on the President, see, e.g., Vasan Kesavan & J.
Gregory Sidak, The Legislator-in-Chief, 44 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 1, 4 (2002) (arguing that
the President is not just in practice but also in constitutional theory the most significant
actor in the legislative process), and why it is important for the courts to extend their
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The decline of Congress, whatever the causes, has produced a quiet
crisis in constitutional law. The Constitution clearly presupposes that
Congress is the most important policymaking institution. The reality is
that Congress has become subordinate to the Executive and for many
purposes even to the courts. The result is a growing gap between the law
on the books and the law in action. Nowhere do we see this gap more
clearly than with respect to the allocation of legislative power. The offi-
cial line, as we have seen, is that Congress has a monopoly on the legisla-
tive power. The reality, as we have also seen, is that the Court has stood
aside while Congress has delegated legislative power at will.
Gaps between law on the books and law in action are not uncom-
mon. 254 Why should we be concerned about this one? One reason is
that it exacerbates cynicism about government. Congress is declared to
be the exclusive organ of legislation. But courts, perceiving the impracti-
cality of this proposition, refuse to enforce it. Since the courts will not
enforce it, legislators will not abide by it either, since they feel the de-
mands of practicality even more insistently than the courts. 255 The net
result is that our system of government is seen as resting on a kind of
massive constitutional violation. Agencies are depicted as exercising un-
constitutional powers. Courts are regarded as lacking the courage to en-
force the Constitution. Legislators are condemned for shirking the duty
they were elected to perform.
A second reason to be concerned about such a gap is that it is dan-
gerous. Gaps between law on the books and law in action can give rise to
sudden avulsions in legal understanding, as the tension between official
doctrine and everyday practice becomes too great to tolerate any longer.
At some point, official doctrine is apt to be wrenched aside and replaced
with some new conception more consonant with institutional reality.
Such avulsions are dangerous, especially when we are talking about basic
constitutional architecture. Here, the principal danger I foresee is that
the Court will suddenly disclaim the legislative monopoly construction of
Article I, Section 1 and adopt by default the legislative supremacy
influence into new areas of social policy. Although these arguments are not explicitly
designed to devalue the role of Congress, they inevitably have that effect.
254. See Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 Am. L. Rev. 12, 15
(1910).
255. Morris Fiorina has even posited that Congress delegates broadly in order to
stimulate demand for constituent services, which are a more reliable and less controversial
means of securing reelection. Specifically, Congress knows that agencies will make
mistakes in implementing broad delegated authority; this generates complaints by
constituents, allowing individual Members of Congress to intervene to correct the mistakes
and thereby gain credit with constituents and contributors. Fiorina, supra note 241, at
44-45. Schoenbrod offers a similar analysis. Schoenbrod, supra note 10, at 85-86; cf.
Epstein & O'Halloran, Delegating Powers, supra note 177, at 117-18 (presenting data
suggesting that the aggregate level of discretion given to executive agencies has remained
largely unchanged in the post-war era).
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model. 256 Such a shift in understanding of the allocation of lawmaking
power would massively transfer power to the executive and judicial
branches, giving them inherent power to make law on any subject within
the competence of the federal government. This would undermine a
number of advantages associated with congressional participation in poli-
cymaking discussed in Part IV-such as the B&P filter and checks and
balances. Moreover, such a shift would be tempting because the federal
courts would be the beneficiaries of such an avulsion in understanding as
much as the executive branch.25 7
A far better device for closing the gap between legal doctrine and
reality would be to adopt the exclusive delegation doctrine-the under-
standing that only Congress can delegate legislative power. Such an un-
derstanding of Article I, Section 1 would provide a secure constitutional
foundation for the administrative state in most of its manifestations. As
long as Congress has acted within the scope of its enumerated powers,
has clearly delegated legislative power to an agency, and the agency is
clearly acting within the scope of its delegated power, there would be no
constitutional defect in the resulting allocation of legislative power. Ac-
cordingly, there would be no reason to impugn the constitutionality of
federal administrative agencies, to question the fidelity of the courts to
the Constitution (on this score at least), or to suggest that legislators are
being unfaithful to their duties when they delegate broad powers to
agencies.
In addition, the exclusive delegation construction would preserve an
important measure of continuity with the original architecture of the
Constitution because it accords significant exclusive power to Congress in
the formulation of public policy. Under exclusive delegation, although
Congress would not be the sole mover in the exercise of legislative power,
it would at least be the first mover in establishing any governmental regime
that acts with the force of law. This would provide greater fidelity to the
original understanding of the power and importance of the three
branches of government than lax nondelegation-or the legislative
supremacy construction-would.
I do not suggest that the exclusive delegation understanding would
reverse the marasmus currently afflicting Congress. Congress's decline is
rooted in historical and structural forces far too entrenched to be re-
versed by changing a proposition of constitutional law. Indeed, the les-
256. For a discussion of different models for permissible sharing of legislative power,
see supra Part II.B.
257. Courts and commentators have from time to time asserted that federal courts
should have inherent authority to make federal common law in areas where Congress is
silent and there is perceived to be a strong interest in a federal rule. I argue against this
view in Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1, 20-24 (1985) [hereinafter Merrill, Common Law]. What I call the "legislative
supremacy sharing principle" would in effect recognize a general power on the part of
agencies and courts to make federal common law.
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son of Part IV is that we should not want to reverse Congress's relinquish-
ment of power, if that would mean restoring Congress to the role of
primary policymaker. Given the scale and complexity of the federal gov-
ernment-a condition that shows no sign of abating-Congress is not the
optimal institution to make federal policy on many and perhaps most
issues. We do not want Congress setting ambient air quality standards,
targets for monetary growth, or safety procedures for commercial air-
plane flights. Agencies, notwithstanding all their flaws, are far better at
doing these things. What we need is an understanding of constitutional
architecture that solidifies and encourages this allocation of authority,
not one that continually calls its legitimacy into question and breeds cyni-
cism about every branch of government.
The exclusive delegation understanding would cast Congress in a
role it is well suited to perform. The nondelegation doctrine-whether
in its current anything-goes version or in a more strictly enforced ver-
sion-demands that Congress directly engage in resolving contested is-
sues of policy. The nondelegation doctrine focuses on what policy should
be. Exclusive delegation, in contrast, demands that Congress determine
whether to transfer power to other government actors and if so over what
domain of policy. Exclusive delegation focuses on who is to decide what
policy is to be. Exclusive delegation would require Congress to deter-
mine whether to create a federal agency, what kinds of powers to give it,
and what sorts of controversies it should resolve. Congress, as a body of
generalists whose principal area of expertise is politics, should be able to
resolve such questions of institutional choice more effectively than deter-
mining the substance of specific policies.
In this respect, the exclusive delegation doctrine is also superior to
the most common proposal advanced by commentators for restoring bal-
ance to the constitutional architecture: reversing Chadha and allowing
Congress to exercise some kind of legislative veto over executive branch
legislative regulations. 258 Proposals to revive the legislative veto share the
same vice as proposals to revive the nondelegation doctrine: They de-
mand that Congress inject itself into the details of particular policy dis-
putes. It is far from clear that this cure would be better than the disease.
The legislative veto would enhance the power of particular units of Con-
gress (most likely the chairs of subcommittees), and it would do so prima-
rily with respect to controversies over narrow points of policy-those that
have crystallized at the end of the administrative rulemaking process. It
would not necessarily require or even encourage Congress to deliberate
258. See, e.g., DarylJ. Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, I11 Yale
LJ. 1311, 1367 (2002) ("[T]he legislative veto or congressional limitations on the
President's removal power . . . would shift some power back from the executive to
Congress."); Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent, and the Rise of the Administrative
State: Toward a Constitutional Theory of the Second Best, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 3 (1994)
(arguing that legislative veto acts as "a surrogate for the bicameral approval required to
enact legislation").
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about the larger and more general questions of institutional choice. In
any event, the Supreme Court is just as firmly opposed to the legislative
veto as it is firmly indifferent to the nondelegation doctrine, so this pro-
posal has no realistic prospect of being adopted.2 59
The architecture of the Constitution is not fixed for all time, but
evolves as institutions change and understandings of the document
change. Continuity with the past is important, as is congruence among
institutions and understandings. Article I, Section 1 is an important cor-
nerstone of constitutional architecture. It will be a stronger corner-
stone-providing better congruence with institutions and more con-
tinuity with our history-if interpreted as incorporating the exclusive
delegation doctrine rather than the nondelegation doctrine.
VI. IMPLICATIONS
In this Part, I will briefly consider some concrete doctrinal implica-
tions that flow from embracing what I have called the exclusive delega-
tion understanding of Article I, Section 1.
A. Repudiating the Nondelegation Doctrine
The first and most evident implication is that the nondelegation doc-
trine, as a general requirement that Congress must circumscribe the dis-
cretion of administrative agencies, should be rejected. Certainly the
Court should repudiate the idea that Article I, Section 1 precludes any
congressional sharing of legislative power. As long as the nondelegation
understanding persists, it clouds the ability of courts to perceive the po-
tential of the exclusive delegation doctrine. I would go further and
would urge the Court to jettison both the requirement that Congress lay
down an intelligible principle to constrain executive discretion and the
canon favoring narrow constructions of statutes to avoid nondelegation
questions.260 If there were evidence that these understandings play a val-
uable role in law, then there might be some point in salvaging them,
259. The Court has twice reaffirmed the ruling of INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
See Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 501 U.S.
252, 255 (1991); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726-27 (1986); see also Clinton v. City of
New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448-49 (1998) (invalidating Line Item Veto Act authorizing
President unilaterally to modify statutory provisions as being inconsistent with Article I,
Section 7).
260. It is important not to overstate the matter by saying the Constitution is
indifferent to the delegation of powers. Given that the transferability principle of the
exclusive delegation doctrine rests on the Necessary and Proper Clause, see supra text
accompanying notes 123-128, and given that only Congress can invoke the Necessary and
Proper Clause, it would seem that neither the President nor the Article III courts enjoy any
power of delegation, unless it is given to them by Congress. See also infra Part VI.D
(discussing subdelegation). Similarly, it is doubtful that the Senate, acting on its own
authority, could delegate the power to confirm appointments, ratify treaties, or try
impeachments. And the Chadha doctrine, which I believe is necessary to preserve healthy
checks and balances, see supra Part IV.A.4, although it is not limited to delegations,
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perhaps under the Due Process Clause or some metaconstitutional rule-
of-law norm. 2 6 1 But they are not worth preserving. Neither doctrine im-
poses any real constraint on Congress, the agencies, or the courts. And
each may do real damage by suggesting that the courts are serious about
preserving an important role for Congress under the Constitution, when
in fact the position of Congress is steadily eroding.
Brief mention should be made of two possible fallback positions that
would preserve narrowed versions of the nondelegation doctrine. The
first, which has been suggested by Todd Rakoff, would permit grants of
legislative power to agencies in delimited fields of regulation, but would
deem unconstitutional any delegation of "omnicompetent" legislative
power that replicates the wide-ranging authority that Congress itself en-
joys. 2 6 2 Inferential support for this fallback position is provided by the
1935 invalidations of the National Industrial Recovery Act.263 The Act
authorized the imposition of codes of "fair competition" on virtually all
segments of the American economy, and thus could be said to constitute
an omnicompetent delegation in a way that the numerous regulatory stat-
utes the Court has upheld against nondelegation challenges do not.
More recently, the Court threw off a dictum in American Trucking to the
effect that "the degree of agency discretion that is acceptable varies ac-
cording to the scope of the power congressionally conferred." 2 64 This
too might be cited in support of a rule against extremely broad delega-
tions of discretionary power.
I am not persuaded, however, that a rule prohibiting very broad dele-
gations of legislative power is worth preserving. Some "omnicompetent"
delegations may be desirable. In a moment we will encounter important
delegations permitting the President to reorganize agencies and subdele-
gate agency functions. 265 These delegations, which could be described as
omnicompetent, have become an integral feature of our system of gov-
ernment and have probably played a salutary role in improving the effi-
ciency of the far-flung federal establishment. Another example might be
a future delegation permitting the President to decline to enforce spend-
prohibits Congress from delegating legislative power to a subunit of Congress or a
congressional agent.
261. In his concurring opinion in American Trucking, Justice Stevens indicated that he
would continue to support the intelligible principle requirement. See Whitman v. Am.
Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 489-90 (2001) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) ("As long as the delegation provides a sufficiently intelligible
principle, there is nothing inherently unconstitutional about it."). However, having
rejected the understanding that Article I, Section 1 prohibits delegation of legislative
power, Justice Stevens did not indicate what provision of the Constitution requires that
Congress lay down an intelligible principle for the agency to follow.
262. See Todd D. Rakoff, The Shape of Law in the American Administrative State, 11
Tel Aviv U. Stud. L. 9, 22 (1992).
263. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Pan. Ref.
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
264. American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 475.
265. See infra Part VI.D.
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ing or tax preference measures he deems inappropriate-a line item veto
by delegation. 266  In addition, a distinction between delimited and
omnicompetent delegations would seem to raise problems of adminis-
trability similar to those that have doomed the more general nondelega-
tion doctrine (how broad is too broad?). Finally, the price of preserving
the hypothetical possibility of future invalidations of omnicompetent
delegations would appear to be continued adherence to the Court's cur-
rent understandings of the meaning of legislative power and of the per-
missible sharing of legislative power-understandings that have been im-
pediments to adopting the exclusive delegation interpretation of Article
I, Section 1, which is better all around.
A second possible fallback position would be that even if delegations
running to federal agencies and courts are permissible, delegations run-
ning to private entities and perhaps to state officials are not.267 Here
again, the invalidations of the National Industrial Recovery Act provide
some inferential support, insofar as the regulations authorized by the Act
were initially drafted by private trade associations before being promul-
gated by the President.268 Many commentators have perceived that this
"private delegation" aspect of the Act may have been especially troubling
to the Court.2 69 This limiting principle might also explain some recent
decisions invalidating agency schemes that would transfer federal regula-
266. In Clinton v. City of New York, the majority opinion, written by Justice Stevens,
invalidated the Line Item Veto Act as violating the constitutional procedures for the
enactment of legislation under Article 1, Section 7. 524 U.S. 417, 447-49 (1998). But the
majority did not suggest the Act would violate the nondelegation doctrine if it had merely
delegated authority to the President to decline to enforce specific expenditure and tax
preference items. Id. Three Justices would have upheld the Act as a valid delegation even
though it appeared to authorize the President unilaterally to amend the text of a statute.
Id. at 468-69 (Scalia, J., joined by O'Connor, J., and in relevant part by Breyer, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Had the Line Item Veto Act authorized the
President to 'decline to spend' any item of spending contained in the Balanced Budget Act
of 1997, there is not the slightest doubt that authorization would have been
constitutional."); id. at 473-80 (Breyer, J., joined by O'Connor, J., and in relevant part by
Scalia, J., dissenting).
267. See generally Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 Colum. L. Rev.
1367, 1437-45 (2003) (discussing private delegation doctrine). Delegations to state
entities may be permissible in circumstances in which delegations to private entities would
not be. For example, it is well established that state courts may be given authority to
enforce federal law. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1947). I do not explore this
refinement any further here.
268. See cases cited supra note 263; see also Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238,
311 (1936) (invalidating private delegation to set wage and hour limits on due process
grounds).
269. See, e.g., 1 Lawrence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 5-19, at 991-92
(3d ed. 2000);James 0. Freedman, Delegation of Power and Institutional Competence, 43
U. Chi. L. Rev. 307, 332-33 (1976).
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tory power to largely unsupervised local governments and citizens'
organizations.2 7
0
Delegations of federal legislative power to private actors or state gov-
ernment officials are troubling. But I cannot see how Article I, Section 1
can be interpreted to distinguish between different recipients of dele-
gated legislative power. The language of Article I, Section 1 permits dif-
ferent interpretations of legislative power, and different interpretations
of how far Congress can share that power. But it does not contain lan-
guage that would permit courts to limit the recipient of delegated legisla-
tive power to federal officials.
A more plausible source of constraint on delegations to nonfederal
actors is the Constitution's implicit design principle limiting the federal
government to three branches. If all federal government activity is con-
fined to three branches, then Congress cannot delegate governmental
authority (i.e., the authority to act with the force of law) to a fourth
branch.2 7 I A delegation of legislative power to a private entity or state
official would violate this design principle. Alternatively, if such a delega-
tion were deemed to be an attempt to expand the scope of either the
federal executive orjudicial branch, it would likely violate other constitu-
tional provisions, such as the Appointments Clause, 2 72 Article III's guar-
antee ofjudicial independence, 273 or the Due Process Clause.27 4
Any principle forbidding delegation to actors outside the Executive
or judicial branches would presumably extend only to powers that are
"governmental," in the sense of having the force of law. Roughly speak-
ing, this means legislative regulations and binding adjudications. 275
Other action that lacks this quality could presumably be assigned to pri-
vate actors. For example, a statute directing the Department ofJustice to
turn its cafeteria over to an outside contractor would not seem to consti-
tute an attempt to create a fourth branch of government. Thus, this de-
270. See, e.g., Nat'l Park & Conservation Ass'n v. Stanton, 54 F. Supp. 2d 7, 20-21
(D.D.C. 1999) (invalidating governing council established by the National Park Service for
regulating a wild and scenic river in Nebraska).
271. See Merrill, Constitutional Principle, supra note 204, at 228.
272. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (providing for presidential appointment of principal
officers and restricting basis for appointment of inferior officers).
273. Id. art. III, § 1 (requiring thatjudges exercising the 'Judicial Power of the United
States" shall hold their offices during good behavior and may not have their compensation
diminished while in office).
274. Id. amend. V. Due process would be violated, for example, if the private
delegatee did not afford the same notice and hearing opportunities to affected parties that
would be required if ordinary executive branch employees exercised the power.
275. Gillian Metzger proposes a somewhat broader formulation: Transfers of
authority to private entities constitute delegations when the private entity exists in an
agency relationship to a governmental agency, which in turn exercises governmental
power. See Metzger, supra note 267, at 1462-70. For a review of delegations to states and
private parties that are arguably governmental, see Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the
Unitary Executive: Congressional Delegations of Administrative Authority Outside the
Federal Government, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. 62, 80-93 (1990).
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sign principle would not interfere with a good deal of what goes by the
name of "privatization" in government, in the sense of contracting out
support functions and information-gathering functions to nongovern-
mental entities. 2 7 6
B. The Limits of Agency Authority
Under the exclusive delegation interpretation of Article I, Section 1,
agencies generally should be denied authority to act with the force of law
unless Congress has delegated such power to them. This entails two sub-
sidiary inquiries: (1) Has Congress delegated legislative power to the
agency? and (2) What is the scope of this delegation? The first is a ques-
tion of agency power; the second is a question of agency jurisdiction.
Both questions must be answered affirmatively before agencies can act in
a governmental capacity, that is, with the force of law.
The two questions about delegated legislative power-Does it exist?
What is its scope?-are sometime elided. In particular, courts and com-
mentators sometimes forget that agencies can be given authority to study,
investigate, or issue advisory opinions in an area, without being given
power to issue regulations and/or adjudicatory decisions that have the
force of law. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, for ex-
ample, with respect to its authority under the Civil Rights Acts of 1964,
can issue interpretations of the Act and right-to-sue letters, but it has no
authority to render binding adjudications or legislative rules.2 7 7 This is
an example of an agency that has jurisdiction over a set of issues (employ-
ment discrimination), but does not have delegated power to act with the
force of law.
Courts and commentators are less likely to ignore the question of
agency jurisdiction or scope of authority. 278 But even here there have
been some spectacular breaches of principle, such as the Supreme
Court's decisions authorizing the Federal Communications Commission
to regulate cable television based on the theory that such regulation was
"reasonably ancillary" to its statutory authority over broadcast televi-
276. I recognize that this paragraph glosses over a great deal of complexity in the
world of privatization. For a sense of the manifold nature of privatization, see generally
Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1285
(2003); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543
(2000).
277. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (2000) (authorizing EEOC to seek to resolve
complaints by conciliation and to file civil charges against nongovernmental parties, but
providing for reference to the Attorney General for potential suit against governmental
parties, and issuance of private "right to sue" letters if the EEOC or the Attorney General
decline to file charges); id. § 2000e-5(b), (f) (authorizing EEOC to seek to resolve
complaints by conciliation, but providing for reference to the Attorney General for
potential suit or issuance of private "right to sue" letter if conciliation fails).
278. See, e.g., Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 650 (1990) ("[I]t is
fundamental 'that an agency may not bootstrap itself into an area in which it has no
jurisdiction."' (citation omitted)).
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sion.279 The FCC had been delegated authority to issue legislative rules
that regulate broadcasters. 280 But when the FCC first asserted authority
over cable operators, Congress had not given the agency any delegated
power to regulate cable television.28 ' This is an example of an agency
having power to act legislatively but using those powers outside the area
of its delegated jurisdiction.
The difficult issue here is not identifying the relevant questions but
specifying how clearly Congress must answer them. If we were writing on
a blank slate, the best answer might be that Congress should answer these
questions expressly, that is, Congress should in so many statutory words
convey power to act with the force of law and demarcate the sphere in
which this power may be exercised. 282 Such a rule would maximally pre-
serve the power and authority of Congress under Article I, Section 1, as
interpreted in accordance with the exclusive delegation doctrine. And it
would provide unequivocal notice to agencies, courts, states, and interest
groups that legislative power has been transferred. Unfortunately, such a
standard of proof would have the effect of invalidating virtually all ex-
isting delegations of legislative power, and hence would be radically
destabilizing.283
A better standard, given existing institutional realities, is probably
one that would require a showing of a clear intent on the part of Con-
gress. 28 4 This standard would not require that Congress use any particu-
lar words or phrases in the delegatory statute. It would permit an infer-
ence of delegation to be drawn based on the logic and structure of the
legislation together with the deployment of certain canons or conven-
tions. Legislative history materials could also be consulted, if the inter-
preter otherwise decides it is appropriate to consult such materials. As
with any clear intent standard, the interpreter would have to be firmly
279. See United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 657-58 (1972); United
States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968).
280. See 47 U.S.C. § 303(f), (i), (j) (2000). See generally Merrill & Watts, supra note
6, at 517-19 (discussing FCC rulemaking grants).
281. Congress subsequently amended the Communications Act to provide expressly
for FCC regulation of cable systems. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 521).
282. For examples of express statement standards, see Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S.
452, 460-61 (1991) (requiring "plain statement" from Congress before statute will be
interpreted as interfering with traditional state prerogatives in setting conditions of
employment for state officials); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 246
(1985) (requiring that any abrogation of state sovereign immunity be effected through
statutory language that targets the issue in specific language). See generally William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as
Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 593, 597 (1992) (discussing recent
development of" 'super-strong clear statement rules' protecting constitutional structures").
283. See Merrill and Watts, supra note 6, at 582 ("Effectively, an express-statement
rule would be the undoing of the administrative state.").
284. For an example of a clear intent standard of this nature, see Pennhurst State Sch.
& Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 24 (1981) (stating that conditions attached to federal
grants affecting state programs will be enforced only if clearly set forth).
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convinced by these materials that Congress did in fact decide to delegate
the required authority. More than a preponderance of the evidence
would be necessary; how much more is impossible to delineate with any
kind of mathematical precision.
Adoption of the clear intent standard would have real bite in certain
contexts. It would mean, most prominently, that courts would have to
repudiate decisions adopting a casual attitude toward whether agencies
can engage in legislative rulemaking. The assumption has arisen in re-
cent decades that any agency that has been given authority to make "rules
and regulations" has been delegated power to issue rules with the force of
law, as opposed to merely procedural or interpretive rules.2 85 But if agen-
cies have no inherent lawmaking authority and must derive any authority
to engage in legislative rulemaking from an affirmative grant from Con-
gress, then something more than an ambiguous grant of rulemaking
power should be required before agencies are allowed to exercise legisla-
tive power. At a minimum, courts should demand some kind of signal-
such as a legislative specification of sanctions for those who violate agency
rules-indicating a clear intent on the part of Congress that the required
delegation has been made. 2 8 6
C. How Chevron Fits In
The exclusive delegation conception of Article I, Section 1 also dove-
tails nicely with the Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence on the alloca-
tion of interpretational authority between courts and agencies. As first
enunciated in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. 287 and elaborated in United States v. Mead Corp.,28 8 that jurisprudence
is based on congressional delegation of legislative power to agencies. If
Congress has delegated power to an agency to act with the force of law,
and the agency interprets an ambiguity in the statute while exercising
that delegated authority, then the agency interpretation must be ac-
cepted by the court if it is a reasonable one.28 9 If Congress has not given
the agency power to act with the force of law, or if the agency' is not
exercising that power when it interprets the statute, then the agency in-
terpretation will be adopted by the court only if the court finds it persua-
sive based on multiple contextual factors.290 It is difficult to overstate the
285. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
286. For further discussion, see Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and
Standards, Meta-Rules and Meta-Standards, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 807, 823-25 (2002); Merrill
& Watts, supra note 6, at 576-87.
287. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
288. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
289. Id. at 226-27, 237-38.
290. Id. at 234-35. This is the so-called Skidmore deference standard, named for
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (stating that courts should weigh agency
interpretations against a variety of factors and should defer to such interpretations if they
are persuasive). Judge Posner has suggested that post-Mead decisions portend a merger of
Chevron and Skidmore. Krzalic v. Republic Title Co., 314 F.3d 875, 879 (7th Cir. 2002).
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importance of this jurisprudence to modern administrative law. The
Chevron doctrine, as clarified by Mead, is the template through which fed-
eral courts approach virtually all questions of statutory interpretation
when reviewing agency action. The doctrine has been applied in
thousands of cases 291 and serves as the metric by which the relative power
of courts and agencies is sorted out at the retail level in the modern ad-
ministrative state.
The first thing to note about the Chevron doctrine, as clarified by
Mead, is that it presupposes that Congress does have authority to delegate
the power to act with the force of law to agencies. The strict nondelega-
tion doctrine, as espoused by Schoenbrod, Lawson, and others, denies
this. Hence, strict enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine would
seem to cut the legs out from under Chevron. Indeed, the premise of
Chevron is that the more discretion Congress gives the agency, the more
deference courts should give to agency interpretations of law.2 92 The
premise of the nondelegation doctrine, in contrast, is that the more dis-
cretion Congress gives the agency, the closer Congress comes to acting
unconstitutionally, and hence the more important it becomes that the
courts either supply a narrowing construction of the statute or remand the
matter to Congress. 293 Thus, Chevron and the nondelegation doctrine, if
not inconsistent, are at the very least pointed in opposite directions when
it comes to determining the judicial response to discretionary agency
power. 294
Contra id. at 882 (Easterbrook, J., concurring) ("I do not perceive in Walton any 'merger'
between Chevron and Skidmore .... ") (citation omitted). But this is premature. The
"eliding" decisions are all written by Justice Breyer, who has long disfavored Chevron and
probably does not speak for the full Court on this matter. See Henry Paul Monaghan,
Supreme Court Review of State-Court Determinations of State Law in Constitutional Cases,
103 Colum. L. Rev. 1919, 1988 n.338 (2003).
291. Chevron is the most cited decision in all administrative law. See Stephen G.
Breyer et al., Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy 289 (5th ed. 2002).
292. Under Chevron, courts exercise independent judgment when enforcing a statute
only if its meaning is unambiguous. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. If there is a gap or
ambiguity, the court is to defer to the agency interpretation, if it is reasonable.
Consequently, the more discretionary (less clear) the statute, the more power flows to the
agency. Id. at 842-44. In a famous passage in Chevron, Justice Stevens said that Congress's
reasons for delegating authority to an agency are irrelevant in determining whether the
agency or the judiciary is to exercise primary interpretational authority; it may even be that
"Congress was unable to forge a coalition on either side of the question, and those on each
side decided to take their chances with the scheme devised by the agency." Id. at 865. This
concept, of course, is anathema to the proponents of a strict nondelegation doctrine, who
rail against allowing Congress to shirk its legislative responsibilities.
293. See, e.g., Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646
(1980) (narrowing construction); id. at 687-88 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment)
(remanding to Congress).
294. For an early recognition of this point, see Douglas W. Kmiec, Judicial Deference
to Executive Agencies and the Decline of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 2 Admin. LJ. 269,
269-70 (1988).
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The exclusive delegation conception, in contrast, supplies a secure
foundation for the Chevron doctrine and reinforces the basic soundness
of its allocation of interpretational authority. Under the exclusive delega-
tion doctrine, Congress is free to transfer legislative powers to another
branch of the federal government. When Congress transfers such power
to an administrative agency, and the agency exercises this power, this is
appropriately viewed as a signal by Congress that it wants agencies, rather
than the courts, to fill gaps and ambiguities in the statute.295 Alterna-
tively, when Congress delegates power to courts in broad language, this
should be seen as a signal that Congress wants the court to do the gap-
filling and ambiguity-resolving, not the agency.296 When Congress de-
clines to delegate legislative power to either an agency or the courts, but
establishes a regime that calls for enforcement by the Executive and adju-
dication by the courts-criminal law is a prime example-then the appro-
priate inference should be that Congress wants the courts to interpret
gaps and ambiguities as faithful agents of Congress; that is, Congress an-
ticipates that the statute will be read the way that the enacting legislature
would most likely want it to be read.
Although exclusive delegation synchronizes nicely with the jurispru-
dence of Chevron, there are certain Chevron issues that would be clarified
by adopting this interpretation of Article I, Section 1. One important
question concerns whether courts should give agencies Chevron deference
with respect to interpretations that affect the scope of the agency's juris-
diction. The explicit debate among the Justices about this issue was short
lived and inconclusive. 29 7 Some decisions have clearly applied Chevron to
questions that affect the scope of an agency's regulatory power.298
Others, perhaps most prominently FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp.,29 9 have declined to defer to interpretations that would significantly
change the scope of agency power, although they have not framed their
inquiry in terms of expansion (or contraction) of agency jurisdiction.
The logic of the exclusive delegation doctrine suggests that courts
should not give Chevron deference to agencies with respect to questions
that implicate the scope of the agency's jurisdiction. If agencies have no
295. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 Geo. L.J.
833, 877 (2001).
296. See Merrill, Common Law, supra note 257, at 40-46 (discussing decisions
supporting inference that "'Congress has given the courts the power to develop substantive
law"') (quoting Tex. Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981)).
297. See Miss. Power & Light v. Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 381-82 (1988)
(Scalia, J., concurring) ("[I]t is plain that giving deference to an administrative
interpretation of [an agency's] statutory jurisdiction or authority or both is necessary and
appropriate."); id. at 386-87 (Brennan,J., dissenting) ("[T]his Court has never deferred to
an agency's interpretation of a statute designed to confine the scope of its jurisdiction.").
298. See, e.g., United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 134
(1985) (giving Chevron deference to agency definition of "navigable waters," which in turn
defined the scope of its authority under the Clean Water Act).
299. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
21732004]
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
inherent authority to act with the force of law, but are dependent on a
delegation from Congress for such authority, then it is important that
courts enforce the limits of the delegation. 30 0
The main counterargument has been that it is difficult, if not impos-
sible, to differentiate between 'Jurisdictional" agency decisions and "ordi-
nary" agency decisions. As Justice Scalia, the principal opponent of any
jurisdictional exception, has put it, "there is no discernible line between
an agency's exceeding its authority and an agency's exceeding authorized
application of its authority."30 1 This may be right, if we conceive of the
task as trying to develop some abstract definition that distinguishes be-
tween 'jurisdictional" and "nonjurisdictional" questions. But there is no
need to proceed this way. It is far more sensible to think of the question
in historical terms: What has the agency done in the past, and what is it
proposing to do now? Those who are familiar with an agency's regulatory
history will usually have no difficulty identifying issues that fall within the
scope of what the agency has done in the past.30 2 This is the logical
benchmark against which 'jurisdiction-altering" proposals can be identi-
fied. When they are identified, courts should not necessarily invalidate
the agency's proposed change in the scope of its regulatory authority.
The question remains whether the agency's departure from past regula-
tory practice is or is not consistent with the scope of authority delegated
to it by Congress; the court may ultimately conclude that the agency is
respecting the boundaries established by Congress. But the court should
not give Chevron deference to the agency's own view of whether its
change of course is consistent with its delegated authority.
That courts should not give Chevron deference to jurisdiction-alter-
ing decisions does not mean they should give no heed to agency views
about the appropriate scope of agency authority. This would appear to
be an area where Skidmore deference rather than Chevron deference is
appropriate. 30 3 That is, courts should consider the thoroughness of the
300. Most of the academic commentary that has addressed the question concurs that
Chevron should not apply to questions that implicate the scope of agency jurisdiction. See,
e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, Legislating Chevron, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 2637, 2673-74 (2003); Ernest
Gellhorn & Paul Verkuil, Controlling Chevron-Based Delegations, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 989,
992-93 (1999); Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: Separating Interpretation and
Lawmaking Under Chevron, 6 Admin. LJ. Am. U. 187, 216-21 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein,
Law and Administration after Chevron, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 2071, 2099 (1990).
301. Miss. Power & Light, 487 U.S. at 381 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
302. Indeed, in the very case in which Justice Scalia complained that it was impossible
to distinguish between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional issues, he discussed at length
the question of whether FERC had jurisdiction to review the prudence of certain wholesale
power pooling arrangements. Id. at 377-83. He clearly understood that to be within an
agency's "jurisdiction" means to be within the scope of its authority, and he clearly
recognized that there was a live debate about whether this type of prudence question was
within or not within the scope of FERC's authority. See id. at 377-78. Once the question
was resolved in favor of FERC's authority, he further recognized that it was a distinct
question as to whether FERC had exercised that authority properly. Id. at 383.
303. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 295, at 909-14.
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agency's reasoning, the consistency of the agency's present view with its
past practice, and other variables in determining whether to follow the
agency's lead. This standard allows the court to tap into the agency's
experience and expertise, while at the same time providing an indepen-
dent check necessary to vindicate congressional supremacy in establish-
ing the sphere in which the agency is permitted to exercise delegated
legislative power.
D. Subdelegation
30 4
There was once an active jurisprudence that addressed the question
whether the President or the heads of departments have the power to
subdelegate tasks that have been assigned to them by Congress.30 5 The
answer was never very clear, with some decisions suggesting that the Presi-
dent and department heads have inherent authority to delegate decisions
to subordinate officers, and others suggesting that subdelegation is per-
missible only when authorized by Congress.30 6 The issue has come to the
fore again. A recent D.C. Circuit decision holds that the Federal Commu-
nications Commission has no authority to subdelegate federal regulatory
authority to state administrative bodies.30 7 And scholars have raised the
possibility of limiting Chevron deference to exercises of primary authority,
as opposed to subdelegated authority.30 8 These developments raise the
304. This subpart draws on an excellent paper by Aimee MacKay undertaken as part
of a senior research project at Northwestern University School of Law in 2001-2002.
305. For an overview of older authorities, see generally Nathan D. Grundstein,
Subdelegation of Administrative Authority, 13 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 144 (1944). Professor
Davis argued that agencies enjoy an inherent power of subdelegation, as long as the
subordinate entity's or employee's discretion is governed by appropriate standards.
Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 3.17, at 219 (2d ed. 1978). Although
early editions of his casebook contained a chapter on subdelegation, see, e.g., Kenneth
Culp Davis, Administrative Law: Cases-Text-Problems 201-07 (1965), he later reduced
coverage of the issue, announcing that "good lawyers are no longer making arguments in
federal courts that power may not be subdelegated." Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative
Law: Cases-Text-Problems 51 (6th ed. 1977).
306. For decisions suggesting inherent authority, see, for example, Miller v. Mayor of
New York, 109 U.S. 385, 394 (1883) (holding that Secretary of War could assign authority
to subordinate officer to determine how high Brooklyn Bridge should be to avoid
obstructing navigation in East River); Williams v. United States, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 290, 297
(1843) (stating that it would be "impossible" for the President personally to attend to the
performance of every duty assigned him by statute). For decisions suggesting that
subdelegation must be authorized by Congress, see, for example, Botany Worsted Mills v.
United States, 278 U.S. 282, 288 (1929) (holding that authority of Commissioner of
Internal Revenue Service to settle tax claims before suit could not be subdelegated absent
clearer statutory authority to do so); Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S. 543, 557 (1887)
(invalidating court martial during peace time authorized by the Secretary of War but not
the President on the ground that the statute required presidential approval).
307. United States Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 568 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
308. See David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001
Sup. Ct. Rev. 201, 235-36.
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question of whether or to what extent subdelegation is consistent with the
exclusive delegation construction of Article I, Section 1.
The exclusive delegation doctrine suggests that the President and
executive branch agencies can subdelegate only if and to the extent Con-
gress has authorized subdelegation. The exclusive delegation under-
standing tells us the Executive has no inherent authority to exercise legis-
lative power. It would seem to follow that if Congress has transferred
specific legislative authority to the President, or to a named department
head or agency, the recipient of the delegated power has no inherent
authority to retransfer the power to someone else. Responsibility for the
exercise of the delegated power must rest where Congress has placed it,
otherwise Congress has been deprived of its exclusive authority to dele-
gate these powers. On the other hand, we know that Congress can trans-
fer the power to exercise legislative power. So it would seem reasonable
to conclude that Congress can also transfer the power to subdelegate del-
egated power.
If this is right, then subdelegation controversies present essentially
the same two issues presented in a primary delegation controversy: Does
power to subdelegate exist? And what is the scope of the power to subdel-
egate? Once again, courts should be able to say that Congress clearly
intended an affirmative answer to both questions before permitting sub-
delegation of legislative power.
Would these understandings create insuperable difficulties for the
administrative state? Perhaps they would have caused some problems in
the early decades of the twentieth century, but almost certainly not today.
In a series of general enactments traceable to the recommendations of
the Hoover Commission of 1949, 309 Congress has delegated broad au-
thority to the President and executive branch departments to subdele-
gate. Since 1951 the President has been authorized to subdelegate virtu-
ally any function he is required by law to perform to "the head of any
department or agency in the executive branch, or any official thereof
who is required to be appointed by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate. 3 10 The President also has general authority, by executive
reorganization order, to authorize any officer of any agency "to delegate
any of his functions. '3 1t This general authority of the President to au-
thorize subdelegations is supplemented by numerous specific provisions
authorizing particular departments or agencies to subdelegate their au-
309. Comm'n on Org. of the Exec. Branch of the Gov't, The Hoover Commission
Report on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government 433-39 (1949).
310. 3 U.S.C. § 301 (2000).
311. 5 U.S.C. § 903(a) (5) (2000). This statute dates to the Reorganization Act of
1951, which was codified and made permanent in 1966. As enacted, the reorganization
plans that were to be submitted to Congress could be vetoed by a majority resolution of
either House. Such one-house vetoes were declared unconstitutional in INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919, 928 (1983). The current version simply requires that the plan be submitted
to Congress at least sixty legislative days before it takes effect, 5 U.S.C. § 903(c), apparently
with the expectation that if there is a strong objection it will be withdrawn by the President.
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thority. For example, the Attorney General is authorized to subdelegate
as "he considers appropriate" any of his statutory functions to "any other
officer, employee, or agency of the Department of Justice. t3 1 2 And the
Federal Communications Act authorizes the Commission, when "neces-
sary to the proper functioning of the Commission and the prompt and
orderly conduct of its business," to subdelegate "any of its functions" to "a
panel of commissioners, an individual commissioner, an employee board,
or an individual employee," subject to a variety of exceptions.3 13
The jurisprudence on authorizations of subdelegation, to the extent
it exists, is broadly consistent with the exclusive delegation doctrine. It
says that clear grants of authority to subdelegate should be enforced ac-
cording to their terms, unless a more specific statute indicates a contrary
intent to preclude subdelegation. 314 As always, there will be questions
about how clear is clear. The Court arguably demanded too much clarity
in Cudahy Packing Co. v. Holland, when it held that a statute authorizing
the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of
Labor to subdelegate investigatory functions did not authorize subdelega-
tion of the power to issue subpoenas.3 15 It probably went too far in the
opposite direction five years later in Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking and Lum-
ber Co., when it upheld the Administrator's power to subdelegate sub-
poena power under another statute based on statements contained only
in the legislative history.3 16 Understanding the logic of exclusive delega-
tion should bring more clarity and coherence to the resolution of these
sorts of questions about subdelegation.
E. Inherent Presidential Powers
Finally, the exclusive delegation interpretation of Article I, Section 1
has implications for the perennial debate over inherent Presidential pow-
ers. In recent years, two doctrinal battles have been fought over this sub-
ject. The large battle has been between the "formalist" approach associ-
312. 28 U.S.C. § 510 (2000) (originally part of a reorganization plan, codified in
1966).
313. 47 U.S.C. § 155(c) (1) (2000) (originally enacted in 1952).
314. See Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 169 (1991) (upholding subdelegation
of Attorney General's authority to designate designer drugs to Drug Enforcement Agency
based on the general authority of 21 U.S.C. § 871 (a) (2000)); United States v. Giordano,
416 U.S. 505, 508 (1974) (invalidating subdelegation to executive assistant of Attorney
General's authority to seek wiretap order, based on specific statutory language requiring
that such a request be made by the Attorney General or a specially designated Assistant
Attorney General).
315. 315 U.S. 357, 367 (1942).
316. 331 U.S. 111, 120-23 (1947). I am not suggesting that the outcome in Fleming
was wrong. The statutory language was probably sufficient to support subdelegation of the
subpoena power, but the Court, in seeking a way to uphold the subdelegation without
overruling Cudahy, reached for an explanation that focused solely on the legislative history
of the later Act. Its rationale therefore seemed to countenance subdelegation based solely
on legislative history, which in my view falls short of showing Congress as a whole has
clearly conferred the required power.
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ated with Justice Black's opinion in the Steel Seizure decision, 3 17 and the
"functionalist" approach allied with Justice Jackson's concurrence in that
case.318 Roughly speaking, the formalist position has been that any exer-
cise of presidential power must be traceable to some source in enacted
law-a statute, a treaty, or a provision of the Constitution. The function-
alist position has been that this rule is too constraining, and that other
factors, including longstanding practice, congressional acquiescence, and
the exigencies of the day should also enter into determining the precise
scope of presidential powers.3 1 9 Within this large battle a narrower battle
has also raged over the meaning of the Vesting Clause of Article II. Here,
one school has asserted that the Vesting Clause is itself an affirmative
grant of presidential power, above and beyond the individually listed
powers of Article 11.320 An opposing school has insisted that the Vesting
Clause is just descriptive of the functions of the President, and that the
constitutional power of the President is limited to the specifically enu-
merated grants of power in Article 11.321
I cannot begin to resolve these questions here. Instead, I will simply
note three ways in which the exclusive delegation reading of Article I,
Section 1 sheds additional light on the debate over inherent presidential
powers. None of these illuminations significantly disturbs the existing
consensus about the scope of inherent presidential powers, as explicated
by Professor Monaghan. 322 But they may permit a more confident claim
that the current consensus is consistent with the Constitution.
First, the anti-inherency principle of Article I, Section 1 precludes
any claim of inherent presidential power to exercise legislative power
over matters that fall within the scope of the enumerated powers granted
to Congress in Article I. Thus, for example, the President has no inher-
ent power to prescribe legislative rules for levying taxes, to borrow
money, or to establish rules for the regulation of interstate commerce,
immigration, or bankruptcy.3 2 3 In this sense, Justice Black was right.
This conclusion, of course, does not eliminate the possibility of claims of
presidential power based solely on powers granted by Article II of the
Constitution, including claims grounded in specific grants of power in
Article II or even claims predicated on the understanding that the Vest-
ing Clause of Article II is itself a grant of power. But it does impose a
317. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 585
(1952) (Black, J.).
318. Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
319. For an overview, see generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Controlling Inherent
Presidential Power: Providing a Framework for Judicial Review, 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 863
(1983).
320. Calabresi, supra note 117, at 1389-1400; Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B.
Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 Yale LJ. 541, 570-78, 604-15
(1994).
321. Flaherty, supra note 137, at 1788-92.
322. See Monaghan, Protective, supra note 83, at 38-74.
323. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8.
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substantial limitation on the outer reach of any claim of inherent presi-
dential power.
Second, the exclusive delegation understanding of Article I, Section
1 eliminates any doubt about the propriety of Congress enacting laws that
broadly transfer discretionary power to the President. Many controver-
sies about inherent presidential power can be successfully resolved by
identifying statutory delegations that confer adequate authority to sup-
port the challenged executive action.3 2 4 The exclusive delegation under-
standing establishes that there is nothing constitutionally suspect about
this, and indeed, makes this the preferred mode of resolving such contro-
versies, since the challenged federal action has the support of two
branches of government. In this sense, Justice Jackson was right.
Third, the proposed interpretation of "herein" in Article I, Section 1
suggests that action that can be characterized as "legislative" may be
within the constitutional power of the President, even if not authorized
by Congress, as long as it is grounded in a sound interpretation of one of
the powers granted to the President by Article II. The classic example
would be rules for the discipline of the armed forces. Article I, Section 8
authorizes Congress "[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regula-
tion of the land and naval Forces. '325 If Congress exercises this power,
then the President is bound to enforce any rules Congress has laid
down-this is the basic postulate of legislative supremacy on which all
agree. But if Congress fails to exercise such power or fails to exercise it
with respect to one or more issues of military conduct that arise, then it is
possible that the President may invoke his power as "Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States" 32 6 to issue interim or
supplementary rules, provided they are consistent with any code of con-
duct Congress has promulgated. 32 7 These Article II-based powers thus
provide the President with greater authority to act in a legislative capacity
than most formalist readings of the Constitution have acknowledged.
Whether these qualifications of inherent presidential powers would
eliminate or solve many disputes is debatable. But at the very least, they
would change the terms of the debate. Consider, as a possible illustra-
tion, the issue presented in In re Neagle.3 28 Neagle was a U.S. Marshall
assigned by the Attorney General to protect Justice Stephen Field while
he was performing circuit duties in California. In the course of those
duties, Neagle killed a man he reasonably believed to be threatening the
324. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2639-41 (2004) (construing
congressional authorization for use of military force as conferring authority on President
to detain "enemy combatants" apprehended on field of battle); Dames & Moore v. Regan,
453 U.S. 654, 669-74 (1981) (construing multiple congressional enactments as conferring
authority on President to abrogate private liens on Iranian assets).
325. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
326. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
327. See, e.g., Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 767 (1996); United States v.
Eliason, 41 U.S. (1 Pet.) 291, 301 (1842).
328. 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
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life of the Justice. Neagle was imprisoned by state authorities, and the
question was whether his assignment to protect Justice Field was a "law of
the United States," making Neagle eligible for release through a federal
writ of habeas corpus. 3 2 9
The majority held that Neagle was entitled to the writ. Much of its
analysis seemed to suggest that the federal executive branch has inherent
power to act to protect a threatened Justice.3 3 0 The dissenters would
have denied the writ, because they could discover no federal statute au-
thorizing Neagle's assignment to protect Field. They argued that under
Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution, only Congress has the power to
enact "laws." Since Congress had not legislated, there was no "law of the
United States" to shield Neagle from state prosecution.3 3 1
It is worth considering how the issue might be resolved in light of the
exclusive delegation construction of Article I, Section 1. This construc-
tion suggests, on the one hand, that it is untenable to argue the President
has inherent authority, without regard to enacted law, to prescribe rules
for the protection of federal judges performing circuit duty. Such a rule
would seem to fall within the Article I power of Congress to "constitute
Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court,"3 3 2 as augmented by the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause. On the other hand, given that Congress had
failed to enact such a statute, arguably the President has constitutional
authority, based on his Article II duty to "take Care that the Laws be faith-
fully executed,"3 3 3 to issue appropriate orders for the protection of fed-
eral judges threatened with violence. Moreover, such orders would ar-
guably have the force of law. If these propositions could be established,
then, contrary to the dissenters, Article I, Section 1 would not impose any
barrier to considering these orders to be part of the "laws of the United
States," and hence would not necessarily bar Neagle from obtaining
habeas relief.
Viewing the controversy through the prism of the exclusive delega-
tion doctrine would not provide all the answers to the puzzle about
whether Neagle was being held in violation of the "laws of the United
States." But it would possibly present more sharply focused questions,
329. Id. at 40.
330. See, e.g., id. at 59 ("It would be a great reproach to the system of government of
the United States.. . if there is ... no means of protecting the judges ... from the malice
and hatred of those upon whom their judgments may operate unfavorably."). The
majority at one point appeared to rely on a federal statute. See id. at 68 (citing a federal
statute giving U.S. Marshalls the same authority in enforcing the law as sheriffs of the state
in which they are located, and arguing that a sheriff in California would be empowered to
commit a justifiable homicide in thwarting an attempted deadly assault). But this statute
did not answer the objection as to the authority to assign Neagle to guard Justice Field in
the first place.
331. Id. at 88-94 (Lamar, J., dissenting).
332. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
333. Id. art. II, § 3.
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which might be resolved by more principled answers. This outcome
would represent at least a small measure of progress.
CONCLUSION
The orthodox understanding of Article I, Section 1 has been that it
prohibits delegation of the legislative power. This understanding, how-
ever, is in tension with the institutional reality that agencies routinely en-
gage in legislative rulemaking. Courts have been able to reconcile the
orthodox understanding with institutional reality only by adopting a pe-
culiar definition of "legislative power" as the exercise of unconstrained
discretion. But the line between constrained and unconstrained discre-
tion is difficult to discern. This difficulty, together with persistentjudicial
fears about disrupting established institutional practice, has led to judi-
cial refusal to enforce the orthodox understanding of Article I, Section 1.
The result, paradoxically, has been an interpretation that purports to give
great constitutional significance to Congress, but actually serves to
weaken its position within a system of separation of powers.
Another understanding, also associated with Article I, Section 1, is
that agencies and courts have no inherent lawmaking authority and must
derive any power to act with the force of law by a clear delegation from
Congress. This understanding is much more congruent with institutional
practices. Yet, perhaps because it is in serious tension with the orthodox
understanding that the legislative power can never be delegated, it is less
often invoked and often ignored by modern courts.
I have argued that it is time to rethink Article I, Section 1, and that
the second tradition-exclusive delegation-provides a better founda-
tion for understanding the role of Congress under the Constitution. The
Constitution is about the allocation of power. Congress, as the first
branch of government, is the primary source of governmental authority.
At least with respect to the powers enumerated in Article I, only Congress
can open the gates of power, and only Congress can direct where the
power will flow. It does not follow, however, that Congress must make all
federal policy, even on matters that are important, controversial, or entail
significant discretion. It is vital to read the Constitution in a way that
preserves the understanding that Congress is the source of most govern-
mental power, while accommodating a system of government capable of
dealing with problems of a magnitude and complexity far beyond any-
thing imaginable when the document was ratified. The exclusive delega-
tion doctrine promises to accomplish this, even as the nondelegation doc-
trine has failed.
2004] 2181
